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Introduction 
 
 
Diplomatic history provides several examples of weaker allies that take 
themselves out of military agreements with major powers in charge of 
guarantying for their security. Unfortunately, alliance theorists have barely 
been focusing on this empirical puzzle, assuming widely that weaker sides 
in asymmetric relationships take on a passive attitude. Still, we can find 
many cases of unsatisfied minor allies that prefer to terminate military 
agreements instead of continuing to benefit from the stronger side's 
protection. To solve this puzzle, I argue that the effectiveness of a minor 
ally’s voice affects its preference for the persistence or termination of an 
asymmetric alliance. Minor allies can develop specific needs and define 
their interests in terms of preserving or increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis 
the stronger partner. On the other hand, great powers can fail in the 
management of the inter-allied conflict adopting a coercive posture that 
denies a sufficient degree of autonomy to the weaker side. 
Therefore, the following thesis aim to fill a gap in the alliance literature. 
Indeed, why the weaker side in asymmetric alliances renounces to the 
stronger ally's protection is an overlooked issue among IR scholars. 
Although numerous debates developed concerning the origins, costs, 
benefits, and security dilemmas of military alliances, few contributions 
touched the topic of alliances’ persistence and termination until the end of 
the Cold War. The debate in the 1990s, moreover, focused quite narrowly 
on the United States’ bipolar alliances. Realist theorists claimed that 
changes in the conditions supporting the US alliances since the time of their 
formation could favor the security agreements’ dissolution. More 
specifically, neorealist authors judged the disappearance of the original 
enemy as the main reason for NATO’s lack of cohesion and likely 
dissolution.1 Differently, neoliberal institutionalist scholars argued that 
conditions predicting the alliances’ formation were not necessarily 
                                                           
1
 Waltz K., “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, International Security, Vol. 
18, No. 2, 1993, pp. 44-79 
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significant predictors for alliance persistence. These authors, for example, 
found that the development of assets specificity increased the likelihood of 
NATO’s persistence even though its external environment was significantly 
transformed.2 In light of this debate, statistically oriented scholars 
emphasized how shifts in the allies’ international power could affect the 
alliances' evolution. James Morrow engaged in large statistical studies 
finding that changes in the aggregate allies’ capabilities affected 
significantly the alliances’ dissolution.3 Other scholars specified this 
hypothesis finding that either side’s change in capabilities could lead to 
alliance termination.4 
     However, these studies still leave a gap in alliance theory having trouble 
explaining the variation we find in diplomatic history concerning allies’ 
behavior. On the one hand, they fail to emphasize which specific causal 
mechanisms characterize asymmetric and symmetric alliances concerning 
the agreements persistence or termination. Moreover, relatively little 
attention then has been given to the critical issue of which member state in 
asymmetric alliances – major or minor ally – is terminating the alliance. 
Rather the weaker sides in asymmetric relationships are judged as merely 
passive actors. 
Therefore, at the current state of the art, it is unfortunately under-researched 
why the weaker side in an asymmetric alliance opts for the persistence or 
termination of its security agreement. Nonetheless, the 20th century 
diplomatic history provides several examples of weaker partners that 
unilaterally abrogate military agreements with major powers in charge of 
                                                           
2
 McCalla R., “NATO's Persistence after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 
50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445-475; Wallander C., “Institutional Assets and 
Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4 
(Autumn, 2000), pp. 705-735 
3
 Morrow J., “Alliances and Asymmetry: An alternative to the Capability Aggregation 
Model of Alliances”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, November 
1991, pp. 903-933; see also Bennet S., “Testing alternative models of alliance duration, 
1816-1984”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 846-
878 
4
 Leeds & Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”, Journal 
of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 4; November 2007, pp. 1118-1132 
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guarantying for their security. In 1951, Egypt famously terminated the 
alliance with Britain aiming to increase its independence and autonomy. 
Differently, other British minor allies tried to preserve their asymmetric 
alliance in virtue of the benefits they received. In 1955, Iraq was successful 
in renewing its agreement with London improving its regional status. On the 
other hand, the US alliances with Australia and New Zealand evolved in a 
significant different way in the mid-1980s. New Zealand preferred to leave 
ANZUS while Australia strengthened the tie with the major partner. 
Therefore, what did lead some minor allies to abrogate unilaterally their 
security agreements with the major partner while others preferred to 
strengthen it? How can we explain a minor ally’ stance toward an alliance 
persistence or termination?  
     The following thesis argues that a weaker ally's quest for autonomy and 
the effectiveness of its voice opportunities can critically affect the alliance 
evolution. The argument relies on the following logic. Once the minor 
partner in an asymmetric alliance suffers from some alliance-deficits, it can 
start negotiating a greater leeway from the stronger ally to satisfy its needs. 
It might ask a change in patterns of transactions and a renegotiation of 
agreements to obtain a better distribution of benefits. Here, the 
(mis)management of interallied relations can affect significantly the weaker 
side’s preference for the persistence or termination of an alliance. For 
instance, a stronger side always maximizing its advantage of relative power 
can favor the resistance and the sense of alienation of the weaker partner. 
The weaker side’s voice ineffectiveness, in these cases, can lead likely to 
the alliance termination. Differently, if the stronger side accommodates the 
partner needs, it can enjoy an increased legitimacy by favoring the weaker 
actor’s sense of inclusion. Although the stronger side might pay some costs 
investing its power resources in the short term, it is more likely to prolong 
the existing matrix of power in the long run. The weaker side's voice 
effectiveness then can likely lead to the alliance persistence. 
These arguments are defined through a model of asymmetric alliance 
persistence and termination, while four empirical cases tests its strength. 
The thesis indeed consists of two parts. Theoretic speculation characterizes 
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Part I (Chapter I and II), while Part II develops the empirical analyses 
(Chapter III, IV, V and VI).  
The first chapter provides a brief literature review on military alliances' 
persistence and termination. It analyses the realist, institutionalist and 
empirical contributions on the topic. Then, the second chapter develops an 
innovative view entering the debate. It theorizes the impact of an omitted 
variable, which is the effectiveness of a minor ally’s voice, defining a model 
of asymmetric alliance persistence and termination. Afterward the empirical 
chapters analyze four cases of asymmetric alliances. The third chapter 
describes the UK-Egypt alliance (1936-1951) as a case of alliance 
termination. The fourth chapter illustrates the UK-Iraq alliance (1932-1955) 
as a case of alliance termination. The fifth chapter analyses the New 
Zealand detachment from ANZUS in the mid-1980s as a case of alliance 
termination. The sixth empirical chapter, finally, discusses the US-Australia 
relation from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s as a case of successful 
alliance persistence. 
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Part I – The Theoretical Framework 
 
The next two chapters constitute the research theoretic part. The first 
chapter provides a brief literature review concerning the debate on military 
alliances' persistence and termination. It analyses the realist, institutionalist 
and empirical contributions on the topic. The aim is to describe the field's 
state of the art in order to identify some gaps in the alliance theories. I found 
two puzzles. On the theoretic level, current studies lead to indeterminate 
hypotheses concerning the persistence or termination of military alliances. It 
implies a gap in alliance theory. On the empirical level, alliance theories do 
not account for cases of minor allies that are actively engaged in terminating 
their security agreement with a great power. It means ignoring cases of 
diplomatic history on the base of a wrong assumption (namely, the weaker 
ally's passive role). 
To solve these puzzles, the second chapter defines a model of asymmetric 
alliance persistence and termination introducing an omitted variable, which 
integrates a preexisting theoretical framework. I argue that the effectiveness 
of a minor ally’s voice affects the weaker side's preference for alliance 
persistence or termination. Minor allies can develop specific needs and 
define their interests in terms of preserving or increasing their autonomy 
vis-à-vis the stronger partner. Once the major ally adopts a coercive posture 
denying a sufficient degree of autonomy to the weaker side, the alliance 
termination is more likely to occur. Differently, if the stronger side 
accommodates the partner’s needs, the minor ally has incentives to keep the 
alliance. Therefore, I theorize the effectiveness of a minor ally’s voice as a 
crucial factor to account for several overlooked cases of asymmetric alliance 
termination and to understand the persistence of successful military 
agreements.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Persistence and Termination of Military Alliances 
 
 
The next paragraphs provide a brief literature review describing the state of 
the art of the debate and outlining some gaps in alliance theory. The critical 
questions of interests are the following: how can we explain the states' 
decision to terminate a military alliance? What are the causes that lead states 
to break security agreements once welcomed? Why some alliances survive 
to inter-allied crisis while others end up unilaterally abrogated?  
To answer these questions, here we consider three research perspectives as 
realism, institutionalism and empirical studies. The last paragraph, finally, 
defines three main causal mechanisms concerning why and how alliances 
might persist or terminate. 
 
 
1. Alliances, threats and balancing behavior: the realist perspective 
 
When realist authors investigate the rationale of military alliances, two key 
features emerge as states' ontological insecurity coming from an anarchic 
environment and third parties' aggressive behavior. In this view, the 
majority of scholars provide a symmetric explanation for alliances 
formation and termination by emphasizing threats as the glue for the 
persistence of security agreements.5 Ancient and modern thinkers widely 
consider the value of joining forces against a third party. In his history of the 
Peloponnesian war, Thucydides describes the implications of the Peace of 
Nicias, identifying the Spartan threat as the essential reason for the birth of 
                                                           
5
 See classic books as Morgenthau H.J., Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, New York, Knopf, 1948; Liska G., Nations in alliance. The limits of 
interdependence, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962; Waltz K., Theory 
of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979 
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the League of Argos.6 Niccolò Machiavelli points out that the presence of 
"enemies so powerful and dangerous” keeps the allies “chained together”7. 
Jean Bodin argues that minor states oppose the power of the strongest 
jointly as much as possible in order to preserve their security.8  
Contemporary realist authors too consider alliances as an expression of 
states' cooperative behavior against common enemies.9 In this view, the 
«capability aggregation» model relies on the idea of states deterring 
aggressive parties by keeping an international balance that escapes 
hegemony. The strict military cooperation among the allies comes in virtue 
of the convergence of the allies’ interests on common foreign policy goals. 
According to George Liska, “the decision to align [...] is made with 
reference to national interests" and “depends on the existence of identical 
interests”.10 Hans J. Morgenthau points out that an alliance requires, for its 
foundation, "a community of interests.”11 Glenn Snyder argues that military 
alliances “are cooperative endeavors, in that their members concert their 
resources in the pursuit of some common goal”.12 Even Randall Schweller, 
although focusing on the phenomenon of bandwagoning, does not ignore 
“the compatibility of political ends” between partners.13 These authors argue 
that allies aim pursuing conflict with an outside party. By considering the 
inter-allied cooperation as a reaction to a threatening rising state, alliances 
find their place within the «balance of power» theory.14 The father of 
neorealism Kenneth Waltz calls it external balancing. In his view, states ally 
                                                           
6
 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Penguin Books, 2000 
7
 Machiavelli N., Lettera al Vettori, ten August 1513. 
8
 Cit in Bazzoli M., Introduzione, in Bazzoli M., L’equilibrio di potenza nell’età moderna. 
Dal Cinquecento al Congresso di Vienna, Unicopli, 2006 
9
 Walt S., The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, 1987 
10 Liska G., Nations in alliance. The limits of interdependence, Baltimore, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962, pp. 26-27 
11
 Morghentau H.J., "Alliances in Theory and Practice", in A. Wolfers (a cura di), Alliance 
Policy in the Cold War, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959, pp. 184-212 
12
 Snyder G., Alliance Politics, Cornell University Press, p. 1 
13 Schweller R.L., “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, 
International Security, XIX, 1, pp. 72-107 
14
 The «balance of threat» theory is a variation of this argument. See Walt S., The Origins 
of Alliances, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987.  
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to balance others power. Stephen Walt provides a variation of this argument 
by declaring that states do not merely balance a concentration of power, but 
rather they oppose to perceptions of threats. The author specifies the sources 
of threat perceptions by considering four factors: aggregate power, 
geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. The 
interweaving of these factors determinates the propensity of states to enter 
into alliances.  
As advocates of the balance of power theory, the majority of realist scholars 
agree that states form military alliances to pursue an «external» target, 
which is to oppose a common enemy. Shared threats attenuate potential 
incompatibilities among partners by favoring their military cooperation. In 
this view, once the enemy is defeated or the threat disappears, there is no 
need to keep the agreement. The alliance and the allies’ cooperation, in 
other words, persist until the common threat endures. As Osgood Hardy 
argues, the “withdrawal of external threat may cause alliance to break up”.15 
According to Andrew Scott, "the disappearance of external threat will 
produce alliance disintegration”.16 Also Arnold Wolfers argues that “any 
diminution of the external threat or of the will to meet it will tend to 
undermine cohesion and render futile any attempts to save the alliance.”17 
     Other realist authors focus on domestic threats as a source of 
international alignment.18 Steven David develops the theory of 
ominibalancing to account for Third World states’ alignment and 
                                                           
15
 Cited in Holsti O., Hopmann T., Sullivan J., Unity and Disintegration in International 
Alliance: Comparative Studies, John Wiley & Sons; 1st edition March 1973, p. 257 
16
 Ibidem, p. 257 
17
 Wolfers A., Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics, Baltimore, 
John Hopkins University Press, 1962, p. 29 
18
 Barnett M. and Levy J., “Domestic sources of alliances and alignment: the case of Egypt, 
1962-73”, International Organization 45, 3, Summer 1991; Miller E. and Toritsyn A., 
“Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States”, Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April-June 2005) pp. 
325-363; Fumagalli M., “Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and 
Implications of Uzbekistan’s Rapprochement with Russia”, International Political Science 
Review (2007), Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 253-271 
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realignment.19 The scholar keeps the key assumptions of balance-of-power 
theory introducing a domestic explanation that relies on states’ internal 
weakness and political leaders’ lack of legitimacy. In his view, the key 
source of international alignments is the rational calculation of Third World 
statesmen who look for external powers that can guarantee to keep them in 
power. Similarly, Michael Barnett and Jack Levy argue that alliances can 
bring a rapid infusion of funds and other resources benefiting states' internal 
economy. By emphasizing an alliance as a source of economic resources 
and military equipment, their contribution mainly fits for Third World states 
facing resource constraints and threats to domestic political stability. 
Security agreements can be useful therefore for internal and external 
security purposes. Eric Miller and Arkady Toritsyn, finally, specify David's 
argument adopting a leader-centric approach. The scholars estimate the 
states' internal threats by considering serious physical threats to the leader, 
such as assassination attempts, coups, secessionist movements, galvanizing 
opposition leaders and parties that may challenge the political leadership. 
For our purposes, both realist scholars focusing on external and internal 
threats share a standard view about alliances persistence and termination 
emphasizing states’ need for security. For David, the determinants of Third 
World states' alignment and realignment are the need to balance against the 
main threats they face. Consequently, the author argues, "if Third World 
leaders enhance their capabilities to deal with threats on their own (…) the 
result will be a diminished role for the superpowers in the Third World.”20 
Decreasing security needs, therefore, lead to alliances dissolution. On the 
other hand, "so long as conflict persists in the Third World, leaders will seek 
out the superpowers for assistance.”21 
     In sum, realist theories argue that an alliance persists as long as it is a 
useful tool against a threat. These authors, therefore, claim that changes in 
the condition supporting an alliance since the time of its formation lead to 
the security agreements’ dissolution. As the security agreement’s purpose 
                                                           
19
 David S., “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan. 
1991), pp. 233-256  
20
 Ibidem p. 202 
21
 Ibidem p. 203 
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erodes when the enemy is defeated or disappears, a critical predicting of 
alliances termination is the changes in states’ threat perceptions. 
However, the limits of these realist models arose at the end of the Cold War. 
While neorealist authors claimed that the disappearance of the original 
enemy would have led soon to NATO's dissolution, the US alliances 
became the cornerstone of the post-Cold War international system.22 As the 
United States’ alliances persisted despite the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union, a low external threat environment did not lead to the alliances' 
termination. These circumstances paved the way for the development of an 
institutionalist paradigm. 
 
 
2.  Alliances, path-dependence and risk management: the 
institutionalist view 
 
Liberal scholars enter the debate on alliances’ persistence introducing new 
insights from the institutionalist theory. They develop alternative arguments 
to explain NATO endurance despite a low external threat environment and 
the loss of the original enemy. Two key features emerge to explain 
alliances’ persistence: processes of path-dependence and states’ attitude to 
risk management. Robert Mc Calla paves the way in this research 
perspective.23 The scholar argues that highly institutionalized alliances 
placed at the center of an international regime (as NATO within the liberal-
democratic one) respond more slowly to changes in threats than others that 
have not developed attendant norms, procedures, and functions. Once a 
regime exists, “there are internal and external incentives to perpetuate it 
rather than start anew when problems arise." Therefore, the members of the 
key regime’s organization adopt three general behaviors: resistance to 
change, affirmation of organizational necessity, and adaptation to change.  
                                                           
22
 See Joffe J., “‘Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after 
Bipolarity”, International Security, Volume 19, N. 4, Spring, 1995, pp. 94-117 
23
 Mc Calla R., “NATO Persistence after the Cold War”,  International Organization, Vol. 
50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445-475 
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In general, the institutional framework supports the idea that an alliance can 
be transformed into a security management institution. By accepting the 
realist assumption that states act within an anarchical environment, the 
institutional theory holds that "institutions can be of general value to states 
in so far as they help them to cope with uncertainty.”24 In other words, as 
states deal with the risk of conflicts and face the issues of uncertainty about 
other states' intentions, liberal scholars argue, "institutions can serve as the 
informational and signaling mechanisms that enable states to get more 
information about the interests, preference, and intentions of other states.”25 
In this view, Celeste Wallander interprets the persistence of NATO after the 
Cold War focusing on mechanisms of institutional adaptation.26 Adaptation 
depends on whether «institutional assets» are specific (dealing with 
deliberate external threats and/or problems arising from instability and 
mistrust) or general (providing information and/or developing operative 
mechanism for deliberation, decision-making, and implementation), and on 
whether its mix of assets matches the kinds of security problems faced by its 
members. As NATO was able to cope with security issues as instability, 
uncertainty, and relations among allies, it persisted within the post-Cold 
War international system although without its original enemy. Similarly, 
Kirsten Rafferty (2003) engages in a comparative study of NATO and 
SEATO.27 The scholar finds that the level of institutionalization affects the 
alliance persistence or termination once a transformation in the environment 
occurs. Deep institutionalization raises material and non-material obstacles 
to exit enhancing the alliance's ability to perform its core military tasks and 
providing secondary benefits, such as affording allies with greater voice 
opportunities in the alliance and other international forums. In this view, 
Rafferty argues that the persistence of NATO, compared with the 
dissolution of SEATO, provides strong evidence in support of the 
                                                           
24
 Haftendorn H., Keohane R., Wallander C., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over 
Time and Space, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 5 
25Ibidem, p. 4 
26
 Wallander C., op. cit.. 2000 
27
 Rafferty K., “An Institutionalist Reinterpretation of Cold War Alliance Systems: Insights 
for Alliance Theory”, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science 
politique, Vol.36, No. 2 (Jun., 2003), pp. 341-362 
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institutionalist theory. Finally, Jae Jeok Park engages in a comparative study 
concerning the US alliances in Asia-Pacific.28 The scholar argues that 
perceptions of lower threats do not affect an alliance persistence if two 
conditions are met. First, member states consider the alliance as a tool for 
«order insurance». The security arrangements respond to an undesirable 
long-term security trend, which may occur in the process of order-
maintenance or order building. In other words, the alliance insures against a 
variety of future challenge to stability and regional order. Secondly, the 
alliance needs some internal insurance in order to survive. The allies 
introduce, cultivate or retain arrangements to safeguard their alliances from 
challenges that might arise because of intra-alliance mismanagement (more 
likely to emerge when member states miss a common threat). The 
«insurance for alliance» includes some costs as reconciling with the ally’s 
core strategic interest and providing benefits in non-alliance agenda (i.e., 
concessions to terms of a free trade agreement). Park applies this framework 
to the U.S.–Australia alliance persistence (considered as a most-deviant case 
from threat-centric explanations) and to cases of alliance discontinuation 
(the U.S.–New Zealand leg of ANZUS in the mid-1980s and the U.S.–
Philippines alliance between 1992 and 1999). The empirical analysis 
confirms that aggregating capabilities to balance or hedge against a specific 
threat are not a necessary condition for an alliance to persist. Differently, 
alliance discontinuation occurs in the absence of a mutually perceived threat 
if its members do not find order insurance benefits or if they have not paid 
insurance cost. 
     Other studies combine the insights from the institutionalist literature with 
the arguments supported by the realist authors. As institutionalist scholars 
consider threats coming from member-states while realists look at threats 
coming from third parties, Patricia Weitsman adopts a combined framework 
to measure the cohesion of alliances and the probability of their persistence 
or dissolution.29 The scholar argues that the evolution of symmetric military 
                                                           
28
 Park J.J., “The persistence of the US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific: an order insurance 
explanation”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 13 (2013), pp. 337-368 
29
 Weitsman P., Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2004 
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alliances is affected by the combined variation of threats internal and 
external to the alliance. When a high level of «threat internal to the alliance» 
(meaning member states having neither mutual values nor sense of loyalty) 
combines with a high level of external threat, cohesion will be difficult but 
not impossible to realize (because of the primacy of external threats). 
However, once the level of external threat decreases (as the Allied Power 
after War World II) the high level of «threat internal to the alliance» will 
probably lead to the alliance termination.30 Differently, Galia Press-
Barnathan looks at asymmetric alliances pointing out that NATO persists 
precisely because of an increasing threat internal to the alliance.31 At the end 
of the Cold War, the systemic change raised NATO minor partners’ fears 
and strategic uncertainty. As conflicting interests characterize the 
transatlantic relationship, the American hegemony is the greatest danger for 
the European countries. According to Press-Barnathan, therefore, NATO 
persists as a «pact of restraint» for managing minor allies fear of entrapment 
and eventually provides the opportunity to restrict, and possibly influence, 
the stronger ally through a coordinated «division of labor», so reducing the 
risk of abandonment. 
     In conclusion, although it is not immediately intuitive that rivalry can 
extend even within alliances, several scholars consider risk management as 
a critical function of alliances. Besides, we find many comments within 
classic works. As George Liska notices, “alliances may serve to restrain the 
more aggressive member states”.32 Paul Schroeder argues that “all alliances 
in some measure are pacts of restraint, restraining or controlling the actions 
of the partners in the alliance themselves.”33 Even Stephen Walt, who 
                                                           
30
 Tethering alliances are different cases because these kinds of security agreements (having 
a high level of threat internal to the alliance) originate precisely to manage the inter-allied 
conflict.    
31
 Press Barnathan G., “Managing the Hegemon: Nato under Unipolarity“, Security Studies, 
2006, pp. 271-309 
32
 Liska G., Nations in alliance. The limits of interdependence, Baltimore, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962, p. 40 
33
 Schroeder P., "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in 
K. Knorr (eds), Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, Lawrence, Allen, 
1976, p. 230 
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mainly focuses on external threats, argues that "the desire to ally in order to 
aggregate power and the desire to ally in order to manage weaker states are 
not incompatible.”34 IR scholars, therefore, hold that alliances can work 
both as a tool for «power aggregation» and «power devaluation» as the 
partners' purposes might be not only to face a common external threat but 
also to manage risks coming from the ally.35 
However, although this perspective sheds more light on alliance policies, 
the institutionalist debate has some limits. Firstly, it focuses too narrowly on 
the United States alliances after the Cold War implying limits once 
institutionalist scholars try to generalize their arguments. Secondly, realists’ 
contributions showed that institutional practices might come both as a minor 
states’ strategy to deal with hegemony and as major states’ attempt to 
exercise asymmetric power. Here, it is still not clear if institutions can 
independently affect states’ behavior or they simply mirror states’ power 
relationships. Consequently, the security institutions literature did not 
improve significantly out knowledge compared to the classic debate on 
international institutions.36 
 
 
3. Alliances and states’ change in international power: the empirical 
studies 
 
Also statistically oriented scholars entered the debate about the persistence 
and termination of military alliances. By providing a formal model of 
alliance formation and dissolution, James Morrow makes the case that “a 
nation will want to break an alliance when it prefers the combination of 
security and autonomy it obtains without the alliance to that with it.”37 This 
framework entails that alliances can advance either autonomy or security 
                                                           
34
 Walt S., op. cit., 1987, p. 8, footnote 20 
35
 See, for instance, Joffe J., “Europe’s American Pacifier”, Foreign Policy, No. 54 (Spring 
1984), pp. 64-82  
36
 See Mearsheimer J., “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International 
Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 5-49 
37Morrow J., op. cit., 1991 
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and it is successfully tested on a set of 164 military alliances formed 
between 1815 and 1965. The trade-off security-autonomy concerns both 
symmetric alliances (where both allies receive security or autonomy 
benefits) and asymmetric ones (where one ally gains security and the other 
autonomy). In this view, three motivations make the dissolution attractive: 
(1) a deterioration of security or autonomy in the alliance; (2) an 
improvement in security and autonomy out of the alliance; or (3) a shift in 
the nation's utility function. Asymmetric alliances should be more stable 
than symmetric security agreements because the allies in the former "derive 
their benefits from different interests […] as each side's capabilities and 
interests change over time, asymmetric alliances are more likely than 
symmetric alliances to continue to provide net benefits to their members.”38 
However, a significant decline in the major ally’s capabilities favors the 
dissolution of an asymmetric alliance. From the minor ally’s point of view, 
the declining capabilities of the stronger member reduce the incentive to 
keep the alliance alive. Concerning the changes in the weaker power’s 
capabilities, they “will not greatly alter the nature of the trade."39 As the 
minor ally gives autonomy to the stronger partner and receives security, the 
allied exchange would be unaffected by the weaker ally changes in 
capabilities. Differently, Jaewook Chung points out that increasing power in 
minor allies can destabilize an existing alliance.40 It may be the case for the 
weaker partners trying to gain more autonomy within an asymmetric 
relation. More precisely, as they might suffer the influence of the stronger 
ally, the weaker side’s increase in capabilities can affect significantly the 
likelihood of alliance termination. However, Chung argues that changes in 
capabilities of the weaker ally on alliance termination is conditional upon its 
economic dependence on the stronger ally. Once a weaker ally is highly 
dependent economically on its partner, it may be restrained from seeking 
autonomy because it could hamper ongoing economic relations with the 
stronger ally. Under economic dependence, terminating the alliance can 
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decrease economic benefits from the alliance relationship. Differently, low 
economic dependence is a permissive condition for alliance termination.  
      Overall, the security-autonomy model finds general support in the 
alliance literature. For instance, Scott Bennet considers four major 
theoretical perspectives to test hypotheses about alliances’ endurance: the 
capability aggregation model; the security-autonomy tradeoff; the influence 
of domestic politics; and the degree of institutionalization.41 His sample 
considers 207 military alliances among peacetime and wartime security 
agreements between 1816 and 1984. The empirical results find little support 
for the capability-aggregation model while strongly support the security-
autonomy model by implying that the larger the changes in capabilities, the 
shorter an alliance is likely to be. Moreover, significant differences 
characterize the endurance of asymmetric and symmetric alliances being the 
former more stable and durable. Then, mixed support is provided for the 
interaction between domestic politics and alliance behavior. On the one 
hand, whereas alliances involving liberal states are likely to last longer than 
alliances involving illiberal ones, regime changes do not lead to alliances 
dissolution. Finally, there is no empirical support for the hypothesis that the 
more alliances are institutionalized the more they perpetuate themselves 
over time. 
Among statistically oriented studies, the article by Ashley Leeds and Bureu 
Savun presents one main innovation recognizing that alliances can end in 
different ways.42 By evaluating a set of 260 military alliances from 1816 to 
1989, the authors find four modes of termination: abrogation (105 cases), 
fulfillment (47 cases), exogenous loss of independence (33 cases) and 
renegotiation (75 cases). Then, they develop a model accounting for the 
alliances that were abrogated due to opportunistic violations. By arguing 
that alliances termination can be predicted by examining changes in cost and 
benefits of alliances in comparison to the conditions in effect when leaders 
joined the security agreements, the scholars consider four main independent 
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variables. These variables are the «level of external threat», the «allies’ 
relative capabilities», the «extent of shared interests» and the «availability 
of substitute allies». Then, they develop four main hypotheses to predict 
alliances persistence or dissolution. Firstly, the changing level of external 
threat suggests that when an alliance member experiences a significant 
decrease in external threat in comparison to the level of threat when the 
alliance was formed, the alliance becomes more likely to end in violation of 
its terms. Secondly, when an alliance member experiences a significant 
change in international power (becoming too weak or too strong) in 
comparison to the conditions in effect when the alliance was formed, the 
alliance becomes more likely to end in violation of its terms. Thirdly, when 
an alliance member experiences a significant change in internal political 
processes in comparison to the conditions in effect when the alliance was 
formed, the alliance becomes more likely to end in violation of its terms. 
Finally, when an alliance member forms outside alliances, the alliance 
becomes more likely to end in violation of its terms. The empirical results 
support the hypotheses except for the third one, so suggesting that domestic 
politics does not affect alliances persistence or collapse. The authors 
evaluate «asymmetry» as a control variable confirming Morrow's findings 
concerning the longer duration of asymmetric alliances compared to the 
symmetric ones.    
     In conclusion, statistical N-Large studies successfully widened the 
debate about alliances persistence and termination. By considering how 
changes in allies’ relative power can affect the alliance evolution, this 
literature introduced a new factor worth to consider in alliance politics. 
However, the principal limitation of these works is that scholars analyze the 
change in power as shifts in actors' attributes exclusively.43 Although a well-
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established tradition of IR scholars consider power as a property of the 
social relations rather than an attribute of the actors, the works above 
reduced the inquiry to the measurement of the changes in states’ composite 
capabilities. Consequently, we find neither theorized causal mechanisms nor 
empirical tests concerning the processes of alliances’ termination.44 
 
 
4. Main hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and gaps in alliance theory 
 
The previous paragraphs analyzed three research perspectives that 
investigate the persistence and termination of military alliances: realism, 
institutional theory, and statistical studies. By combining some of their 
features, it is possible to define three main causal mechanisms concerning 
why and how alliances might terminate. 
Firstly, the «successful independence» hypothesis suggests that an alliance 
may become less attractive for a member state that is experiencing a 
sensible increase in relative capabilities.45 On the one hand, when an ally 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
these six indicators, providing a measure of its relative capabilities. More precisely, IR 
scholars have adopted two operational criteria to measure changes in allies' power. Morrow 
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those five years. Morrow, therefore, relates the allies' changes international power to the 
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Savun predicted that alliances terminate as the allies experience changes in the alliance 
costs and benefits in comparison to the conditions in effect when leaders chose to form 
these alliances.43 Therefore, they measured the proportional change in the international 
power of each member state since the time the alliance was formed by dividing the current 
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improves its security position over time, it might be able to face its enemies 
autonomously by preferring to abrogate existing security agreements.46 On 
the other hand, a rising ally might claim more autonomy to pursue changing 
foreign policy goals. As the partner might not be able or willing to set its 
alliance commitment differently by conforming to the new internal balance 
of power, the alliance is more likely to terminate than when allies’ relative 
capabilities keep stable.47 
Secondly, the hypothesis of «threat internal to the alliance» suggests that 
alliances might end as one ally becomes significantly dangerous for the 
partner.48 States whose power is increasing often adopt more ambitious 
foreign policy goals alarming the allies itself.49 Although a rising partner 
permits the alliance to gain in aggregate power, a stronger ally is more 
challenging to control, and it might even assume a hegemonic attitude.50 
Here, scholars mainly stress how an ally can be a source of damages. In this 
case, the status-quo or weaker partner might opt for breaking the alliance in 
order to escape an increasing internal threat. 
Finally, the «declining credibility» hypothesis suggests that an alliance 
might deteriorate as members begin to question their partner’s reliability.51 
As one’s ally is weakening, its material capacity to fulfill the alliance 
obligations might become insufficient. Asymmetric alliances might be 
particularly sensitive to this kind of changes. As Liska argues, "a marked 
decline in the capability of a crucial ally is even more likely to set off 
dissolution.”52 However, even minor allies are asked to cultivate specific 
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capabilities to cope with the alliance security challenges.53 In this view, if 
the alliance provides less benefit due to missing material support, also major 
allies can be persuaded to abrogate the security treaty.54 
     Although these hypotheses start to shed light on the processes concerning 
alliances termination, they come out from scattered suggestions and 
comments in the literature. In other words, they represent a starting point 
rather than a conclusive one. It is, therefore, useful to stress two issues. On 
the one hand, these hypotheses fail to emphasize which specific causal 
mechanisms characterize asymmetric and symmetric alliances. Relatively 
little attention, then, receives the critical issue of which member state in 
asymmetric alliances – major or minor ally – is abrogating the alliance.55 On 
the other hand, they hide that different incentives can affect states’ choice to 
preserve or terminate a security agreement. In other words, these processes 
leave a huge vacuum of indeterminacy analyzing certain allies’ behaviors. 
Here, it is worth noticing that IR scholars do not deeply theorize about 
minor allies’ behavior in asymmetric alliances, generally assuming their 
passive attitude. However, history provides several examples of weaker 
partners that unilaterally abrogate agreements with major powers in charge 
of guarantying for their security.56 In light of these last remarks, the next 
chapter will adopt an innovative view entering the debate on the asymmetric 
alliances’ persistence and termination. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Minor Ally’s Voice Effectiveness  
and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances 
 
 
IR scholars do not deeply theorize about minor allies’ behavior in 
asymmetric alliances, generally assuming their passive attitude. Weaker 
sides are judged to follow the major ally complying with its preferences in 
virtue of a beneficial exchange of goods. Certainly, weaker sides in 
asymmetric relationships can obtain several benefits: enhancing their 
security and territorial integrity; reducing uncertainty and potential for 
disputes with third parties; enjoying favorable standards of international 
behavior from other compliant states. However, history provides several 
examples of weaker partners that unilaterally abrogate military agreements 
with great powers in charge of guarantying for their security.57 Therefore, 
what leads a minor ally to abrogate a bilateral security agreement with a 
great power unilaterally? How can we explain the decision of minor allies to 
terminate asymmetric alliances once welcomed? 
Although IR theories define key points in the debate about the alliances’ 
persistence and termination, they can answer only partially to these 
questions. On the one hand, realist scholars consider alliances as tools to 
improve states’ security in the face of threatening actors.58 On the other 
hand, institutionalist authors focus on path-dependence processes 
highlighting the increasing benefits and exit-cost of allied cooperation.59 
                                                           
57
 See Appendix p. 167 
58
 See classic books as Morgenthau H.J., Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, New York, Knopf, 1948; Liska G., Nations in alliance. The limits of 
interdependence, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962; Waltz K., Theory 
of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979; Walt S., The Origins of 
Alliances, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987. 
59
 See Mc Calla R., “NATO Persistence after the Cold War”,  International Organization, 
Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445-475; Haftendorn H., Keohane R., Wallander C., 
  
24 
 
Both perspectives barely reflect on the possibility of one minor ally 
abrogating a security agreement with a great power unilaterally. Moreover, 
the most established statistical analyses assume that changes in minor allies’ 
relative power do not affect the evolution of asymmetric alliances.60 Also 
statistical N-Large studies, therefore, adopt the mainstream view 
considering weaker partners as passive actors.   
In light of this gap in alliance literature, the next sections adopt an 
innovative perspective focusing on the minor ally behavior, its search for 
autonomy and the voice opportunities in asymmetric alliances.61 
 
 
1. The basic theoretical framework 
 
As IR scholars develop two primary explanations for alliances persistence 
and termination – security concerns and path dependence – the following 
section develops a 2x2 matrix aiming to define the minor ally’s incentives 
and disincentives to abrogate an asymmetric alliance according to these 
theories. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space, Oxford University Press, 
1999, p. 5 
60
 See Morrow J., op. cit., 1991; Bennet S., “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance 
Duration, 1816-1984”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), 
pp. 846-878; Leeds B. and Savun B., “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate 
Agreements?”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Nov., 2007), pp. 1118-1132 
61
 Several works paves the way in this research perspective. See De Castro R., “Philippines 
Defense Policy in the 21th Century: Autonomous Defense or back to the Alliance?”, 
Pacific Affairs, Volume 78, Number 3, Fall 2005, pp. 403-422(20); Catalinac A., “Why 
New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing ‘‘Opposition for Autonomy’’ in 
Asymmetric Alliances”, Foreign Policy Analysis (2010) 6, 317–338; Chung J., “Capability 
Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination”, The Korean Journal of 
International Studies Vol.14, No.2 (August 2016), 209-240. More general studies on minor 
allies are Rothstein R., Alliances and Small Powers, Colombia University Press, New York 
and London, 1968; Reiter E. & Gartner H. (eds.), Small States and Alliances, Physica-
Verlag, 2001; Von Hlatky S., America Allies in Times of War. The Great Asymmetry, 
Oxford University Press, 2013 
  
25 
 
1.1.Minor ally’s need for security and alliance evolution 
 
The first variable is the minor ally's security concerns. Here we consider the 
most common realist explanation for alliance formation and persistence 
pointing out the role of menacing third parties.62 In this view, weaker allies 
might experience both internal and external threats. In the former case, the 
occurrence of threats to the minor ally’s regime survival might be the glue 
for preserving the alliance.63 However, once the domestic threats are 
defeated or disappears, the need for external support and legitimacy should 
decrease making the alliance termination more likely. In the second case, 
external security concerns should increase when neighbor states show 
aggressive intentions or their military capabilities rise.64 Here the need for 
the alliance might decrease when significant disputes are settled, or regional 
rival states become significantly weaker.65 
The threat-hypothesis, therefore, can be formulated as follows. 
 
THREAT HYPOTHESIS: when security concerns increase, the minor ally is 
less likely to terminate the alliance; when security concerns decrease, the 
minor ally is more likely to terminate the alliance.  
 
However, how states measure the entity and sources of threats? Firstly, a 
state involved in a militarized interstate dispute experiences higher security 
concerns than one having peaceful external relations.66 Secondly, one actor 
might reasonably expect to conflict with states within its politically relevant 
international environment. In operational terms, it looks at its neighbors and 
global powers. Security concerns, therefore, might increase if one out of 
                                                           
62
 Walt S., The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, 1987; David S., op. cit., 1991 
63
 David S., op. cit., 1991 
64
 Walt S., op. cit., 1997 
65
 Other studies point out that external and internal security challenges might reinforce each 
other. On interrelated threats see Harknett R. & VanDenBerg J., “Alignment theory and 
interrelated threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf crisis”, Security Studies 6, no 3, spring 
1997, pp. 112-153 
66
 Correlates of War project provides a detailed data set classifying states involvement in 
MID. 
  
26 
 
these actors increase its offensive power and credibly menace a military 
move.67 However, a rising state that develops threatening power resources 
might not express its aggressive intentions. In these cases, the historical 
experience can justify an increasing perception about this potential external 
threat. Thirdly, domestic uprisings might imply that internal opponents seek 
to delegitimize and destabilize the ruling elite.68 
 
 
1.2.Minor ally’s need for gain and alliance evolution   
 
The second variable is the alliance's remunerative power. Here we stress 
that the allies’ exchange of resources can bring benefits and it can be then a 
source of dependence for the weaker side in asymmetric alliances.69 
Scholars considering power as a property of the social relations (rather than 
an attribute of the actors) focus deeply on these aspects of alliance politics. 
They generally define alliance dependence as a function of one ally’s needs 
and alternatives.70 Put it simply, one ally is dependent on the other to the 
extent the partner provides greater benefits than those provided by the next-
best alternative are. Therefore, the alliance’s remunerative power can be 
measured on the prospect of actors being deprived of something already 
possessed, namely the alliance «ceasing benefits». As allies exchange some 
goods, they value each other remunerative power by considering what they 
are going to lose once the alliance is broken. The path-dependence 
hypothesis, therefore, can be formulated as follows.  
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PATH-DEPENDENCE HYPOTHESIS: when the alliance remuneration 
increases, the minor ally is less likely to terminate the alliance; when the 
alliance remuneration decreases, the minor ally is more likely to terminate 
the alliance. 
 
By focusing on the minor ally needs, our measurement of the alliance 
remuneration should take into account the partners’ military cooperation in 
terms of arms transfers, military training exercise, officers training, and 
shared intelligence. The major ally's resources should have both an intrinsic 
and relative value for the other member-state. On the one hand, they might 
be highly significant in absolute terms because they satisfy some partner's 
needs; on the other hand, they acquire more or less value in light of their 
substitutability. In this view, the degree of resources' substitutability 
provided by one ally points out how the minor partner values the inter-allied 
military cooperation. 
 
 
1.3. How security concerns and alliance remuneration affect minor allies’ 
choices? 
 
Once we combine the two variables, four ideal paths for alliance evolution 
come out (see table below). First, we have a clear case for alliance 
persistence (B) once security concerns rise while also the alliance 
remuneration increases. Here, the minor ally has strong incentives to keep 
the security agreement. On the other hand, the mirror-like case implies the 
inverse outcome (C). If both security concerns and alliance remuneration 
decrease, we have an over-determinate case of alliance termination since 
there are few incentives for the minor ally to keep the agreement. 
By considering the case (C), IR scholars point out two underlying causal 
mechanisms leading to the agreement's dissolution. Firstly, the «successful 
independence» hypothesis suggests that an alliance may become less 
attractive as one member-state become able to face its enemies 
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autonomously.71 For instance, one ally’s security concerns might decrease 
following a sensible increase in its relative capabilities. In addition, it might 
be the case that either enemies are defeated or rivalries with neighbors are 
solved. In this view, as alliances imply costs in terms of resources 
commitment, the disengagement could favor the internal relocation of 
resources by favoring domestic productions and well-being.72 Secondly, the 
«declining credibility» hypothesis suggests that states can be persuaded to 
abrogate the security treaty as the alliance provides less benefit due to 
missing material support.73 This scenario implies that, whether the alliance's 
remunerative power decreases, the alliance might deteriorate as members 
begin to question their partner’s reliability. It can occur for several reasons. 
On the one hand, a state might change its foreign policy goals missing the 
will to support its partner. On the other hand, as one’s ally is weakening its 
material capacity to fulfill the alliance obligations might become 
insufficient. Asymmetric alliances might be particularly sensitive to this 
kind of changes as a decline in the capability of a stronger ally is even more 
likely to trigger an alliance termination.  
The following matrix illustrates graphically the arguments above.  
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(A) Indeterminate Type I 
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The two remaining alliance paths suggest that we are dealing with 
indeterminate cases (A and D) as both offers contradictory incentives to the 
minor ally. These typologies, in other words, cannot predict the outcome of 
alliance persistence or termination because the variables’ inducements 
collide. Type I suggests that the minor ally security concerns might increase 
while the alliance's remunerative power decreases. Here a weaker ally faces 
a significant alliance deficit as the partner does not provide sufficient 
support. In a way, it resembles the scenario provided by the «declining 
credibility» hypothesis. Inefficiencies and lack of material support make 
stronger the incentives for the agreement abrogation. However, the risks of 
isolation in conjunction with an increasing threat might discourage the 
alliance dissolution. Differently, the Type II case suggests that the minor 
ally security concerns might decrease while the alliance provides increasing 
returns from the allied cooperation. The «successful independence» 
hypothesis provides the key features of this case as the weaker ally might 
evaluate that the alliance-costs are too high in light of its reduced need for 
security. As the minor allies are asked to cultivate specific capabilities to 
cope with the alliance tasks, there are incentives for a unilateral 
abrogation.74 However, an increasing remuneration from the allied 
cooperation also provides an inducement for keeping the alliance. 
     In sum, these typologies cannot infer by themselves if a minor ally might 
prefer an alliance to persist or terminate. This theoretical gap might come 
from an underestimation of other critical functions of alliance politics. For 
this reason, we will focus on the alliance restraint functions formulating a 
new hypothesis about minor allies’ incentives for alliance persistence or 
termination.   
 
 
 
 
                                                           
74
 On minor allies’ duties see Kih J. and Kim J., “The Capabilities-based Analysis of 
Alliance Transformation in the Asia-Pacific: Focusing on the ROK-US and US-Philippines 
Alliances”, The Korean Journal of International Studies Vol.14, No.3 (December 2016), 
369-389. 
  
30 
 
2. Restraint in Alliance Politics 
 
Several scholars point out the value of restraint in alliance politics.75 This 
function sheds light on mechanisms of mutual hindrance and influence 
between allies. As states can have both compatible and incompatible 
interests,76 they might also ally to gain control over the partner, but not 
necessarily to face a common enemy.77 Rather, scholars refer to the restraint 
of the ally as a tool for reducing the risk of being involved in unwanted 
conflicts. Josef Joffe, for instance, claims that Bismarck’s pact-mania did 
not aim “to aggregate power but to devalue it.”78 The web of Prussian 
agreements discouraged the formation of hostile coalitions by preserving the 
German primacy on the European continent. Gaining control over minor 
states through the establishment of security agreements, in this view, also 
increased the control over third states outside the alliance system. Also 
according to Patricia Weitsman, "adversaries may have incentives to form 
alliances with each other either to react to threats confronting them or to 
contain or manage the threat they face from each other.”79 This kind of 
behavior, defined as «tethering», indicate that "threats emanate from within 
alliances as well as from outside them.”80 For Jeremy Pressman, some 
alliances "are formed to modify the behavior of someone within the alliance 
itself more so than any external party.”81 Failure or success of the allies’ 
restraint attempts will depend on their willingness to mobilize power 
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resources.82 Finally, Victor Cha argues that the US choice for bilateral 
alliances in North East Asia after World War II came from "the desire for 
maximum and exclusive control over potential dangerous allies.”83 
Although the alliances aimed to contain the Soviet threat, bilateralism was 
preferred to multilateralism to constrain "rogue allies" that could engage in 
aggressive behavior and wars against neighbor states.   
     In the view of the alliance restraint functions, realist scholars claim that 
major allies can pursue specific strategies to keep control over their minor 
partners.84 However, several authors claim that also weaker states can bind 
the stronger ones through institutional mechanisms of consultations and 
decision-making. For Grieco, institutionalization can be a solution for 
weaker states to solve "the problem of working with, but not being 
dominated by, a stronger partner in the context of mutually beneficial joint 
action.”85 IR scholars generally recognize that the minor allies “voice 
opportunities” are a useful tool to restrain stronger partners. In this view, 
alliance restraint should highlight the role of inter-allied control as the minor 
ally may use the alliance to address its concerns to the major partner, either 
looking for its support or aiming to limit its leeway. It is plausible, then, that 
weaker member-states raise their voice depending on their need to influence 
the major ally once the latter is involved in international issues that directly 
affect them. However, there is one main bias in this literature. Those 
investigating the value of voice opportunities consider this function mainly 
in the view of the minor partners’ security concerns while underestimating 
the value of the minor allies' autonomy ambitions. According to Ohtomo, for 
instance, minor partners might remain in alliances for “a desire to dampen 
suspicious (reassure others) in order to solve the ‘sheep in wolf’s clothing 
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problem'.”86 As Japan and Germany did in the post-Cold War period, minor 
allies might prefer to keep an alliance to reassure the stronger partner and 
the secondary states about their status quo intentions. In a different vain (but 
still considering the minor allies' security concerns), Galia Press-Barnathan 
argues that smaller allies can keep alliances alive in order to "mitigate a 
future potential threat from their hegemonic partner." Alliances, therefore, 
can help "to restrain the hegemon […] and develop semi-independent 
capabilities in order to create a division-of-labor strategy" that reduces the 
risks of abandonment and entrapment.87 In this view, unfortunately, these 
scholars do not consider that minor allies might aim to enhance their status 
or influence in their region through a security agreement with a great power. 
In other words, weaker partners in asymmetric alliances might not have a 
status quo attitude or be exclusively persuaded by the fear of abandonment 
and entrapment.  
     In sum, the literature on alliance restraint considers both the major and 
minor allies' behavior. Stronger sides aim to control the weaker ones 
reducing their freedom and leeway. The latter try to manage the relationship 
with the potential hegemon reducing risks. However, both perspectives are 
under-theorized and show limits in analyzing the allies' behavior. For this 
reason, the next two sections will pave the way for a more comprehensive 
understanding of interallied relations in asymmetric alliances.  
 
 
2.1.Asymmetry and major ally’s politics of restraint 
 
Restraint behavior characterizes both symmetric and asymmetric alliances. 
However, as we focus on the latter, we need first to clarify the meanings and 
effects of asymmetry in alliance politics. IR scholars stress one main feature 
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by referring to an unbalanced distribution in power resources between allies. 
Asymmetry, therefore, is conceptualized as a gap in capabilities. This view 
implies a primary distinction between alliances formed by equal partners 
(either major-major states or minor-minor states) and alliances signed 
between one stronger power and one weaker actor. However, it is worth 
stressing that asymmetry does not imply necessarily the unilateral dominion 
from the stronger to the weaker. Instead, our inquiry in alliance politics 
suggests excluding these extreme cases. Brantly Womack's general 
definition looks more appropriate, judging an asymmetric relationship as 
"one in which the smaller side is significantly more exposed to interactions 
than the larger side because of the disparity of capabilities, and yet the 
larger is not able to dictate unilaterally the terms of the relationships.”88 
Nonetheless, the disparity in capabilities favors the establishment of a 
specific kind of interaction among allies. Firstly, most scholars argue that it 
implies that allies exchange different types of goods. In Morrow’s terms, the 
stronger actor gains autonomy by controlling the internal and foreign policy 
of the minor partner while the latter improves its security enjoying the major 
partner’s protection. For instance, agreements with asymmetric obligations 
might imply the stronger side’s unilateral commitment to guarantee the 
weaker side’s security, while the latter makes some political and economic 
concessions. In this view, even though both allies are bound to specific 
obligations, commitments might be different and not reciprocal.  
IR scholars generally recognize that these features produce some benefits 
making asymmetric alliances more stable and durable than symmetric 
ones.89 Member states derive their benefits from different needs developing 
a more stable bargain of interests than those in symmetric relationships. As 
the bargaining space is wider, alliances are likely to provide net benefits 
even when each side’s capabilities and interest change over time. 
Asymmetry, in other words, can help to overcome the inter-allied crisis 
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promoting a useful division of labor.90 However, other theorists stress some 
critical features of asymmetry. They contend that asymmetric relationships 
create differences in attention and perspective among allies by favoring a 
“structural pathology of misperception”.91 As the weaker side occupies a 
smaller share of the great power's international horizon, it suffers from the 
"sporadic and partial" attention of the stronger partner. On the other hand, 
the weaker side is particularly concerned because it has more to gain or lose 
in the relationship than the stronger actor. In this context, "the errors of 
inattention by the larger side and over-attention by the smaller side reinforce 
one another in crisis situation.”92 
     However, it is worth stressing that nonreciprocal commitments and 
differences in perspectives/attention are not the only effects of asymmetry. 
Although asymmetry does not imply necessarily a unilateral dominion, a 
gap in capability can also be conceptualized in terms of power differentials 
among allies. Scholars considering power as a property of the social 
relations conceptualize asymmetry in the view of dependence disparity, 
bargaining power and ability to obtain others' conformity.93 Power 
differentials, in this view, can be interpreted as a tool to “structure 
relationships, including through method of (attempted) control”.94 As the 
major ally is the preponderant power, it requires the conformity of the 
weaker partner to its preferences.95 This claim can originate from the 
exchange between protection (provided by the stronger to the weaker) and 
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obedience (promised by the weaker to the stronger).96 The weaker ally's 
duty of obedience might concern different areas of state action. More 
specifically, the major ally can indicate friends and enemies, or even inhibit 
the partner to fulfill its ambitions (foreign policy control); it can require its 
foreign military arms to transit the weaker side's territory, placing them 
permanently and requiring access to strategic areas (territorial control); it 
can assure itself the monopoly of the military command (operational 
military control); it can ask for privileged trade agreements, and it can 
require to share the alliance burden (economic and financial control); it can 
influence the internal processes of decision-making (domestic politics 
control); it can penetrate, finally, the weaker society with its customs and 
tradition (ideological and cultural control).97  
     An asymmetric relation, therefore, can imply an acknowledgment of 
different degrees of autonomy among partners. The power of the stronger 
side relies on its ability to preserve its freedom of action while influencing 
the weaker partner's choices, or even coercing its behavior. However, 
scholars recognize that two opposite forces affect the evolution of 
asymmetric relations. On the one hand, several asymmetric features push 
the stronger side to establish a coercive relation with the weaker partner. On 
the other hand, the successful management of an asymmetric relationship 
requires the acknowledgment of a certain degree of autonomy from the 
stronger to the weaker side.98 It is worthwhile to recall here that history 
provides several examples of a stronger actor facing the issue of power 
management. In ancient Greece, for instance, autonomy and hegemony were 
not contradictory terms. According to Jacqueline de Romilly, the hegemony 
of the stronger actor was preserved both through active and generous 
conduct toward the weaker and through avoidance of any reduction of its 
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autonomy.99 In ancient China, the Song dynasty was careful managing its 
relations with its periphery. According to Womack, “the rituals of the tribute 
system could be seen as an exchange of central acknowledgment of 
autonomy for signs of deference from neighbors.”100 In the contemporary 
international system, many scholars argue that the persistence of the US 
alliances requires careful management of power by the superpower.101 
Indeed weaker sides in asymmetric relationships might define their interests 
in terms of preserving or increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the stronger 
partner. A minor ally can adopt an aggressive strategy in its regional 
environment, maybe assuming the benevolence of the stronger partner. The 
latter then can be more or less accommodating toward the weaker side's 
quest for autonomy, affecting its leeway in the regional context and its 
capacity of external extraction. 
In sum, although the majority of alliance theorists consider the power 
aggregation side of a military alliance, the restraint functions highlight the 
power devaluation one. In this view, an alliance providing protection can 
also strongly affect the minor ally’s freedom of action.  
 
 
2.2.The quest for autonomy and the minor ally’s voice opportunities  
 
In the alliance literature, scholars have been starting considering the allies’ 
autonomy concerns and ambitions.102 For Morrow, a nation’s autonomy is 
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the “degree to which it pursues desired changes in the status quo.”103 
Howorth & Keeler define the concept as “the political and military 
capability […] to take decisions and to embark on initiatives involving the 
projection of military power with limited or no assistance [from the 
ally]”.104 Catalinac embraces Morrow's perspective specifying that one ally's 
autonomy consists in the capability of "obtaining new concessions or 
removing old obligations.”105 Chung, finally, adopts a more general 
definition considering autonomy as "the ability of a state to shape policy 
without external influence.”106 These authors stress that pursuing autonomy 
implies a deep interaction among allies. Paradoxically, an increasing 
autonomy might require even greater coordination and convergence of 
interests; otherwise, it could be a signal of the alliance's erosion. However, 
alliance theorists did not investigate how the quest for autonomy can be 
settled through internal bargaining and the «voice opportunities» functions. 
This gap is even more evident looking at studies on minor allies in 
asymmetric alliances. By considering the alliance «voice opportunities» 
exclusively in the view of states’ security concerns, no room is left for the 
weaker partners’ quest for autonomy. 
     In light of this gap in alliance literature, this section will point out that 
minor ally's quest for autonomy and the effectiveness of its voice 
opportunities can affect the alliance evolution critically. Grieco defines 
effective voice opportunities "as institutional characteristics whereby the 
views of the partners (including relatively weaker partners) are not just 
expressed but reliably have material impact on the operations of the 
collaborative arrangement.107 Grieco's view implies that minor partners "can 
work with but not being dominated by a stronger partner in the context of 
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mutually beneficial joint action."108 However, which kind of demands might 
minor allies advance in the context of a military alliance? It is worth 
remembering that the majority of scholars assume that minor allies aim 
exclusively to obtain a security guarantee from the major ally. This classic 
literature supports the idea that alliances are a status quo phenomenon.109 
However, we can find several other insights in the IR literature. Some 
contributions find that alliances provide significant opportunities for gain 
(that is the bandwagoning argument)110 while other studies have focused on 
the quest for autonomy as a significant factor to account for minor allies’ 
behavior.111 Here, several circumstances can occur. Either the weaker side 
in an asymmetric alliance can suffer from some alliance deficits once the 
partner appears less supportive or useful; or it can fear to become a satellite 
of the stronger partner; or it can have the issue of maximizing its goals 
within the alliance.112 In all cases, the weaker side can start negotiating a 
greater leeway from the stronger ally to satisfy its needs. It might ask a 
change in patterns of transactions and a renegotiation of agreements to 
obtain a better distribution of benefits. It can try to pursue a “relational 
autonomy” that would make more powerful both its independence and its 
cooperation with the stronger partner.113 
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Therefore, how can we define the minor ally’s autonomy ambitions? As we 
focus on states’ autonomy ambitions, we aim to measure how states are able 
to influence international affairs and how they can favorably change their 
environment. It might imply the desire to possess some specific good and 
the attempt to change the goods distribution among states. Within the 
international environment, these goods might include territory, status, 
markets, ideology, and the creation or change of international law and 
international institutions.114 Therefore, the minor ally’s quest for autonomy 
might be expressed pursuing a regional strategy aiming to improve the 
state’s status and influence. For instance, minor allies might aim to increase 
their capability of external extraction in order to consolidate the state 
internal strength or reduce the capability-gap with rival neighbor states.115 
External extraction may be a useful strategy generating resources that 
reinforce the domestic position of the state and elude the internal political 
instability. It can positively affect states ability to invest more resources in 
domestic goals (more internal mobilization) and eventually reduce domestic 
pressures (less internal extraction). In these circumstances, an increasing 
threat might be faced successfully even though the major ally does not 
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provide sufficient material support (Type I case). Neighboring states, for 
instance, might significantly improve their military technology or show 
aggressive intentions imposing to extract resources from society rapidly. By 
taking resources abroad, the minor ally can decrease the domestic pressure 
avoiding affecting the internal state legitimacy negatively. On the other 
hand, the minor ally might decide to capitalize on the cost of the alliance 
commitment once the level of threat is decreasing (Type II case). It might be 
the case once the weaker partner attempts to use the alliance as a “force-
multiplier”116 to increase its capabilities for external extraction. However, 
these processes might require the benevolence (or even the support) of the 
major ally. Here a minor ally can measure the effectiveness of its voice 
opportunities within the alliance. 
 
 
2.3. Hypotheses and Alliances Processes 
 
The theoretical framework sketched above adopts a power perspective that 
does not share Thucydides' argument claiming that "the strong do what they 
can and the weak suffer what they must.”117 Although power differentials 
strongly matter, it is inconvenient assuming that the more powerful is 
omnipotent while the less powerful is impotent. Indeed an asymmetric 
approach investigates "how the management of asymmetric relationships 
can shorten or prolong the existing matrix of power"118 by considering both 
accommodative and coercive approaches.  
By building on the theory of asymmetric relationships, this section develops 
a new hypothesis about the persistence and termination of asymmetric 
alliances. It relies on the following logic. In interallied asymmetric relations, 
if the stronger side always maximizes the advantage of its relative power 
dealing with the ally, it favors the resistance and the sense of alienation of 
the weaker partner. In the short term, it can successfully reach its egoistic 
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goals; however, it can pay the strategic cost of loose the latter consensus in 
the long run.119 The weaker side’s voice ineffectiveness, in other words, can 
lead likely to the alliance termination. Differently, if the stronger side 
accommodates the partner needs, it can enjoy an increased legitimacy by 
favoring the weaker actor’s sense of inclusion. Although the stronger side 
might pay some costs investing its power resources in the short term, it is 
more likely to prolong the existing matrix of power in the long run. The 
weaker side's voice effectiveness then can likely lead to the alliance 
persistence. 
     These arguments imply that the major ally might exercise a different 
degree of restraint toward the weaker partner. By adopting soft restraint, it 
triggers those forces that favor the alliance persistence. Here, two alliance 
processes are at work touching both external and internal dynamics. Firstly, 
the major ally is successful in asymmetry management by providing other 
paths to accommodate the partner’s needs. Soft restraint can imply the 
restrainer bringing its resources to develop a path for satisfying the weaker 
side’s interests.120 Indeed favoring too much freedom implies a risk of moral 
hazard giving incentives to the weaker partner to consider riskier and more 
aggressive behavior, which otherwise would be avoided. Therefore, a soft 
restraint approach implies that the stronger side manages the partner 
requests considering the latter needs as part of the broader alliance strategy. 
Although conflict of interests might occur, the dominant partner should be 
able to provide feasible alternatives widening the alliance common goals.  
Secondly, the alliance gains internal cohesion because the weaker partner 
recognizes the benefits of the hierarchical relations in virtue of the 
effectiveness of its voice opportunities. Successful management of 
asymmetry favors increased authority legitimacy from the weaker to the 
stronger side. A weaker ally engages in acts of symbolic obeisance 
acknowledging its acceptance of the asymmetric relations.121 International 
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obeisance implies to follow the leader providing adequate support in the 
diplomatic and military fields.  
Therefore, we can point out the voice-effectiveness hypothesis as follows. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: when the weaker partner’s voice is effective, the latter is 
less likely to terminate the alliance. 
 
The voice effectiveness, therefore, indicates the accommodation of the 
minor ally needs while the stronger side benefits in the long-term in virtue 
of the renovated cohesion. Differently, the weaker side's voice 
ineffectiveness implies a coercive attitude that can trigger a process of 
erosion. Within a context of alliance-deficit (as described by Type I-II 
cases), a major ally adopting hard restraint toward the minor partner favors 
mismanagement of the asymmetric relationships. By preferring a strategy of 
hard restraint, it makes ineffective the partner's voice opportunities and 
obstructs its quest for autonomy. Here two alliance processes are at work. 
Firstly, the minor ally starts opening to new partnerships to diversify its 
foreign policy. As the duty of obedience and the limitation of the resources 
inevitably constrain to take side privileging one relation at the expense of 
another, the alliance erosion incentives the minor ally to evaluate how new 
friends are beneficial. For instance, it might pursue a new formal alliance 
that better mirrors the state interests. Moreover, other benefits might be 
appeasement with a former rival and the development of a new political-
economic partnership with regional neighbor states. Finally, as alliances 
impede the partners from entering into contradictory agreements with 
someone else, and more specifically an alliance with opponents, the minor 
ally might also consider the plausibility of improving its relations with a 
stronger side's rival state. 
Secondly, the alliance cohesion starts loosening because the weaker side 
considers the major ally as a strategic hindrance.122 Although the minor ally 
needs the other side’s partial collaboration (or at least its benevolent 
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neutrality) to achieve its national goals, the allies have divergent interests, 
which obstruct the interallied cooperation. The weaker side, therefore, might 
seek to lower the levels of the transaction, favoring a lesser degree of policy 
coordination and showing greater concern about the distribution of 
benefits.123  
According to these arguments, we can advance the voice-ineffectiveness 
hypothesis as follows. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: when the minor ally’s voice is ineffective, the latter is 
more likely to terminate the alliance.  
 
In sum, the voice ineffectiveness favors the minor ally's disaffection as the 
stronger side does not consider the former's needs. Although the major ally 
maximizes its relative advantages in the short term, it triggers a process of 
alliance erosion in the long run. 
The table below summarizes the arguments of this section showing how 
Type I and Type II alliances are likely to evolve. 
 
SCOPE 
CONDITION 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
 
ALLIANCE PROCESSES OUTCOMES 
  
 
 
 
YES 
 
Soft Restraint 
 
Widening common alliance goals 
 
Strategic obeisance 
 
 
 
 
Alliance 
persistence 
 
Minor ally 
quest for 
autonomy 
Minor ally  
voice 
effectiveness 
 
  
  
 
 
 
NO 
 
Hard Restraint 
 
Strategic Hindrance 
 
Foreign policy diversification 
 
 
Alliance 
termination 
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3. Research design and method 
 
3.1.Research Goal and Types of Cases  
 
This study deals with two puzzles having different nature: a theoretic puzzle 
and an empirical one. On the theoretical level, the most established 
hypotheses lead to indeterminate outcomes concerning the persistence or 
termination of military alliances. It implies a gap in alliance theory. On the 
empiric level, alliance theories do not account for cases of minor allies that 
are actively engaged in terminating their security agreement with a great 
power. It means ignoring cases of diplomatic history on the base of a wrong 
assumption (namely, the weaker ally's passive role). To solve these puzzles, 
this research introduces an omitted variable that integrates a preexisting 
theoretical framework. The research so engages in a hypothesis-
modification study.124 In other words, it deals with a puzzle which previous 
contributions overlooked, and adds an undervalued factor to solve it. 
It is worthy of defining the type of cases that the study deals. Type I cases 
are failed most-likely case for realism when the minor ally terminates the 
alliance even though there are increasing security concerns. On the other 
hand, they are passed least-likely cases for institutionalism once the alliance 
persists although the remuneration is decreasing. Differently, Type II cases 
are passed least-likely cases for realism when the alliance persists despite 
decreasing security concerns. Finally, they are failed most-likely cases for 
institutionalism once the alliance terminates although the remuneration is 
increasing.125  
 
 
3.2.Research Methodology 
 
I will analyze four cases, a pair of Type I cases and a pair of Type II cases. 
The cross-case analysis requires to compare similar cases differing on only 
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one cause and having different outcomes (Method of Difference – MoD), 
and to compare different cases that share only one cause and have similar 
outcomes (Method of Agreement – MoA).126 However, for this study, the 
MoD constitutes the primary tool of the empirical analysis, while the MoA 
constitutes a logical extension aiming to emphasize further the empirical 
results in the view of their generalization.   
The table below shows the cases, the variables, and the outcomes. 
 
CASE SECURITY 
CONCERNS 
ALLIANCE 
REMUNERATIVE 
POWER 
TYPE MINOR ALLY 
VOICE 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
OUTCOMES 
(1) Increasing  Decreasing  I Ineffective Alliance 
Termination 
(2) Increasing  Decreasing  I Effective Alliance 
Persistence 
(3) Decreasing Increasing II Ineffective Alliance 
Termination   
(4) Decreasing  Increasing II Effective Alliance 
Persistence 
 
Then, by adopting the method of process tracing, I aim to identify the 
processes behind the minor ally preferences for alliance persistence or 
termination.127 As in each pair the minor ally's voice opportunities are 
effective in one case and they are ineffective in the other, I expect two 
different processes at work. In order to test the validity of the hypothesized 
causal mechanisms, some observable implications of the deductive 
theoretical framework should be found.128 In this view, the empirical 
sections provide evidence through a within-case analysis focusing on key 
alliance processes. 
Primary and secondary sources are both crucial for examining the processes 
shaping the alliances' evolution within the political and military fields. Clues 
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can be found in the documentation attesting the history of the interallied 
relationships as the bilateral joint statements, the guidelines for the defense 
cooperation, and the alliances' strategic concepts. Moreover, the writings 
and utterances of political leaders and the public documents of each state 
might give a more specific idea about the allies’ national interests. On the 
other hand, secondary sources as the interpretations of diplomatic historians 
can provide a broader understanding of the international context where 
states acted. 
 
 
3.3. Case Selection Criteria and Empirical Cases 
 
By considering the type of cases this research deals with (3.1.), the most 
relevant criterion for case selection is whether the empirical analysis 
produces surprising outcomes. Therefore, it is peaceful that “the choice of 
cases is intentional and based on a case's cross-case scores that deviate from 
the theoretically expected scores.”129  
The empirical sections analyses the following cases: 
 
(1) United Kingdom-Egypt alliance from 1945 to 1951 as a case of alliance 
termination. 
(2) United Kingdom-Iraq alliance from 1945 to 1955 as a case of alliance 
persistence. 
(3) United States-New Zealand alliance from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s as 
a case of alliance termination. 
(4) United States-Australia alliance from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s as a 
case of alliance persistence. 
 
These cases are comparable in virtue of the research’s theoretical 
parsimony. In other words, they approximate to the sketched ideal 
typologies whether the situational variables (security concerns and alliance 
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remuneration) assume the expected values.130 The MoD is feasible to 
compare the British alliances with the Middle Eastern countries (case 1 and 
case 2), and the American alliances in the South Pacific (case 3 and case 4). 
More precisely, I followed two main criteria to select the cases. Firstly, I 
looked for similarities among the minor allies considering the research’s 
theoretical framework. In other words, given the weaker side’s quest for 
autonomy, I measured whether the states’ security concerns and the alliance 
remuneration produced similar values. Moreover, preferable comparing 
cases were similar on other relevant variables as the states’ size, the internal 
political system, the geographic region and the historical period.131 
Secondly, I preferred to compare through the MoD alliances having the 
same major ally (for instance, UK-Egypt as a case of termination and UK-
Iraq as a case of persistence). 
On the other hand, the logical extension through the MoA is possible 
because different cases (as the UK-Egypt alliance and the US-New Zealand) 
produce similar outcomes. Again, the dissimilarity comes firstly from the 
values that the alliance variables assume. Then, I looked also for other 
relevant differences, as a different major ally, size, domestic political 
system, region, and historical period.  
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Part II – The Empirical Analysis  
 
The next four chapters analyze empirically four cases of asymmetric 
alliance. The third chapter describes the UK-Egypt alliance (1936-1951) as 
a case of alliance termination. The fourth chapter illustrates the UK-Iraq 
alliance (1932-1955) as a case of alliance termination. The fifth chapter 
analyses the New Zealand detachment from ANZUS in the mid-1980s as a 
case of alliance termination. The last empirical chapter discusses the US-
Australia relation from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s as a case of 
successful alliance persistence. 
The four cases follow a similar format. Each begins with a brief introduction 
describing the alliance treaty’s main features and the interallied historical 
relations. This first section then points out the trigger point in which the 
minor ally’s quest for autonomy emerges. The second section describes the 
alliance variables: the weaker ally’s security concerns, the alliance 
remuneration, and the weaker side’s voice opportunities. Then, it follows an 
in-depth historical narrative on the inter-allied relations during the period 
under investigation. This section describes the main events, and it 
introduces the last paragraphs about the alliance processes. These last 
paragraphs develop a specific analysis according to the processes of alliance 
persistence and termination. By looking at cases of alliance persistence, I 
expect to find evidence of greater cohesion between the allies; while 
analyzing cases of alliance termination, I expect to find evidence of erosion 
in the interallied relations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
The Anglo-Egyptian alliance in the early Cold War:  
a case of alliance termination 
 
 
Britain and Egypt signed a treaty of military alliance in 1936 modifying the 
agreements of 1899. The 1936 treaty consisted of 17 articles. Overall, it 
seemed to favor the weaker ally’s autonomy as Egypt gained full sovereign 
rights (art. 3) and the British government agreed to favor the abolition of the 
Capitulations in the country.132 However, strict military clauses imposed 
British control over the minor ally territory by limiting its regional 
aspiration.133 More specifically, Egypt granted Britain the military facilities 
to protect lines of communication and agreed on the permanence of British 
troops in the Canal Zone during peacetime (art. 7-8). Then, Egypt allowed 
the free use of its land, water, and air to the British forces in case of 
emergency (except the Royal Air Force, which had no restrictions). 
The signature of the pact did not solve all issues in the Anglo-Egyptian 
relations. Indeed the joint administration of Sudan was still a source of 
complaints by Cairo. In the mid-1930s, although Egypt wanted to increase 
its influence over the Nile Valley, the treaty provided for the maintenance of 
the status-quo in Sudan (art. 11).134 On the other hand, Cairo enjoyed fiscal 
freedom due to the end of Capitulations, while the permanence of British 
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forces was agreed until Egyptians would be able to defend their territory and 
the Canal Zone (art. 8) autonomously. 
On the outbreak of World War II, the Egyptian government adopted a pro-
British foreign policy.135 However, the weaker ally's willingness to 
cooperate with the major one "ebbed and flowed with the fortunes of 
war.”136 During the conflict, Egypt preferred a cautious foreign policy, 
trying both to accommodate the ally and to avoid confrontation with the 
ally's enemies. At the end of World War II, differently, Egypt defined 
clearly its foreign policy goals. However, as Cairo's needs and regional 
plans emerged and were effectively possible to pursue, Britain did not 
accommodate the weaker ally paving the way for its unilateral treaty 
abrogation in 1951.  
As a case of alliance termination, therefore, our inquiry will analyze the 
period 1945-1951. We will see that the allies did not overcome the internal 
crisis as the weaker ally was not successful in its quest for autonomy and the 
major partner adopted a hard approach. Indeed at the end of World War II, 
Egypt engaged in a new foreign policy course trying to improve its regional 
status and modifying the inter-allied relations. On the other hand, Britain 
was not able to accommodate the weaker partner's needs and support its 
regional plans. The ineffectiveness of Egypt's voice, therefore, paved the 
way for the alliance termination.  
     The following chapter develops in four sections. The first section 
describes Egypt's ambitions at the end of World War II. As we need to focus 
on the weaker ally's quest for autonomy as the trigger point of the inquiry, 
this section depicts the Egyptians' plans for regional leadership and the 
sources of Cairo's dissatisfaction toward Britain. The second section gives 
an account of the alliance variables. On the one hand, it measures Egypt's 
security concerns and the alliance remuneration in order to settle the 
framework for the empirical inquiry. On the other, it accounts for the 
Egyptians' voice attempts and its ineffectiveness. The third section describes 
the Anglo-Egyptians relations historically from 1945 to 1951. The fourth 
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section, finally, gives an account of the alliance processes. It firstly 
evaluates the British politics of hard restraint. Then, it provides evidence of 
Egypt's detachment before the unilateral abrogation. These processes of 
alliance erosion, finally, represent empirical evidence confirming the 
strength of the alliance termination's model. 
 
 
1. How to define the case: Egyptians' ambitions after World War II 
 
Following the end of World War II, the primary concern of Egyptian 
strategists focused around the question "What new order should arise in the 
Middle East?"137 This juncture was crucial for the Egyptian history 
representing an appropriate starting point for our inquiry for two main 
reasons. Firstly, Cairo adopted a more ambitious foreign policy in its 
regional context trying to establish its leadership in the Arab world.138 Egypt 
was "the wealthiest, most populous, most advanced technologically, and 
generally the most powerful of the Arab states.”139 Although other Arab 
states projected to expand their territories and improve their power status in 
the region (as the greater Syrian project by Jordan and the Fertile Crescent 
project by Iraq), Egypt served its interests best taking the lead of the Arab 
States League.140 Cairo’s position in the organization well describes how 
Egypt was the dominant power among the Arab states and aimed to improve 
its status. Egypt played a central role in the establishment of the League and 
preserved its leadership in the organization for three decades. Egyptians 
held the key roles and functions within the organization. The League had its 
headquarters in Cairo; it elected Egyptians secretaries-general until 1979; 
and Egypt was the main financial contributor.141 Moreover, Cairo influenced 
the League to undermine alternative projects of regional order. The first 
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secretary-general, Abdul Rahman Azzam, had a strong belief that the unity 
of the Arab world could only be pursued through the Egyptian leadership.142 
The League, therefore, became a useful tool for Egypt to promote its foreign 
policy aims and expansionist ambitions against rival projects of regional 
order, both from Britain and Arab neighbors.143  
Secondly, Egypt engaged in a new course toward Britain, its major security 
partner. On 20 December 1945, Cairo asked for a revision of the Anglo-
Egyptian treaty of 1936. The Egyptian government claimed that “the 
circumstances which determined the particular character of the Treaty of 
1936 have changed (…) it has become necessary to revise it in order to 
bring it into harmony with the new international situation; its clauses which 
detract from the independence and the dignity of Egypt no longer 
correspond to present conditions.”144 
Cairo aimed to stabilize Anglo-Egyptian relations on a level of equality to 
establish, then, its regional leadership among the Arab states. For this 
reason, Egyptians raised two main points: the withdrawal of British military 
forces and the unity of the Nile Valley. Although both issues were delicate, 
Egypt was less prone to compromise on the latter. Cairo strongly desired to 
reach political control over Sudan (or even to obtain the unity under the 
Egyptian crown) to make sure of natural resources as the water of the Nile; 
to favor emigration for its surplus population; to increase favorable 
economic relationships and capital investments.145 Moreover, the control of 
Sudan could imply the extension of Egyptian interests to the rest of Africa, 
or at least it improved Cairo status toward neighbor states.146 
     In sum, following the end of World War II, Egypt tried to take advantage 
of the new international environment. The achievement of Arab leadership 
and the establishment of more favorable inter-allied relations were not 
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separated issues, but connected factors in the new Egyptian foreign policy 
course. This new course represents the trigger point of the chapter’s 
analysis, which is the minor ally’s quest for autonomy. 
 
 
2. The Alliance Variables 
 
This section describes the model’s variables. Looking from the weaker 
side’s perspective, it measures the Egyptians’ security concerns and the 
alliance remuneration. These variables assume the values as a Type I case. 
Then, this section accounts for the minor ally's voice attempts. The analysis 
shows that Egypt's voice was ineffective as the minor ally was not able to 
improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs. 
Overall, the Anglo-Egyptian alliance fits the theoretical framework as a case 
of alliance termination. Firstly, the case passes the test for case selection 
successfully, as the Egyptians' security concerns increase while the alliance 
remuneration decreases in the period under consideration. Secondly, the 
explicative variable fits the theoretic expectations comfortably as the 
ineffectiveness of Egyptian's voice led to the alliance termination in 1951. 
The following paragraphs will describe the variables in details. 
 
 
2.1. Egypt increasing security concerns.  
 
2.1.1. Egypt and the Middle East balance of power: Cairo increasing 
external threats 
 
By considering threats at the regional level, Egypt opposed to projects of 
reunification embraced by the Hashemite countries.147 Starting from the 
1920s, Jordan developed a greater Syria project aiming to rule a reunified 
Tran-Jordan-Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. In the early 1940s, Iraq called 
for a more comprehensive union, the Fertile Crescent project, which 
provided for the union between a greater Syria with Iraq. Egypt’s increasing 
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concerns, therefore, came from the expansionist ambitions of Jordan and 
Iraq, which supported the reunification of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Trans-
Jordan, and Iraq, while excluding Cairo. A lot was at stake in these inter-
Arab relations: the regional leadership; the bargaining power toward Britain; 
the relationships with other extra-regional powers; and, more generally, the 
security of every regime. When the Palestine issue arose imminently in late 
1947, the question for all Arab countries became “What political authority 
should replace the British mandate?”148 As the analyst Michael Doran 
argued, Egypt was particularly concerned with the issue.  
 
[C]ircumstantial evidence suggests that, especially in the case of King Faruq, the threat 
posed by King Abdallah’s Greater Syria project constituted the primary consideration 
leading him to champion direct intervention (…) The king, together with Azzam and 
Hafiz Wahba, had advanced the Arab-bloc formula for regional defense—a proposal 
designed, at one and the same moment, to contain Jordan, permanently diminish the 
international status of Iraq, and advance the interests of Egypt in the Anglo-Egyptian 
struggle (…) Indeed, when King Abdallah refused to relinquish his army to the Arab 
League, he left no choice to the leaders in Cairo: in order to retain their influence in the 
Fertile Crescent, they had to go to war in Palestine. If the Egyptian government had 
failed to join the battle, then the freedom of action that Jordan enjoyed in the military 
arena would have inevitably translated itself into freedom of action in the political 
arena as well. Given the proclivities of King Abdallah, the peace conference following 
hostilities would have resulted in the partition of Palestine between the new Jewish 
state and Jordan—that is, it would have resulted in the worst-case scenario.149 
 
Thus, Egypt supported intervention in order to preserve its Arab leadership 
and to diminish the power of the Hashemite Entente. At the end of the 
Palestine conflict, Jordan was weakened, and the economic consequences of 
the war put an end to the Greater Syrian Project. However, Iraq replaced 
Jordan as the primary threat to Syria independence by supporting the Fertile 
Crescent project.150 Moreover, the rise of Israel quickly became a new 
source of threats for Cairo. As the war demonstrated, Israelis forces were 
well organized and well armed while the Egyptians ones were ill organized 
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and ill armed.151 Moreover, the Palestine conflict left Egypt with further 
strategic problems toward its main ally. As the historian John Marlowe 
argued, 
 
[o]n the one hand, Israel was a power with which Great Britain wished to be friendly. 
And which she wanted to include with the Arab states in comprehensive scheme for the 
defense of the Middle East. On the other hand, Israel was a power whose hostility 
Egypt feared and whose destruction she desired. While Great Britain wanted Egypt to 
become reconciled with Israel and to dovetail her military preparations into a general 
plan for the defense of the Middle East against Russia, Egypt viewed her defense 
preparations as being primarily directed towards the possibility of a local war with 
Israel. Thus the main condition of a military alliance – identity of strategic purpose – 
no longer existed.152 
 
Although the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement provided a period of truce, 
a border war started in 1949 triggering a slow escalation toward the second 
Arab conflict of 1956.153  
 
 
2.1.2. Egypt’s regime instability: the increasing internal threats 
 
Internal turmoil to the Egyptian state characterized the entire period under 
our study. Anti-government public demonstrations, assassinations and the 
attempted assassination of public figures, terroristic bombing attacks were a 
current affaire from 1945 to 1952.154 The Ikhwan (also known as the 
Muslim Brotherhood) substituted the Wafd as the most radical group in 
Egyptian politics and became the leader of this campaign of violence in the 
country.   
The historian P. J. Vatikiotis so accounted for the main events from 1945 to 
1948: 
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[T]he assassination of Prime Minister Ahmad Maher in February 1945 was followed 
almost a year later in January 1946 with the assassination of Amin Othman (a known 
Anglophile) in the streets of Cairo in broad daylight. Othman’s assassin had only a 
month earlier (December 1945) attempted to blow-up Nahhas’s car with a hand 
grenade which missed. There were similar grenade and gelignite attacks on public 
places perpetrated by the Ikhwan and other radical groups throughout 1946 and 1947 in 
both Cairo and Alexandria. One of these, a gelignite explosion in the Metro Cinema in 
which several people were killed, occurred on 6 May 1947, the anniversary of Faruq’s 
accession to the throne.   
More ominous was the attempt by the Ikhwan and other extremists to intimidate 
members of the judiciary with threats of assassination and actual bombing attacks. The 
secretary of the Cairo Court of Appeals was murdered in March 1948 for his past two 
years earlier in the Alexandria court trial ok Ikhwan ‘bombers'. In April, unknown 
assailants tried to dynamite Nahhas’s residence in Garden City. 
 
As the hostilities in Palestine started in mid-1948, the government imposed 
the Martial Law in the country reducing the internal disorders. On 
December, Prime Minister Nuqrashi ordered the dissolution of the Ikhwan. 
The organization responded twenty days later murdering the Prime Minister 
when he was going up to his office. A few months later, although hostilities 
in Palestine ended, the Parliament extended the Martial Law for another 
year. 
 
 
2.2. The decreasing alliance remuneration: Egypt’s dissatisfaction and 
Britain lack of support 
 
As the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 granted military sovereignty to Egypt, 
Cairo increased its pressures to modernize its military forces.155 Britain had 
the monopoly over arms supply and armed forces training by making Cairo 
dependent on the approval of London for improving its military.156 At the 
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beginning of the negotiation for the treaty revision in early 1946, Bevin 
declared that Britain aimed to modernize the ally’s military forces. 
However, the allies had different views considering Egypt’s role in the 
Middle East. As the historian David Tal pointed out,  
 
Egypt’s army commanders hoped to build a modern army consisting of two infantry 
divisions and one armored division, but Britain’s chiefs of staff did not expect the 
Egyptian armed forces to make a significant contribution to the Western war effort 
against the Soviet Union, and so they had no interest in significantly strengthening the 
Egyptian army. Egypt’s importance for the British was geostrategic, and all that the 
chiefs of staff expected of the Egyptian army was an active role in the defense of air 
bases. Hence they called for the setting up of a more modest force, consisting of two 
anti-aircraft brigades, two infantry brigades for internal security needs, one field army 
infantry division and one light armored brigade, comprising a tank regiment and two 
mechanized regiments.157 
 
During 1946-1947 Egypt ordered forty-eight planes and about seventy 
Centurion tanks to Britain. London escaped the ally’s request assuming that 
the Egyptian army did not need these armaments. By April 1947, the 
Egyptian quest for arms extended to the United States as the Nuqrashi 
government sent a delegation to explore possibilities for an arms deal. 
Egyptians again did not obtain any significant collaboration.158 
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In mid-1948, the United Nations Security Council approved an arms 
embargo to Middle East countries. The embargo endured one year forcing 
Britain to suspend the delivery of arms, which Egypt had already ordered 
and paid. The lack of adequate British support in arms transfer and military 
modernization paved the way for Cairo defeat in the Palestinian conflict.159  
Nonetheless, Egypt resumed its demands for arms as the Palestinian 
hostilities ended. For the fiscal year 1949, the government allocated £52 
million for military expenditure "to build an army which will be one of the 
most formidable in the Middle East.”160 Around 40% of this amount was 
spent in Britain by an Egyptian delegation, which placed orders for jet 
planes, tanks, armored cars, and other military equipment. The delivery was 
planned in 2 or 3 years. 
Meanwhile, Britain agreed with the United States and France to regulate 
arms supply in the Middle East to avoid an arms race. The Tripartite 
declaration was signed on May 1950 establishing that Arab countries should 
have delivered arms only for purposes of self-defense and internal 
security.161 Actually, as Bevin admitted to Acheson at a Foreign Ministers 
meeting in May 1950, Britain’s interest was to keep the Egyptian army at a 
low level of modernization. Britain, argued the Foreign Secretary, "had 
treated the Egyptians ‘rather shabbily' by providing them with ‘junk' 
arms.”162 
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The deficit in arms supply, as the historian David Tal pointed out, was also 
a British coercive tool to persuade Egypt to comply with London’s 
demands. When treaty negotiations deadlocked in late 1950,   
 
Prime Minister Nahhas Pasha told the Egyptian parliament that ‘the Egyptian 
government no longer regarded the Treaty of 1936 as a basis for Anglo-Egyptian 
relations’. This was only one step short of abrogating the Treaty, and in response 
Britain froze deliveries to Egypt of the aircraft and Centurion tanks that it had intended 
to supply. Egypt’s request for sixty additional Centurion tanks was not even 
considered.163 
 
On the other hand, in late-1950 Britain suspended delivery of weapons 
purchased by Egypt because needed by Britain forces in Korea. During the 
period under consideration, therefore, the alliance remuneration was low 
and worsening from the Egyptian perspective. 
 
 
2.3. Egypt’s voice attempts and its ineffectiveness 
 
In the period under study, the inter-allied disputes developed on two main 
issues raised by Egypt. Indeed, Cairo contested both the presence of British 
troops situated on its territory and the disunity of the Nile Valley, which 
implied the lack of political control over Sudan by Egypt. As the historian 
Roger Louis argued, these were “the two points on which the King, the 
leaders of the Wafd, and virtually all other Egyptians could agree.”164  
At the beginning of the negotiations for the treaty revision, Egypt attempted 
to increase its degree of autonomy without challenging the primacy of 
Britain in the Middle East. According to the scholar Michel Doran, 
 
Sidqi Pasha regarded as hopeless any attempt to force the British to renounce 
completely their claim on Egyptian facilities and territory. Seeing no possibility of 
prying Egypt completely loose from the grip of the Empire, he sought instead to reduce 
and regulate British power, to create a legal and institutional framework of alliance that 
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would safeguard Egyptian independence in time of peace and minimize the extent of 
British interference in domestic affairs in time of war.165 
 
The Egyptians, therefore, attempted to establish an equal relationship with 
Britain. As the British ambassador to Egypt, Sir R. Campbell, reported in 
1946, Cairo desired more freedom of action to be agreed in an amicable 
settlement.166 The ambassador recorded a personal conversation with Sidky 
Pasha to the Foreign Office as follows. 
 
Egyptians then wanted an alliance, but on a footing of real equality. The basis should 
be that of two friends, a big and a small one, but equals in status. There could not be 
friendship unless it was of a kind in which the smaller friend could say to the larger not 
"I want to do such and such: may I?" but "I am going to do such and such". Sidqi was 
certain that as friends, we could together contribute all that was necessary to the 
defense of our common interests (…) 
[Sidqi] deprecated the provision (as he put it) to submit Egyptian foreign policy to 
Britain (Article 5). (I said this was surely common form in Treaties of this kind and 
bound both parties: while Sidqi admitted this, he said the presence of British troops 
gave the provision an unequal character).167 
 
Similarly, Egypt considered the condominium over Sudan as a British 
occupation undermining Cairo’s ambitions of unity with Khartoum. As the 
historian James Marlowe pointed out, Egyptians were convinced that 
 
the British government was determined, irrespective of the real wishes of the Sudanese 
people, to separate the Sudan from Egypt, and considered that the implementation by 
Great Britain of a policy of progressive self-government in the Sudan would enable her 
to ensure this. Egypt was therefore unwilling to acquiesce in a policy which was 
designed, in her consideration, to defeat her aims and ambitions as regards the 
Sudan.168 
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The Sudanese constitutional reform provides a useful example of Egyptians 
suffering the British dominance. In 1947-1948 London and Cairo attempted 
to agree on the Sudanese constitutional reform. Although it was established 
a committee made by British, Egyptians and Sudanese representatives, 
Cairo found unacceptable the final draft agreement. The reasons were the 
following: the draft overlooked the fundamental principle of unity between 
Egypt and Sudan under the Egyptian Crown; it increased the powers of the 
British Governor-General (rather than empowering the Egyptian king); 
Egyptians had a minimal participation in the Executive Council (two 
members out of eighteen); the Sudanese participation was inadequate 
compared to the powers of the Governor-General.169 However, the British 
government decided to promulgate the ordinance unilaterally despite the 
Egyptians claims. For Egypt, it was a new display of "contemptuous 
indifference to the views and feeling of a joint partner in the Sudan 
venture.”170 
In sum, London had monopolized the administration of Sudan and denied 
the Egyptians project of unity. Moreover, it maintained three times the 
number of troops in the Suez Canal Zone permitted under the treaty of 1936. 
From the Egyptian's perspective, the lack of British's recognition of Cairo's 
national aspirations made ineffective any attempt to voice and forced the 
minor ally to oppose the dominant partner directly. 
 
 
3. The Anglo-Egyptian relations from 1945 to 1951 
 
3.1.The framework of the Anglo-Egyptian disputes  
 
Following the end of World War II, the Anglo-Egyptian disputes focused 
mainly on the revision of the alliance treaty. On 20 December 1945, 
Egyptians wrote to the British government asking to start negotiations. 
Cairo pointed out the main issues to settle: 
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(…) The presence of foreign forces on our soil in peace-time, even if stationed in 
distant areas, is still wounding to national dignity, and can only be interpreted by 
Egyptian public opinion as the tangible sign of a mistrust which the British 
Government themselves, we believe, must regard as unjustified. (…) It goes without 
saying that the negotiations will include the question of the Sudan and will be inspired 
by the interests and aspirations of the Sudanese.171 
 
In April 1946, London decided to send a delegation to Cairo. When the talks 
opened, Ernest Bevin – Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during 
Clement Attlee's office period – expressed hope that Anglo-Egyptian 
relations could strengthen "on a footing of full and free partnership as 
between equals in defense of their mutual interests, and with full respect for 
the independence and sovereignty of Egypt.”172 Actually, Bevin wanted to 
preserve the essential figures of the 1936 treaty but removing all grounds for 
Egyptian claims of British occupation.173 He knew that the British military 
presence in Egypt was crucial on strategic grounds. "If we move out of the 
Mediterranean" Bevin explained to the Defense Committee in mid-1946, 
"Russia will move in, and the Mediterranean countries, from the point of 
view of commerce and trade, economy and democracy, will be finished.”174 
Moreover, London was committed to self-government in Sudan, and it was 
incompatible with the Egyptian's project of unity with Sudan.175  
On the other hand, Ismail Sidqi – the Egyptian Prime Minister during the 
1946’s negotiations – received the British delegation asking the 
unconditional withdrawal of military forces from the country. Sidqi argued 
that the presence of foreign forces undermined Egyptian sovereignty, 
violated the United Nations Charter, and interfered in Egyptian domestic 
politics.176 Although the British did not expect this tight line, Attlee and 
Bevin preferred to accommodate the Egyptians announcing their intention to 
withdraw the troops from the country. As the Chief of Staff explained, "It 
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would be better...to make a bold gesture at the outset... and thus hope to gain 
the willing cooperation of the Egyptian Government in negotiating the base 
and other requirements in Egypt which are essential to us both in war and 
also in peace."177 According to this view, London announced the troops to 
be evacuated from Cairo and Alexandria by the end of the year.178  
However, London could not accept to leave the country unconditionally. 
When Bevin told the House of Common that he would not "leave a vacuum 
[in Egypt]”, the negotiations in Cairo entered a prolonged impasse.179 
Moreover, the issue of Sudan was even more complicated. In late April, 
Hubert Huddleston – General Governor of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan – 
expressed publicly in favor of a free and independent Sudan “which will 
define ... for itself its relations with Great Britain and with Egypt".180 Cairo 
instead wanted the unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown. 
Although Bevin publicly repudiated Huddleston’s statements, he was 
determined to support the Sudanese self-government. The status of Sudan 
became soon the "stone wall" (as Bevin used to say) of the Anglo-Egyptian 
discussions, even more than the troops' withdrawal.181 
 
 
3.2.From the Sidqi- Bevin agreement to the Egyptian appeal to the Security 
Council 
 
In October 1946, Sidqi traveled to London personally to negotiate a 
compromise with Bevin. The two leaders agreed on many issues as the 
evacuation of British troops and the establishment of a joint defense board 
to activate in the event of war in the Middle East. However, the Sudan issue 
was handled through an ambiguous compromise. While Cairo demanded the 
British recognition of Egyptian sovereignty in Sudan, the British supported 
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the Sudanese right of self-determination.182 The Bevin-Sidqi protocol finally 
recognized both "the framework of unity between the Sudan and Egypt 
under the common crown of Egypt" and the right of Sudan to achieve 
independence and decide its own future.183  
     The British and Egyptian claims over Sudan were partially conceivable, 
but different interpretations made them incompatible. In the British view, 
the protocol did not alter the status quo in Sudan unless Sudanese people 
asked for some change. Differently, as Sidqi came back to Cairo, he 
declared he had secured the Egyptian-Sudanese unity. It provoked rioting in 
Khartoum by pro-British parties. On the other hand, Bevin publicly 
repudiated Sidqi’s declaration, and Attlee later explained that British "had to 
regard the susceptibilities and real interests of the Sudanese people” against 
the Egyptian elites.184  
The turmoil favored Sidqi’s resignation, while the new Prime Minister 
Nuqrashi publicly announced to the Egyptian House of Representatives the 
break of the negotiations. Since Britain aimed to divide Sudan from Egypt, 
Nuqrashi announced that Egypt would appeal to the Security Council for 
obtaining the foreign troops’ withdrawal from the entire Nile Valley.185 
In August 1947, Egyptian and British officials debated during Security 
Council sessions at Lake Success. Cairo, however, was not able to obtain a 
favorable resolution in the following months.186 The historian Peter Hahn so 
described this period: 
 
Between January 1947 and April 1948, the Anglo-Egyptian impasse over the Canal 
Zone base and Sudan hardened. Britain frustrated Egypt's appeal to the Security 
Council in 1947, and Bevin failed to resume productive Anglo- Egyptian negotiations 
in early 1948. The irreconcilable British and Egyptian aspirations regarding Sudan that 
produced deadlock in December 1946 persisted in 1948. Meanwhile, British strategists 
reconsidered their willingness to evacuate the Canal Zone base by 1949 and decided to 
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retain facilities there for as long as possible. In April 1948, Britain and Egypt were 
further from settlement than they had been in December 1946.187 
 
Meanwhile, the end of the British mandate in Palestine opened a new issue 
in the Egyptian foreign policy agenda. 
 
 
3.3.The Palestine conflict  
 
On 15 May 1948, Britain terminated its mandate over Palestine leaving a 
massive vacuum of power in the country.188 That same day David Ben-
Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel triggering the Arabs’ armed reaction. 
The Egyptian government expected the war to be a quick and easy task to 
solve in few days.189 However, Israel prevailed on the Arab states and 
invaded Egypt on 7 January 1949. Although the two countries signed a 
bilateral armistice at Rhodes on 24 February, Cairo brought back heavy 
losses from the conflict in both military and financial terms.     
The Arab defeat originated from both the Israeli military superiority and the 
inter-Arab divisions and conflicting ambitions.190 For our purposes, the 
Palestinian conflict and the establishment of an Israeli state affected the 
Anglo-Egyptian relations negatively in several ways. While Britain failed to 
respond to Egypt's demands for help during the war, Cairo intensified the 
restrictions on the Suez Canal shipping. Moreover, the Israeli invasion of 
Egypt demonstrated that Cairo was incapable of defending its territory 
without foreign assistance. That strengthened the British's belief that 
complete and unconditional withdrawal was inopportune, especially in the 
Suez Canal Zone. On the other hand, the establishment of the Israeli state 
restricted the freedom of action of both allies. Egypt now considered Israel 
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as a stronger hostile neighbor it had to deal with. Britain had lost Palestine 
as a possible alternative military base in the Eastern Mediterranean.191   
 
 
3.4.The last round of negotiations  
 
In early January 1950, Nahhas Pasha became again Prime Minister of 
Egypt. At that time, Bevin reached Cairo to engage in several conversations 
with Egyptian ministers about the desirability of a new agreement. The 
historian Alan Bullock so described Bevin’s conversation with Saleh el-Din, 
the Egyptian Foreign Minister:  
 
In conversation with the Foreign Minister, [Bevin] pointed to the American use of 
bases in the UK as part of the NATO defense plan, arguing that, with NATO looking 
after the defense of Western Europe and with the USA taking an increased interest in 
the Far East, there was a gap in the Middle East. Saleh el-Din agreed about the gap but 
would not accept that Americans using facilities in the UK were in the same position as 
the British in Egypt: the difference was that the USA and the UK treated each other on 
the basis of equality. This was the heart of the matter as far as the Egyptians were 
concerned: even without raising the question of the Sudan, they were unwilling to 
consider any defense agreement without the prior evacuation of the Canal Zone, a 
condition that the British, including Bevin, equally stubbornly refused to consider.192    
 
British forces in 1950 numbered over three times the amount of 10,000 
allowed by the treaty. More precisely, the ‘Land Striking Force’ accounted 
for 7,000; the Royal Air Force and army defense units, 10.000; and the 
personnel of General Headquarters and base troops, 13.000.193 
In March, the Egyptian government asked to resume negotiations. In late 
May, the formal meetings took place in Cairo. However, in late 1950 Anglo-
Egyptian negotiations were still deadlocked.194 
     When Herbert Morrison substituted Bevin as Foreign Secretary, the 
British government still believed that appeasement of Egypt would lead to a 
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deterioration of the British's position as a world power.195 After the failure 
of negotiations in mid-1951, the British tried to define a new security 
agreement with Egypt including the United States, known as the Middle 
East Command (MEC). However, the British were not able to give a new 
look to the combined Anglo-American engagement. As the historian Peter 
Hahn pointed out, 
 
[a]s originally conceived in London, however, the MEC would ensure Britain’s 
hegemony at the expense of Egypt and the other Arab states, which would be relegated 
to an advisory role only. Not were the Americans willing to concede the Arabs a truly 
equal voice, either in the negotiations regarding Egypt’s right to restrict traffic on the 
Suez Canal or in those involving the Anglo-American plan for the MEC. They sided 
with the British in the dispute over transit rights and settled for a plan that would give 
Egyptian officers only nominal command of British troops. In these and other ways the 
Anglo-Americans treated Egypt as an unequal partner, which helps to explain the anti-
western demonstrations in Cairo and the decision of the government there to reject the 
Anglo-American proposal and abrogate the treaty of 1936. 
 
 
4. The British hard restraint and the Egyptian detachment: the 
processes of alliance termination 
 
This last section accounts for the alliance processes leading to the security 
treaty termination. Firstly, it describes the British politics of restraint. The 
analysis shows that the stronger ally adopted a hard posture increasing the 
weaker partner's dissatisfaction. Secondly, it focuses on the Egyptian's 
attitudes before Cairo's unilateral act of alliance abrogation. Since the failure 
of Bevin-Sidqi agreement, we can find evidence of the Egyptian detachment 
on two main plans: attempts to diversify arm suppliers and attempts to 
undermine the British primacy in the Middle East building an alternative 
defense system of alliances.  
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4.1.Britain politics of hard restraint 
 
Following the end of World War II, Britain still considered Egypt as a key 
ally in the Eastern Mediterranean because of its geographical position 
connecting the African and the Asian continents. The Suez Canal Zone, 
then, was an invaluable overseas asset, which assured the oil supplies from 
the Middle East and a quick connection with colonial and ex-colonial states. 
Therefore, keeping the military access on the Egyptian territory in wartime 
(and eventually stationed troops in peacetime) was a core British interest as 
much as the exclusive control of the Suez Canal Zone. 
In the British strategy, the control over Sudan represented the best tool to 
restrain the Egyptian ambitions and freedom of action.196 Because of the 
interdependence between the two countries, British politicians thought, 
"who control Sudan, then control Egypt”.197 Therefore, preserving the 
division of Egypt and Sudan was essential for the British power projection. 
As the analyst Lawrence Fabumni pointed out, 
 
Britain struggled against the ‘Unity of the Nile Valley’ for fear that Egypt-Sudanese 
union might create one of the strongest power states in the Mediterranean and the most 
powerful in the Red Sea – a state that would include both the 22 million Egyptians and 
the 8 million Sudanese, whose military potentially was fully brought home to the 
British during the First World War, the Italo-Abyssinian War, and the Second World 
War. Within a short space of time, such a state might challenge British interests and 
authority in the Mediterranean and Africa. With a natural desire to prevent, or at least 
delay, the formation of such a state, Britain persistently maneuvered to maintain the 
Sudan under the British regime, thereby ensuring its effective influence on Egyptian 
policy.198 
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Moreover, in the view of preserving Britain’s status as a great power in the 
early Cold War, British imperial strategists wanted to hold London primacy 
in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.199 They rejected any retreat 
strategy fearing that Britain could be considered as a junior partner by its 
former wartime allies. According to the scholar Michel Doran, 
 
The weakness of Britain vis-à-vis the superpowers compelled statesmen in London to 
gird themselves for a struggle with their wartime allies, who, purely on the basis of the 
arrogance of power, might not be inclined to respect British interests in the postwar 
era. Contemplating the present differential in capabilities and gambling that the 
economic recovery of Britain would diminish that differential, British diplomatists 
resolved that they must refuse to relinquish control over traditional spheres of interest. 
They believed that if their government, as a result of temporary weakness, allowed its 
international position to erode, then even after an economic recovery it would be 
impossible for Britain to regain the status of a great power. Retreat, they reckoned, 
would be permanent; hunkering down offered the only basis for hope.200 
 
Therefore, British politicians opposed the «retreat thesis» in the Middle East 
to avoid the Russian involvement in the Mediterranean countries and to 
preserve bargaining power with Americans. The appeasement to Egypt in 
early 1946 originated from the belief that both Palestine and Cyrenaica were 
likely to be available for stationing troops. However, following the decision 
in early 1947 to withdraw from Palestine and the failure of Bevin-Sidqi 
protocol, British decided to reaffirm the 1936 military clauses, which gave 
Britain the right to keep forces in Egypt in peacetime. Moreover, British 
strategists valued that the increasing Soviet threat imposed the deployment 
of a significant military contingent in Egypt, despite Cairo’s opposition.201  
When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the possibility of an enlarged 
conflict made essential the strategic control of the Middle East. 
Notwithstanding Egypt’s demands, Britain considered Cairo as a junior ally 
that had to conform to London’s requests. In May 1950, the British Chiefs 
of Staff described the ideal military arrangements in the Middle East as “a 
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regional pact consisting of the UK, the Arab League States, Israel, Turkey, 
Persia and possibly Greece, in which Egypt as a willing partner would 
provide the base facilities required."202 As Bevin’s biographer Alan Bullock 
pointed out, the COS expressed the widespread view that Egypt was a 
weaker ally that had to comply with the British interests. This strategic view 
was the core of the British politics of hard restraint and paved the way for 
the Egyptian’s detachment from the major ally. 
 
 
4.2. Egypt looking for alternative arms suppliers  
 
Because of the British policy of weapons supply, since 1947 Egypt 
attempted to explore an arms deal with third countries, both from the 
western and communist bloc. In April 1947, Prime Minister Nuqrashi sent a 
delegation to the United States asking to establish a U.S. military mission 
and to agree on a weapon supplies arrangement.203 The U.S., however, 
preferred to avoid antagonizing the British and limited the aid to Cairo. 
Then, as the tension arose in Palestine, the State Department suspended any 
arms export to the Middle East.204 On the other hand, Cairo started 
negotiations also with the communist bloc. In 1947, Egypt ordered weapons 
from Czechoslovakia totaling 368 million Koruna.205 However, the embargo 
imposed by the Security Council made ineffective this attempt by Cairo to 
establish a new channel of weapons supply. 
In 1949, following the defeat against Israel, buying arms became an even 
more urgent issue. Egypt came back to the major ally, but Britain suspended 
the arms supply because of the deadlock on the treaty negotiations. In 1951, 
the Waft government, without reporting to Britain, sent another delegation 
to Europe in search of arms.206 Because of these efforts, Egypt signed a new 
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agreement with Czechoslovakia on 24 October 1951, which committed to 
provide Cairo with “arms and ammunition – to be selected by Egyptian 
experts – worth about 600 million Egyptian pounds, to be paid in Egyptian 
cotton.”207 
 
 
4.3. Egyptian diplomacy undermining the British primacy in the Middle 
East 
 
On the other hand, the Egyptian detachment from Britain expressed on the 
strategic ground of international diplomacy. Firstly, Cairo challenged the 
ally in the United Nations. As Doran reported, 
 
During the first meeting of the Security Council, the Egyptian delegation, which held 
one of the temporary seats, displayed an alarming tendency to support the anti-British 
initiatives of the Soviet Union. In the case of Indonesia, for instance, the Egyptians 
were the only members of the council who voted together with the Poles and the 
Soviets for the immediate withdrawal of British troops; in the case of the Levant, the 
Egyptians also pursued an anti-British line. Though less aggressive on the matter of 
Greece, Cairo nonetheless did not fall in directly behind London.208 
 
The failure of the Egyptian appeal to the Security Council suggested 
focusing more strictly on inter-Arab relations. Since the collapse of the 
Bevin-Sidqi agreement, Egypt initiated an anti-British campaign looking for 
the support of other British's allies as Jordan and Iraq. In January 1947, the 
ambassador in Cairo raised a severe warning writing to London. 
 
There is every indication that King Farouk, and [the Secretary General of the Arab 
League Abd al-Rahman] Azzam are endeavoring to undermine friendly Hashemite 
rulers in Iraq and Trans-Jordan; thus the Egyptian influence is being used to alienate 
Arab states generally from Great Britain…It seems to me that an  essential condition of 
maintaining our positions in the Middle East is that we should show firmness, by 
which both friends and enemies will realize that we are not going to allow ourselves to 
be driven out of the Middle East by Egypt and that our patience and conciliatory 
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attitude during negotiations does not mean we can be driven to any position the 
Egyptians choose.209 
 
This Egyptian’s new attitude represented a juncture in the interallied 
relations because the weaker ally opposed the dominant partner directly. 
Following the British withdrawal from Palestine, Cairo strengthened its 
policy aiming to undermine the British primacy in the region. As Doran 
pointed out, 
 
The Arab-bloc initiative is certainly of intrinsic interest, but the timing of King Faruq’s 
approach also adds to its historical importance. The Palace’s decision to launch a 
proposal for a new regional order during the civil war in Palestine suggests a 
connection between the initiative for an Arab League defense organization and the end 
of the British Mandate. First and foremost, the idea of creating an Arab bloc commands 
attention because immediately after the Palestine war the Egyptians did, in fact, 
establish an Arab League Defense Pact.  
 
The establishment of a system of Arab collective security was realized then 
in 1950. It was a further step to pursue Egyptian independence, to exclude 
Britain and favor the Egyptian primacy in the region.210   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
On 8 October 1951, the Prime Minister Nahhas asked the Egyptian 
Parliament to abrogate the 1936 treaty and the 1899 condominium 
agreement. The Parliament approved with an overwhelming majority giving 
full support to Nahhas. The decision was justified by the lack of British's 
recognition of Egypt national aspirations: London had monopolized the 
administration of Sudan and denied the Egyptians project of unity; it 
maintained three times the number of troops in the Suez Canal Zone 
permitted under the 1936 treaty; and denied Cairo the supplies of arms and 
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equipment necessary for its defense.211 In sum, the British's intransigence 
made as ineffective any Egyptian attempt to voice and forced the minor ally 
to oppose the major partner directly until the decision to terminate the 
alliance unilaterally. 
     For the purposes of our inquiry, we found abundant evidence that voice 
ineffectiveness led to Egypt detachment and unilateral abrogation in 1951. 
The government of Sidqi had a vision of regional order "that would have 
diminished, but not eliminated, British participation in regional defense.”212 
Following the failure of Bevin-Sidqi agreements, Egypt was not able to 
establish a favorable interallied cooperation preferring to renounce the 
major partner’s protection. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
The Anglo-Iraqi alliance in the early Cold War:  
a case of alliance persistence 
 
 
 
Britain and Iraq signed a treaty of defense alliance in 1930, which became 
valid after Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932. The treaty 
replaced all previous agreements between the two countries (Article 7) and 
was supposed to last for 25 years (Article 11). It was a typical defense pact 
between one great power and one minor state including asymmetric and 
non-reciprocal obligations between the partners. On the one hand, Britain 
provided protection to the weaker ally against third parties (Article 3). 
London, then, was in charge of Iraqi needs in the military field, as arms 
supplies and military training (annex Article 5). On the other hand, Iraq 
guaranteed the use of facilities on its territory – as railways, rivers, ports, 
aerodromes, and means of communication – and assistance to the major 
partner in the event or imminent menace of war (Article 4). Moreover, Iraq 
granted Britain two sites upon Iraqi territory to install airbases and maintain 
military forces (Art. 5).  
The treaty did not oblige Baghdad to consult the British on domestic 
matters, but the system of advisers in the Iraqi administration became an 
effective instrument of external political influence.213 As the scholar Joseph 
Sassoon pointed out, “the British continued their policy of giving the Iraqis 
more power in administering their own affairs, while continuing to influence 
them through the advisers. A good illustration of this policy was the 1936 
agreement transferring ownership of the Iraqi State Railways to the Iraqi 
government, while leaving all the key positions in British hands”.214 
Similarly, in the field of foreign affairs, the weaker ally used to conform to 
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the major partner’s choices. As World War II broke out and Britain declared 
war on Germany, Baghdad broke off diplomatic relations with Berlin and 
assured its cooperation to London.  
However, by March 1940, the interallied relations suffered a deep crisis 
because of the British request of stationing troops in Basra.215 When London 
– facing a difficult fight with the Germans – sought to enforce the treaty, the 
new Iraqi premier Rashid Ali feared another British military occupation and 
led a revolt in April 1941. The British suppressed the revolt in four weeks 
and entered in Baghdad by the end of May 1941. The new Iraqi government 
led by Nuri as-Said fully supported the major ally and declared war on 
Germany at the beginning of 1943.216 
For the purposes of our inquiry, the interallied crisis of 1941 cannot be a 
trigger point because Iraq mostly missed control over its domestic and 
foreign policy. As two British analysts pointed out, "Iraq was in an 
important sense an occupied country during the war (…) Her history in this 
period was shaped in the main by forces operating far away from her 
territory and over which she could exert no control".217 Moreover, Rashid 
Ali’s plan to favor the Germans looked like an attempt of bandwagoning, 
rather than a quest for Iraqi autonomy. 
Differently, we will analyze the period from the end of World War II to the 
British's adhesion to the Baghdad Pact in 1955. As a case of alliance 
persistence, the allies overcame an internal crisis as the weaker ally was 
successful in its quest for autonomy and the dominant partner adopted a soft 
approach. From the Iraqi perspective, the Baghdad Pact was not merely a 
product of the Cold War, but the result of a struggle for regional 
dominance.218 As the historian Elie Podeh argued, “Nuri considered the 
Baghdad Pact a substitute for the Fertile Crescent plan and the Arab League 
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– schemes he had devised but there were either blocked or taken over by 
Egypt.”219 It was not merely a security agreement, but an alliance that 
enhanced Iraq's regional and international status. On the other hand, Britain 
was able to accommodate the weaker partner's needs and support its 
regional plans. The effectiveness of the Iraqi's voice, therefore, avoided the 
alliance termination.   
     The following chapter develops in four sections. The first section 
describes the Iraqi ambitions at the end of World War II. As we need to 
focus on the weaker ally's quest for autonomy as the trigger point of the 
inquiry, this section depicts the Iraqi's plans for regional leadership and the 
sources of Iraq dissatisfaction toward Britain. The second section gives an 
account of the alliance variables. On the one hand, it measures the Iraqi 
security concerns and the alliance remuneration in order to settle the 
framework for the empirical inquiry. On the other, it accounts for the Iraqi 
voice attempts and its effectiveness. The third section describes the Anglo-
Iraqi relations historically from 1945 to 1955. The fourth section, finally, 
gives an account of the alliance processes. It firstly focuses on the Britain 
politics of soft restraint. Then, it analyses the weaker ally's strategic 
obeisance and the major side's policy concessions. These processes 
represent empirical evidence confirming the validity of the alliance 
persistence's model.     
 
 
1. How to define the case: Iraq ambitions at the end of World War II 
 
At the end of World War II, the Iraqi quest for autonomy expressed in two 
ways: the pursuit of regional leadership and the demand for changes in 
interallied relations. 
In 1943, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri already presented to Britain its plan 
for Iraqi leadership in the Arab world. The aim was to make Iraq the 
dominant state of the Fertile Crescent – an area including Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Palestine – while marginalizing Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia. The union with Syria was the cornerstone of this regional 
                                                           
219
 Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, intro  
  
77 
 
project. Moreover, Iraq aimed to reinforce its status becoming the leading 
intermediary between the Arab states and the non-Arab countries of the 
region, Turkey and Iran.220 
Once Nuri failed to persuade Britain to his Fertile Crescent project, he 
attempted to establish an inter-Arab organization under Iraqi leadership. The 
Arab League, however, soon became a tool for the Egyptian’s foreign 
policy. According to the scholar Elie Podeh, “Nuri long harbored 
resentment against the British for allowing this to happen (…) He 
subsequently viewed a regional defense pact centered on Baghdad as a 
powerful countermeasure to Egyptian domination of the League". Such a 
pact could attract other Arab states and isolate Cairo. The Baghdad Pact, 
therefore, became a modified version of the Fertile Crescent project aiming 
to combine the three Iraqi's main goals after World War II: achieving Arab 
hegemony, revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and confronting the Soviet 
threat.221  
Indeed changes in interallied relations – and specifically the revision of the 
1930 Treaty – became a significant issue in Iraqi domestic agenda after 
World War II.222 As Sassoon pointed out,  
 
[t]owards the end of the war, the Iraqi press began calling on Britain ‘to remove the 
last vestige of imperfection in Iraq’s independence’. The government formed by 
Tawfiq as-Suwaydi in February 1946 set up a committee to study the treaty’s revision, 
and the subsequent fall of Suwaydi’s government three months later did not alter this 
trend of thought among Iraqi politicians. British officials began reporting ‘slight signs 
of increased anti-British feeling’, expressed in sharp press attacks on British 
advisers.223 
 
Iraqi politicians, therefore, aimed to increase Iraq's independence by 
removing the limitations enforced by the 1930 treaty. Many issues were at 
stake. Firstly, the British control on the Habbaniya and Shaiba air bases 
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represented a limitation of the country sovereignty. Therefore, an alternative 
defense system had to be defined to preserve British interests and Iraqi 
security.224 Then, the British influence in Iraqi administration and domestic 
politics had to be limited. It is not a case, as the historian Daniel Silverfarb 
reported, that in 1946 and 1947 "Iraqi leaders dismissed nearly all of the 
British advisers whom they had employed during the war and did not 
replace them.”225 In foreign affairs, finally, Iraqi politicians desired greater 
freedom and support from the partner to gain leadership in the Arab 
world.226 The British's preference for Egypt, however, impeded the 
realization of Iraqi regional leadership. In this view, the British adhesion to 
the Baghdad Pact in 1955 was hugely significant for the Iraqi ambitions: it 
was the first time that Britain took side clearly between Iraq and Egypt in 
favor of Baghdad.   
In sum, in the aftermath of World War II Iraq clearly expressed a quest for 
autonomy. The effectiveness of the weaker side’s voice, then, led to the 
persistence of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance through the Baghdad Pact.  
 
 
2. The Alliance Variables 
 
This section describes the variables that lead the empirical inquiry. Looking 
from the weaker side’s perspective, it measures the Iraqi security concerns 
and the alliance remuneration. These variables assume the values as a Type 
I case. Then, this section accounts for the minor ally’s voice attempts and its 
effectiveness. The analysis shows that the Iraqi voice was effective as the 
minor ally was able to improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of 
its needs. 
Overall, the Anglo-Iraqi alliance fits the theoretical framework as a case of 
alliance persistence. Firstly, the case passes the test for case selection 
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successfully, as the Iraqi security concerns increase while the alliance 
remuneration decreases in the period under consideration. Secondly, the 
explicative variables fit the theoretic expectations comfortably as the 
effectiveness of the Iraqi voice led to the alliance renewal in 1955. The 
following paragraphs will describe the variables in details. 
 
 
2.1. Iraq increasing security concerns 
 
2.1.1. External threats: Iraq and the Middle East balance of power 
 
At the end of World War II, Iraqi’s general external threats still concerned 
the integrity of the country borders toward neighbor states as Iran and 
Turkey. As Eppel pointed out,  
 
Iraq had signed the 1937 Saadabad Pact of friendship and cooperation with Iran, 
Turkey, and Afghanistan, and the four states shared a common interest in preventing 
the establishment of a Kurdish state. Nonetheless, relations between them were 
characterized by suspicion. Iraq felt threatened by the superior strength of Iran and 
Turkey and the unresolved border issues and disputes.227  
 
Moreover, Baghdad was involved in limiting the influence of rising actors 
in the Arab world as Egypt and Israel. On the one hand, Iraq and Egypt were 
involved in a struggle for regional dominance since 1945. The Arab system 
then polarized in two main blocs: the Hashemite countries, Iraq and Jordan, 
opposed to the Egypt-Saudi entente. Once Nasser took power in 1952, the 
struggle intensified as Cairo assumed a more aggressive policy aiming to 
lead the Arab countries against the western powers. Then, while the struggle 
for the regional leadership with Egypt developed on the strategic ground of 
inter-Arab relationships, Iraq fought and lost in Palestine against the Israeli 
military forces in 1948-1949.228 The war did not avoid the establishment of 
an Israeli state and demonstrated the Iraqi military weakness. 
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Finally, the Soviet Union was another source of security concerns for Iraq. 
Following the end of World War II, Moscow pressured the “Northern Tier” 
countries demanding territory and base rights from Turkey (Kars, Ardhan, 
and Bosporus) and supporting separatist movements in Iraq and the 
communist forces in the Greek civil war.229 Iraqi politicians, therefore, 
feared both the strengthening of the domestic challenge posed by the Iraqi 
Communist Party, and the Soviet’s support to the Kurd minorities.  
 
 
2.1.2. Internal threats: the regime instability and the Cold War nexus  
 
Analyzing Iraqi internal security since 1945, the historian Matthew Elliot 
argued that "the country problems were very great and the extent of 
discontent correspondingly large, so that the regime faced a day-to-day 
struggle for survival with the threat of disorder or coup d'état rarely 
absent.”230 Iraqi domestic security concerned the maintenance of internal 
order, political stability and the assurance of the subordination of ethnic 
groups as the Kurds to the central government.  
In the years following the end of World War II, the streets of Baghdad often 
hold violent antigovernment demonstrations led by illegal communist 
organizations.231 Iraqi politicians perceived the threat of communism to the 
monarchy seriously. Leftist ideas were widely appreciated by students 
(almost 85% of students of secondary and higher institutions belonged to 
leftist organizations by 1954), and the Communist Party reached 
approximately 5.000 members by 1953-1954.232 The first large-scale 
uprising broke up in January 1948, known as Wathba. A few months later, 
as the Arab-Israeli war began, the government declared the martial law 
terminating the series of strikes and demonstrations. In November 1952, 
domestic unrest erupted again in violent public disturbances. As the police 
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was unable to keep the order, the Regent turned to the army and martial law 
was declared.  
Although internal order was restored partially in 1953, the country’s 
political stability was not: from 1953 to 1958, 11 Cabinets changed and 9 
different persons held the office of Prime Minister.233  
On the other hand, Iraq's internal weakness came from the complex 
composition of its population. Following the end of World War II, Iraqi 
politicians began to fear that Soviets could support Kurd separatism and, 
eventually, invade Iraq through Kurdistan. Kurds composed indeed almost 
20% of the Iraqi population inhabiting adjacent areas in Iran, Turkey, and 
Iraq. Traditionally unreceptive to rule from Baghdad, the Kurds rose against 
the central government in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.234 Once the cold war 
reached its peak in the early 1950s, Iraqi felt that Kurds might achieve 
substantial support from an extra-regional superpower. As the historian 
Roger Louis pointed out, "the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union 
instilled a fear of Russian expansion in some Iraqi nationalists that most 
Egyptian nationalists never shared.”235   
 
 
2.2. The Alliance remuneration 
 
At the end of World War II, Britain reduced its ability to provide Iraqi 
military forces with equipment and supplies. The British inefficiency had 
two main reasons. Firstly, the United States imposed restrictions on British 
export of military equipment that Britain had received under the Lend-Lease 
program. Secondly, London decided to decrease its internal production of 
military equipment in order to favor the production of civilian goods.236 
This alliance-deficit increased tensions in Anglo-Iraqi relations. As Louis 
pointed out, Iraqi “wished to modernize the army with new military vehicles 
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and equipment and to have the British send a military mission to Iraq to 
train a nucleolus of officers in the use of modern weapons.”237 London, 
however, offered only second-hand merchandise while Iraqis officers 
wanted new equipment.   
In mid-1947, Baghdad refuted most of the second-hand equipment belonged 
to the British forces that were evacuating the country.238 Once the Palestine 
conflict broke out and Britain adhered to the international embargo on the 
supply of arms to the Middle East, the Iraqi army did not have any tanks. 
Although Baghdad requested new supplies, Britain refused to sign any new 
arms contracts because of the international agreements, and plausibly 
facilitated Israeli victory.    
During the early 1950s, Iraqi officials often complained because of delays in 
the delivery of British arms and ammunition. Moreover, they argued that 
London assigned a small number of vacancies in British Army training 
courses to Iraqis.239 By describing the mood of Iraqi officials toward the 
major ally, the historian David Silverfarb pointed out that 
 
[t]o them it appeared that Britain was attempting to keep the Iraqi armed forces as a 
type of police, equipped and trained only for internal security, and therefore incapable 
of threatening Britain’s position either within Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East. 
Even when Britain did deliver weapons, the Iraqis complained about the continual 
delays, the frequent receipt, and the fact that they had to pay what they considered to 
be excessively high prices.240 
 
In mid-1950, Britain signed the Tripartite Declaration with France and the 
United States to control arms supply in the Middle East. The western 
powers aimed to avoid an arms competition in the aftermath of the 
Palestinian conflict.241 However, Iraqi felt that they were getting little 
support from the British ally. In 1951, a senior British intelligence officer 
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reported about the Iraqi discontent writing that “the view is strongly held 
that the failure by the West to supply arms to Iraq in adequate quantities will 
tend to heighten the feeling of isolation and despondency felt by many 
Iraqis, and encourage a policy of neutrality.”242  
In February 1953, Nuri met British and American diplomats and strongly 
pressured them for arms. As the scholar Daniel Williamson reported, "Nuri 
stated that he ‘was not satisfied with the policies of the British and United 
States governments in furnishing equipment and supplies’. Nuri expressed a 
desire for the most modern arms available and claimed that Iraq could pay 
for these arms, although dollars were in short supply”. At the Iraqi request, 
the British answered quite coldly. Williamson reported on the meetings 
between Nuri and Troutbeck, the British ambassador to Baghdad: 
 
Troutbeck expressed support for Iraq's goal of an expanded military and claimed that 
London was willing to live up to its treaty obligations to assist Iraq. However, the 
ambassador said that Britain "would only consider further assistance as part of the 
regional defense problem." (…) When Nuri renewed the Iraqi request for a grant of 
arms later in the summer, Troutbeck told more bluntly that it would be impossible to 
fulfill his request. As Troutbeck explained, Britain had many bilateral and multilateral 
military alliances and could not afford to a precedent by giving arms to Iraq, as its 
other allies would then demand similar.243 
 
Although the alliance treaty established that Britain had to provide Iraqi 
forces with "arms, ammunition, equipment, ships and airplanes of the latest 
available pattern (…) whenever they may be required"244, Iraqi officers and 
politicians were dissatisfied by the major ally supplies, both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms. Although the Iraqi forces had sufficient equipment to 
keep internal order, it was not possible to adopt an ambitious policy in the 
Arab world. In this view, the alliance remuneration was insufficient for 
Iraqi's goals. 
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2.3. Iraq’s voice attempts and its effectiveness 
 
At the end of World War II, Iraqi politicians wanted to revise the alliance 
treaty to establish a balanced relation with Britain, not as one imposed by a 
stronger partner upon a junior one. The historian David Silverfarb argued 
that also formal aspects became significant for Iraqi politicians. 
 
For Iraqi leaders the clauses requiring them to give precedence to the British 
ambassador in Baghdad over the representatives of all other nations and preventing 
them from elevating the status of their legation in London to that of an embassy were 
some of the annoying features of the treaty. Although these diplomatic provisions did 
not have much practical effect, they symbolized Britain’s dominant position in Iraq and 
Iraq’s subordinate status. The fact that Egypt had an embassy in London, and thereby a 
superior status to Iraq, made this restrictions particularly irritating.245 
 
Another symbol of Britain’s overweening presence in Iraq was the British 
control of air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba. In August 1947, General 
Renton – the head of the British military mission in Iraq – wrote to the FO.  
 
[F]rom the Iraqi officers point of view the retention of bases of foreign power in their 
country is humiliating and this is being continually rubbed into them by all other Arab 
countries as an instance of incomplete independence (…) any attempt to bind Iraq to 
provide bases for a further period would be bitterly resented in the Army as a whole as 
humiliating and unnecessary.246   
 
However, in a later memorandum, Renton reported that the Iraqi army still 
desired more in-depth cooperation with the major ally, but on equal footing. 
 
I know that the leading officers of the younger generation of the Army will expect 
great thing from a Joint Defense Board (…) to serve on the Joint Defense Board would 
be the ambition of all the best officers of the Army, especially of those who had 
graduated at the British Staff College.247  
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However, once the Iraqi parliament rejected the Portsmouth Treaty in 
January 1948, the two allies waited several years before entering in new 
negotiations. A second opportunity came in 1953-1954 when Iraq gained 
more internal stability, and Britain switched from Cairo to Baghdad as its 
main regional ally in the Middle East. Waldemar Gallman, the United States 
ambassador in Baghdad during 1954-1958, so described Nuri’s ideas and 
determination in his memories. 
 
[In August 1954] Nuri made a more detailed statement before the Financial Affairs 
Committee of Parliament. The British government, he said, had been notified that Iraq 
did not intend renewing or prolonging the 1930 Treaty, nor would Iraq be prepared to 
replace the treaty by another bilateral agreement as was customary before World War I. 
In any negotiations Iraq would be guided by Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations 
Charter which contain principles for defense and the maintenance of peace as exercised 
by sovereign, independent countries throughout the world.248 
 
Iraqis, therefore, made clear that the Anglo-Iraqi relations had to evolve on 
an equal footing. The British control of air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba, 
for instance, was no more feasible because it was a violation of Iraqi 
sovereignty. 
On the other hand, Baghdad needed the ally's support for pursuing its 
regional leadership. Nuri plans had been already rejected by Britain on 
several occasions. In 1943, Britain did not favor the original Fertile Crescent 
project; in 1945, Britain did not support Iraqi leadership of the Arab League; 
in 1949 and 1951, Nuri proposed an Arab defense pact tied to the West, but 
London refused.249 In 1955, the plan for the Baghdad Pact became Nuri’s 
last occasion to raise Iraqi voice, restoring the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on 
favorable terms and establishing the basis for a regional defense 
organization centered on Baghdad.250  
The British adhesion to the treaty in April 1955 evidenced that Iraqi voice 
attempts became effective finally. While the agreement established that Iraq 
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did not commit beyond its borders (Article 3), the air bases of Habbaniya 
and Shaiba were transferred to Iraq sovereignty. Moreover, Britain made 
several concessions. London joined a pact which invited other Arab states to 
adhere and implicitly (but clearly) excluded Israel; it took sides between 
Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad; it linked the persistence of the Anglo-
Iraq special agreement to the continuation of the Baghdad Pact (Article 9, 
letter b). 
The Baghdad Pact, finally, realized the Iraqi requests to Britain since the 
end of World War II and made effective the weaker side’s voice in the 
alliance.  
 
 
3. The Anglo-Iraqi relations from 1945 to 1955 
 
3.1. The Iraqi-Turkish agreement and the conflict in Palestine 
 
Following the end of World War II, Iraq needed to formulate a new regional 
policy able to increase its international status. The failure of earlier projects 
– as the Fertile Crescent plan rejected by Britain and the missed leadership 
of the Arab League impeded by the Egyptians – imposed a different 
strategy. To obtain a central role among the Arab states and gain a 
privileged position toward the Western powers, Iraq moved to strengthen 
relationships with its main non-Arab neighbor, Turkey. 
In summer 1945, Nuri adopted an initiative to improve cooperation between 
Baghdad and Ankara. He aimed to create a counterweight to Egypt 
introducing Turkey in the Arab politics and advantaging Iraq because of a 
special relationship with Ankara. Moreover, Iraq's connection with Turkey 
could encourage the Syrian to establish a federation with Baghdad.251 In 
March 1946, Nuri signed an Iraqi-Turkish agreement increasing cooperation 
in the areas of economics, communications, culture, and security. During his 
visit, Nuri declared that Turkey had a new status as a leader of the Arab 
countries.252 
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Secondly, Iraq became the leading promoter of the Arab struggle against 
Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish state. According to the scholar 
Michel Eppel, 
 
[a]t Arab League conferences between 1945 and 1948, Iraq—in contrast to the 
moderate approach adopted by the League secretary and by Egypt—took extreme 
militant positions regarding the Palestine question. Under the influence of Nuri al-Said 
and given the importance of the Palestine question in domestic Iraqi politics, Iraq 
transformed its own extremism with regard to the Palestine conflict into a means of 
undermining Egypt’s status and that of the secretary of the Arab League. According to 
Iraqi accusations, the League and its secretary were neglecting Palestine and refraining 
from taking any definitive stand in its defense, due to excessive weight placed by the 
League on Egyptian interests. In this way, Iraq was able to substantiate its argument to 
the effect that it was the staunchest supporter of the Arab nationalist cause.253 
 
Actually, from the 1930s on, Iraq exploited the Palestine question to realize 
its ambitions in Syria and its aim of Arab leadership in the Fertile Crescent. 
Moreover, during the Iraqi economic crisis of 1946-48, many Iraqi 
politicians thought that active involvement in Palestine could redirect the 
public opinion attention from domestic issues to an external nationalist 
topic. At the end of the conflict, Iraq did not participate in the peace 
negotiations and did not sign the armistice agreement with Israel. As Eppel 
argued, 
 
[t]his was perfectly in line with the Iraqi pattern of behavior which had prevailed 
regarding Palestine since the 1930s: obvious and declared adoption of a rigid, 
uncompromising position, exploiting the Palestine conflict to reinforce Iraq’s status in 
the inter-Arab arena as the champion of the pan-Arab nationalist struggle and to 
strengthen the nationalist image of the politicians and governments of Iraq in the eyes 
of domestic nationalist public opinion.254 
 
The Palestinian conflict also produced tensions in the Anglo-Iraqi relations. 
In January 1948, when Britain still held the mandate, Iraq infiltrated about 
900 volunteers – most of whom were former soldier or police officers – in 
Palestine to support the other Arab armed sections. London protested for 
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this illegal movement of armed forces within a territory still under its 
control, but Baghdad did not order any withdrawal. Once the conflict broke 
out in May, Iraqi officers criticized the British for not supporting them in 
the fights and for London's adherence to the international embargo. Britain, 
on the other hand, tried to persuade the weaker ally uselessly to accept the 
truce called by the Security Council and, later, the Bernadotte's proposal. 
Finally, the allies differed on the recognition of the Palestinian government 
in Gaza.255 The conflict in Palestine, therefore, aggravated the Anglo-Iraqi 
relations, which were already tense after the failure of the treaty revision.  
 
 
3.2.The abortive Treaty of Portsmouth 
 
Britain and Iraq began discussions for the treaty revision in May 1947 and 
concluded the negotiations in mid-January 1948. The Portsmouth treaty 
confirmed the fundamental British interests in Iraq and provided for some 
improvements in the weaker ally position.256 Iraqi negotiators believed that 
the new agreement was definitively better than the older one. As the 
historian David Silverfarb argued, 
 
[Iraq negotiators] had secured shared air bases, gained some control over Britain’s 
previous unrestricted right to move troops across Iraq, ended the obligation to consult 
with Britain on matters of foreign policies, and obtained the elimination of the levies, 
the military mission, and the requirement to hire only British subjects as advisers and 
employees (except for the armed forces). They had also received a number of valuable 
British-owned installations for free, procured financial assistance for the training of 
their officers in British military schools, and secured the termination of the railway 
agreement.257 
 
On the other hand, Britain obtained the right to use the air bases of 
Habbaniya and Shaiba in war and peace, and to keep the British units under 
their own command. Moreover, the treaty stipulated that Britain remained 
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the only supplier for Iraq in military matters, as arms supply and officers 
training.  
In general, the Portsmouth treaty made several concessions to the weaker 
side. However, wide popular opposition in Iraq developed against the new 
agreement. While Iraqi negotiators ignored demonstrations in early January, 
the signature of the treaty was followed by two bloody demonstrations, 
during which the police opened fire against the crowd and killed many 
protesters.258 As strikes and demonstrations broke out, the political forces 
demanded the rejection of the treaty transversally in order to end the British 
presence in Iraq. Iraqi politicians, even the pro-British ones, heavily 
criticized the agreement. The most important issue concerned the British use 
of the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba. Other criticisms focused on article 
3, which apparently forced Iraq to support Britain in all distant conflicts 
involving the major ally.259  
The popular insurrection of January 1948 became known as Wathba and 
forced the Prime Minister Jabr to resign, while the new government 
informed the British that the Iraqi parliament could not ratify the 
Portsmouth Treaty. However, the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was only partially 
responsible for the uprising. According to the scholar Joseph Sassoon, 
 
(…) the Portsmouth Treaty was abrogated not because of its contents but rather due to 
the circumstances surrounding its signature: the atmosphere of secrecy, and the fact 
that no Arabic translation of the text was prepared, aroused suspicions in nationalist 
circles in Iraq about the government’s intentions. The atmosphere of distrust was 
undoubtedly exacerbated by the financial crisis developing in Iraq in 1948, and by the 
events in Palestine.260 
 
Other domestic issues concerned the government’s rejection of the 
opposition demands for civil liberties and changes in the electoral system, 
which would guarantee free and direct election.261 The repudiation of 
Portsmouth Treaty, in other words, was mainly due to a domestic crisis, 
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which fed a firm anti-British opposition, rather than objectively unfavorable 
agreement terms.262 
 
 
3.3.Projects of regional defense: 1950-1954 
 
After the demise in Palestine and the failure to renew the agreement with 
Britain, Iraq engaged in new attempts to settle a favorable system of 
regional defense. In November 1949, Nuri proposed to Britain the 
establishment of an Arab defense pact tied to the West.263 Nuri aimed to 
oppose the Arab Collective Security Pact which Faruq – King of Egypt – 
proposed attending the October 1949 session of the Arab League. The Iraqi 
Prime Minister attempted firmly but in vain to ruin the Egyptian project. In 
November 1950, Nuri tried to persuade Syrian and Lebanese leaders to 
consider a regional pact based on the NATO model. In February 1951, Nuri 
made a last attempt proposing to the Ralph Stevenson – the British 
ambassador in Cairo – a different version of the Egyptian proposal which 
made possible for Britain and other states (as Turkey) to join. However, the 
Arab states and Britain did not want to oppose Egypt, and both rejected 
Nuri’s proposals.264  
On the other hand, Iraq tried to strengthen the Hashemite union with Jordan. 
However, Britain opposed to closer bilateral ties between Baghdad and 
Amman. During 1950 and 1951, the two countries exchanged several 
proposals to form a union, but London restrained the attempts of the two 
weaker allies.265 Therefore, to avoid isolation, Iraq joined the Arab 
Collective Security Pact led by Egypt in February 1951.266 
     In 1950-1952, Britain still considered Egypt as the main actor in Middle 
East. London defined two projects of regional defense system with the 
support of the United States, and both centered on Egypt. In September 
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1951, the two western powers proposed the "Middle East Command", which 
should involve the United States, Britain, France, Turkey, and Egypt as 
founding members. In June 1952, Britain and the United States projected a 
new plan for establishing the "Middle East Defense Organization". Both 
projects considered Iraq as a secondary actor and failed because of Egyptian 
refusal.267  
In May 1953, the United States promoted a new plan, the "Northern Tier", 
which relied on Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq. It was the first western 
regional project in Middle East that excluded Egypt. As the cornerstone of 
this defense system, Turkey and Pakistan signed a security agreement in 
February 1954. The two signatories engaged in consulting and co-operating 
in three areas of defense: exchange of information; arms production; and 
defense against third parties. Besides, the treaty invited any state willing to 
cooperate in its goals to join.268  
  
 
3.4.The formation of the Baghdad Pact 
 
Iraq was warmly invited to join the Turkish-Pakistan pact increasing the 
Egyptian's fear to be isolated. However, the agreement between Turkey and 
Pakistan was not suitable for Baghdad's goals. Nuri, for instance, felt that 
the terms for third states accession to the pact were too broad, and did not 
explicitly excluded Israel. Moreover, the pact could not serve as a cover for 
the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty and did not enhance Iraqi aspirations 
for the Arab hegemony. Britain, on the other hand, did not pressure 
Baghdad to join fearing to lose control over the ally because of the direct 
American involvement in the project.269      
In March 1954, the Prime Minister Jamali informed the governments of 
Turkey and Britain that Iraq would not have signed the pact. In summer, 
Nuri opened new negotiations with the British. Again, Nuri proposed to link 
the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty to the establishment of a regional 
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organization centered on Baghdad. While the attempt to include Egypt 
failed, Nuri undertook intense negotiations with Turkey. In January 1955, 
Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan showed a positive attitude toward a possible 
Iraqi-Turkish agreement.270 Nuri, therefore, decided to continue the talks 
with Ankara although the strong opposition by Cairo. On February 24, Iraq 
and Turkey signed the alliance and opened to additional states to join.   
The American ambassador Gallman described Nuri’s speech following the 
signature of the pact. 
 
During the debate on the [Iraqi-Turkish] pact in the Chamber, Nuri again spoke at 
length. Iraq's co-operation under the pact would, he said, be based on three principles. 
First, Iraq would not accept commitments outside her frontiers or the frontiers of 
members of the Arab League Collective Security Pact. Secondly, the government of 
Iraq alone was responsible for the defense of Iraq and no other government could 
dictate to Iraq the conditions under which she was to co-operate. Thirdly, Iraq's foreign 
policy would be based on full sovereignty and on equal rights between the contracting 
parties. He said again that the pact was in line with Iraq's traditional foreign policy and 
in no way ran counter to the charters of the Arab League and of the Arab Collective 
Security Pact. Iran and Pakistan would be welcomed into the pact, and he hoped that 
the United States and the United Kingdom would join. He placed special significance 
on the fact that adherence by the United Kingdom would mean the termination of the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.271 
 
The Iraqi-Turkish pact provided for cooperation in the security and defense 
fields between the two countries. Article 5 opened to any Arab League 
states to join while implicitly excluded Israel. As the historian Elie Podeh 
argued,  
 
[t]he signing of the Iraqi-Turkish Pact was the most significant turning point in Arab 
politics since 1948. It shattered the Arab system, leading to new political groupings 
and new patterns. The Arab system was now clearly divided in three camps: Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen; Iraq, with Western support; and the “floating” Arab states – 
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The possibility of accession by other Arab states (…) 
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prompted Egypt to launch an all-out offensive against Iraq and the three wavering 
states.272  
 
Britain joined the Iraq-Turkey pact officially on April 4 signing a Special 
Agreement with Iraq. The British adherence to the pact, therefore, had two 
functions. On the one hand, it permitted to revise the Anglo-Iraqi. On the 
other, it was supposed to favor Iraqi regional leadership inducing other Arab 
states to join. 
 
 
4. The British's soft restraint and Iraqi loyalty: the processes of 
alliance persistence 
 
This last section accounts for the processes leading to the alliance 
persistence. Firstly, it describes the British politics of restraint. The analysis 
shows that the stronger ally adopted a soft posture neutralizing the sources 
of internal opposition. Britain favored the development of a system of 
regional defense that satisfied the weaker side needs and requests. On the 
other hand, Iraq preferred to strengthen the relationship with the old ally 
instead of turning toward a new one as the United States, which was a 
feasible strategic alternative in 1954. 
 
 
4.1. Britain politics of soft restraint   
 
Britain's approach to Iraq had two different phases. Following the end of 
World War II, London was more concerned to manage the Anglo-Egyptian 
relations as the cornerstone of its strategy in the Middle East. However, 
already at the time of the abortive Portsmouth Treaty in 1948, Bevin 
assumed an accommodative attitude toward Iraq. Looking at the collapse of 
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations in 1946, he wanted to avoid similar 
mistakes. The British Prime Minister emphasized that nothing other than a 
basis of "equality" in interallied relations and a "complete independence" 
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could satisfy the Iraqi aspirations.273 Actually, although some rhetoric, the 
Portsmouth treaty effectively represented an improvement in the weaker ally 
autonomy. Unfortunately, as described in the historical section, it was not 
ratified because of the domestic instability affecting Iraq in 1948.    
However, in the late 1940s Britain did not accommodate Iraqi plans for the 
alliance renewal within a new regional defense system. Britain indeed aimed 
to settle an agreement with the Egyptians as its regional hub. Nuri often 
complained that Iraq deserved to be considered on an equal footing with 
Egypt, instead of being treated as a secondary actor by Britain.274 
In 1952 the British started to change their attitude. As the scholar Daniel 
Williamson argued,  
 
[f]rom 1952 to 1954, the British moved away from their earlier plans to send major 
reinforcements to the Middle East in case of a general war toward promoting military 
self-reliance among their allies in the region. Particularly after the July 1954 Anglo-
Egyptian Agreement ended the British plan to center regional defense on the massive 
Suez base, the concept of a Northern Tier position became paramount in British 
defense thinking concerning the Middle East. Western alliances with Turkey, Iraq, Iran 
and Pakistan would form a defensive cordon on the Soviet Union's southern border. 
Iraq was the key Arab piece of the Northern Tier puzzle, and Britain therefore needed 
to promote good relations with Baghdad to secure its cooperation in a regional defense 
pact.275 
 
As Iraq rejected the American “Northern Tier” project in mid-1954, Eden 
sent the following note to the British mission in Iraq. 
 
Generally speaking I agree we should leave Nuri to make the running with other 
Middle East Governments. I do not wish to put pressure on him to join [the] Turkish-
Pakistan Pac if he thinks other solutions preferable.276 
 
On September 1954, Sir John Troutbeck, the British ambassador to Iraq 
from 1951 to 1954, wrote to the Foreign Office expressing a similar point of 
view. 
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Nuri is reverting to an old idea which he put to me so long ago as 1951 [regional 
defense pact] (…) This may therefore prove our last chance of agreeing with the Iraqis 
some reasonable arrangement for defense (…)  
There is something to be said for trying to tie them up in an arrangement based on their 
own ideas, rather than force them into a Western-made plan. Our efforts hitherto to do 
this have failed lamentably.277  
 
During the Turkish-Iraqi negotiations in January 1955, Nuri wanted to be 
sure about the British support for his initiative. As the scholar Richard Jasse 
reported, 
 
Nuri asked Wright whether London would blame Iraq for any break with Egypt. The 
British Ambassador assured Nuri of Whitehall's 'sympathy and support in the general 
aims she was pursuing. The pact was viewed by the Foreign Office as in the best 
interests of Iraq and its Middle East neighbors. Britain hoped that Nuri would 
successfully lead the Arab League, including Egypt, to accept his plan. Wright 
emphasized, 'But there must be a lead to follow and only Iraq could continue to give it. 
My advice was to be polite and reasonable but firm and in the last resort not to be 
deflected' by Egypt.278 
 
Finally, Britain fully supported the Iraqi-Turkish pact and then joined the 
Baghdad Pact establishing a pro-Western alliance where Baghdad was the 
leading Arab state. The British's soft restraint, therefore, paved the way for 
the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance and preserved Britain's dominant 
position in the region temporarily. 
 
 
4.2.The British concessions to the weaker ally 
 
Britain made several concessions to the weaker partner to save the alliance 
from termination. We can consider three main points.  
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Firstly, the Special Agreement of 1955 provided for Iraqi control over the 
air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba. Although Britain preserved the right to 
use the bases in wartime under Iraqi invitation, Baghdad increased its 
independence significantly. 
Secondly, Britain showed noteworthy strategic flexibility giving up its 
preference for a bilateral agreement – assuring more control on the weaker 
partner – in favor of a multilateral arrangement. Moreover, the Special 
Agreement of 1955 subordinated the persistence of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance 
to the success of the Baghdad Pact, which practically coincided with the 
Iraqi's achievement of the leadership among Arab states. 
Finally, Britain took side into the Arab struggle for domination in favor of 
Baghdad. In the late 1940s, London aimed to preserve the link with Egypt 
considering Cairo as the key actor of the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact, 
differently, raised the Iraqi regional position and status promoting a scheme 
that could potentially isolate Cairo. The Britain support, in this regard, was 
strongly significant within Nuri plans.   
 
 
4.3. Britain or the United States? The Iraqi preference for London   
 
Iraq demonstrated its strategic obeisance to the major ally once he felt 
recognized and favored its needs by Britain. Evidence of this process is the 
Iraqi preference for London instead of Washington as its main ally in 1954, 
and the Iraqi hard posture toward the Soviet Union in late 1954. 
In the early 1950s, the alliance-deficits pushed Iraq to strengthen relations 
with the United States. In 1951, the two countries concluded a technical-
assistance agreement providing for American advises and aid in agriculture, 
public health and general economic development. In March 1953, Baghdad 
formally requested military assistance from the United States expressing a 
clear preference for American arms.279  
However, when Iraq in 1954 had to choose between Britain and the United 
States as its major partner, Baghdad preferred the British ally. On the one 
hand, Iraq did not join the Turkish-Pakistani agreement, so undermining the 
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American "Northern Tier" project. On the other, Nuri excluded the United 
States from his plan and did not even inform the State Department about its 
negotiations in late 1954.280 The "Northern Tier" plan was indeed the 
foundation of the American Middle Eastern policy and did not enhance the 
Iraqi leadership in the Arab world. Differently, Nuri's plan privileged the 
British ally providing a framework for the alliance renewal and favoring the 
British influence in the region.  
Then, Iraq hardened relations with the Soviet Union once Britain switched 
to Iraq as its key ally in the region. As the scholar Juan Romero pointed out,  
 
[a]s a preparation for the signing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact Nuri severed diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union on January 3, 1955, thereby unnecessarily alienating a 
great power. The Iraqi prime minister was the only head of government in the Northern 
Tier who took such an extreme step. Nuri’s action confirmed to Moscow that the Pact 
was directed against the Soviet Union. It is possible Nuri believed he would impress 
his allies by breaking relations with the U.S.S.R.281 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
As a case of alliance persistence, the Anglo-Iraqi relation from 1945 to 1955 
appropriately represents how allies can overcome an internal crisis. 
Actually, the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of 1955 still provided for an 
alliance with asymmetric obligations under British leadership. However, the 
alliance persistence now was strictly linked to the success of the Baghdad 
Pact (Article 9, letter b), and the establishment of an Iraqi leadership among 
Arab states. 
For our purposes, we found sufficient evidence that the effectiveness of the 
Iraqi voice led to the alliance persistence. Although both the allies reached 
significant achievements, the regional project centered on Iraqi needs. 
Firstly, the agreement established that Iraq did not commit beyond its 
borders (Article 3) and transferred to Iraqi control the air bases of 
Habbaniya and Shaiba. Moreover, Britain made several concessions: it 
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joined a pact that invited other Arab states to adhere and implicitly (but 
clearly) excluded Israel; it took side between Iraq and Egypt in favor of 
Baghdad; it linked the persistence of the Anglo-Iraq special agreement to 
the continuation of the Baghdad Pact (Article 9, letter b). 
The signature of the Baghdad Pact, finally, showed that the weaker ally 
voice attempts were effective paving the way for the alliance persistence 
instead of its termination. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The New Zealand’s exit from ANZUS in the mid-1980s: 
a case of alliance termination 
 
 
 
ANZUS Pact was signed in September 1951, and came into effect early in 
1952. It was the cornerstone of New Zealand’s security establishing a new 
link with the United States and Australia. The treaty committed the 
member-states to mutual aid in order to “maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (art. 2). Then, the 
allies agreed to “consult together” in case of issues affecting their territorial 
integrity, political independence or security (art. 3). Finally, it established 
the parties co-operating in case of an armed attack on any of them in the 
Pacific Area (art. 4). To New Zealand, the pact provided several benefits. 
Firstly, ANZUS provided for US intervention against regional threats (as a 
resurgent Japan or an aggressive China) substituting the protection that 
Great Britain was no more able to assure. Then, it paved the way for several 
bilateral and trilateral agreements to strengthen the weaker side’s defense 
forces. Finally, although the alliance was asymmetrical due to the 
differences in size and power of its member-states, the ANZUS Council 
annually provided an opportunity to exchange views, information, and 
coordinate policies among the allies.282 
On the other hand, the treaty provided a regional area to the United States 
forces to exercise and operate. Then, the alliance assured port and airfield 
access to the US forces in New Zealand, while two American installations –  
a navy base and an astronomical observatory – were putted in place on two 
New Zealand’s south islands.283 Nonetheless, the US enjoyed the weaker 
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ally’s support during the Cold War in the Asia Pacific region. As one 
scholar defined it, ANZUS was a “showcase” alliance for more than 35 
years.284 It provided a useful tool to contain communism, promoting the 
western values of freedom and democracy, and bringing security and 
stability in the South Pacific region. New Zealand also took responsibilities 
of collective defense supporting US forces in Korea and Vietnam. 
However, in the mid-1980s an interallied crisis broke out paving the way for 
the alliance termination. Wellington’s denuclearization policy and non-
conformity to the stronger side’s requests triggered a process of non-
reciprocity in interallied relations. On 11 August 1986, the United States 
formally ended its security commitment to New Zealand. A few months 
later, Prime Minister Lange said: "New Zealand is better out of ANZUS.”285 
The US-NZ relations downgraded from the status of “allies” to that of 
“friends”. The former allies preserved cordial relations that did not imply 
any alliance’s obligation.286  
Still, Wellington's preference to pursue unilateral denuclearization 
compromising its alliance membership remains puzzling. Although security 
concerns were low, ANZUS provided significant benefits for a small 
country like New Zealand. Therefore, this chapter investigates the weaker 
side’s voice opportunities to evaluate whether this factor affected the 
alliance evolution. The analysis shows indeed that New Zealand’s voice was 
ineffective paving the way for the alliance termination. As the minor ally 
was not able to improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its 
needs, it renounced to the principal ally protection and military 
cooperation.287 
     The following chapter develops in four sections. The first section 
describes New Zealand's ambitions starting form the end of the 1970s. As 
we need to focus on the weaker ally's quest for autonomy as the trigger 
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point of the inquiry, this section describes how New Zealand redefined its 
defense posture and which sources of dissatisfaction developed toward the 
United States. Then, the second section gives an account of the alliance 
variables. On the one hand, it measures the New Zealand security concerns 
and the alliance remuneration in order to settle the framework for the 
empirical inquiry. On the other hand, it accounts for New Zealand voice 
attempts and its ineffectiveness. The third section describes the US-NZ 
relations historically from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s. The fourth section, 
finally, gives an account of the alliance mechanisms focusing on the US 
politics of hard restraint and New Zealand's detachment from the alliance. 
These processes represent empirical evidence that confirms the validity of 
the alliance termination's model. 
 
 
1. How to define the case: New Zealand ambitions since the 1970s  
 
Three main features characterized New Zealand’s posture in the early 
1970s: the search for greater independence, a growing focus on the South 
Pacific region, and the policy of denuclearization.  
In the early 1970s, the Kirk government proclaimed that New Zealand had 
to achieve a higher degree of independence from its allies: "We want New 
Zealand's foreign policy to express New Zealand's national ideals as well as 
to reflect our national interests."288 The goal was to move New Zealand 
away from close conformity to the US foreign policy. Kirk declared "New 
Zealand (…) intends to follow a more independent foreign policy. It has 
emerged from the phase in its national development where it allowed its 
policies to be determined by the views and interests of its most influential 
ally (…) We must in future be more self-reliant, and self-reliance requires 
independence of judgment and action."289 
Since the mid-1970s, the National party governments also supported a more 
independent strategic posture. The 1978 and 1983 NZ’s Defense White 
                                                           
288
 McCraw D., “From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand's Foreign-
Policy Priorities”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter, 1982-1983), pp. 640-659 
289
 McCraw D., op. cit., 1982 
  
102 
 
Papers sustained a defense policy more self-reliant focusing on the South 
Pacific region. The 1978 Defense Paper clearly expressed this change in 
NZ’s defense posture: “in the past our alliances have led us to concentrate 
our military efforts in areas distant from New Zealand, like the Middle East, 
Korea or Southeast Asia. Today the situation is different. In present 
circumstances New Zealand can best contribute to the strength of the 
western world by helping preserve peace and security in our own part of the 
world, particularly the South Pacific”.290 The 1983 Defense Paper confirmed 
this new posture. New Zealand aimed to promote training, exercises, and 
exchanges with the South Pacific countries to develop skills to manage low-
level emergencies in the region and to support New Zealand's broader 
interests and security demands.291 
Although Wellington's pursuit of greater autonomy did not imply a split 
from its most reliable ally, it paved the way for growing internal opposition. 
Interallied frictions developed mainly because of New Zealand’s policy of 
denuclearization. At the 1974 meeting of the ANZUS Council, the New 
Zealanders promoted the idea of a South Pacific Nuclear Weapons-Free 
Zone, which the United States rejected. In the mid-1980s, Wellington anti-
nuclear instance strengthened. Gerard Hensley, a former NZ’s diplomat, 
described the origins of New Zealand’s posture in these terms:  
 
There were explanations for this [NZ’s anti-nuclear posture]: the British and American 
tests in the Pacific, one of which the young David Lange saw from an Auckland 
balcony; the French atmospheric tests in the South Pacific from which some fallout 
drifted over New Zealand and put radioactive strontium-90 in the nation’s milk and 
which led Norman Kirk, the Prime Minister, to send a frigate to the test area in protest; 
and the continuing tests underground at Mururoa long after the other nuclear powers 
had retreated to their own countries.  
But the strength of New Zealand’s distaste was probably reinforced by distance. Where 
most in the West (and in the East no one had any voice) reluctantly accepted being 
defended by these weapons as a necessary evil, some New Zealanders felt that their 
country in its remoteness could perhaps dissociate itself entirely from this evil, and in 
doing so give a lead which might help the world to come to its senses on disarmament. 
                                                           
290
 Janaki K., “International Regimes, New Zealand and the Pacific”, in Alley R., New 
Zealand and the Pacific, Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1984. 
291
 Alves D., op. cit., 1989 
  
103 
 
A dissenting missionary zeal was never far below the country’s consciousness, and the 
hope of setting a moral example and leading the world to better things was 
beguiling.292 
 
As the Labour party won the 1984 election, the government decided to 
sacrifice New Zealand’s operational membership in ANZUS to promote its 
anti-nuclear policy. Although Wellington did not aim to abrogate the 
alliance treaty, it was determined to change the terms of New Zealand 
cooperation. The weaker ally called for the renegotiation of the agreement 
to establish its non-involvement in ANZUS nuclear activities. 
     In sum, New Zealand's strategic posture slowly changed since the 1970s. 
A greater focus on the South Pacific implied a detachment from the global 
concerns of its most reliable ally. The attempt to change the US-led status-
quo in the region is the trigger point of the inquiry. 
 
 
2. The Alliance Variables 
 
This section describes the model’s variables. Looking from the weaker 
side’s perspective, it measures firstly New Zealand’s security concerns and 
the alliance remuneration. These variables assume the value as a Type II 
case. Then, the section accounts for the minor ally’s voice attempts to start 
reporting on the validity of the explicative model. The analysis shows that 
New Zealand’s voice was ineffective as the minor ally was not able to 
improve the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs. 
Overall, the split of New Zealand from ANZUS in the mid-1980s fits the 
theoretical framework as a case of alliance termination. Firstly, the case 
passes the test for case selection successfully, as New Zealand's security 
concerns decrease while the alliance remuneration increases in the period 
under consideration. Secondly, the explicative variable fits the general 
expectations comfortably as New Zealand’s ineffective voice plausibly led 
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to the alliance termination. The following paragraphs describe the variables 
in details. 
 
 
2.1. The South Pacific in the mid-1980s: a low threat environment for New 
Zealand 
 
To New Zealand, the signature of the ANZUS pact in 1951 provided long-
term security insurance against a resurgent Japan and an immediate one 
against any aggressive communist country, as China and the Soviet Union. 
In 1957, the NZ Defense Paper concluded that "the threat arises today from 
the world-wide activities of the Communist bloc.”293 During the 1950s and 
1960s, threats were believed to develop in Southeast Asia pushing New 
Zealand’s military involvement in Malaysia and Singapore supporting 
Britain, and Vietnam supporting the United States. However, the security 
environment radically shifted at the end of the Vietnamese war. As the 
scholar David McCraw pointed out,     
 
By the 1970s, [New Zealand’s] security environment was changing. China was at odds 
with the Soviet Union, and seeking better relations with Western nations as a result. 
The United States was seeking an accommodation with both China and the Soviet 
Union and, along with Britain, was withdrawing militarily from Southeast Asia. Both 
major New Zealand political parties realized that, in the future, New Zealand would 
have to formulate new and more self-reliant policies concerning Asia.294  
 
As the superpower rivalry decreased in the region, New Zealand focused 
increasingly on specific South Pacific issues as economic survival and 
internal political unrest.295 NZ’s Defense spending fell from nearly 4.7 
percent of GNP in 1974 to about 1.8 in 1977, one of the world’s lowest 
figures. Although the Cold War tensions slightly increased at the end of the 
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1970s, NZ's defense expenses did not increase significantly.296Instead, the 
government started to emphasize the lack of a direct military threat to New 
Zealand because of its geographical isolation. As the American analyst 
Wade Huntley argued,  
 
The most striking aspect of New Zealanders' growing regional awareness was the 
perceived absence of serious regional threats, which came to be a consensus view in 
security debates and a staple premise in Defense Reviews from the late 1970s onward. 
This conclusion marked a virtual reversal of nineteenth-century judgments of the 
bearing of geography on threat perception. Whereas regional isolation had been 
originally seen as a source of vulnerability, by the 1980s most had come to see it as a 
source of protection.297  
 
Therefore, New Zealand’s security perceptions had significantly altered 
since the signature of the ANZUS pact in 1951. As two American scholars 
pointed out,  
 
By 1984, the former enemy Japan had become New Zealand's largest overall trading 
partner, and growing trade with, and knowledge of, China has steadily reduced fear of 
that country since diplomatic links were established in 1973. Fear of the Soviet Union 
undoubtedly persists despite important trade links with that country, but the 
Communist threat today appears to most New Zealanders as more distant and less 
virulent than that of two or three decades ago.298 
 
On the other hand, New Zealand enjoyed internal political stability, and 
there were no sources of domestic threats. In a 1985 paper, the Prime 
Minister David Lange wrote that New Zealand faced no threat of military 
aggression. The stability of the South Pacific, therefore, was its primary 
concern. That goal could be pursued depending “on the economic 
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development of the region and on the absence of destabilizing outside 
influences.”299 
 
 
2.2. The ANZUS remuneration: New Zealand’s increasing benefits from the 
alliance 
 
To New Zealand, military cooperation with the US provided remarkable 
benefits.300 Firstly, the weaker ally enjoyed privileged access to American 
sources and information. As the Australian historian Stephen Hoadley 
pointed out, New Zealand developed intelligence cooperation with the 
United States on three levels. 
 
The first was participation in the UKUSA network, wherein all five members submitted all 
their data and received intelligence on the topics they requested.  Members could also make 
special requests.  New Zealand requested additional information on French nuclear testing in 
the early 1970s and mid-1990s. (...) 
The second form of intelligence collaboration was direct consultation.  The Director of the US 
National Security Agency Admiral Bobby Inman visited the newly established GCSB 
[Government Communication Security Bureau of NZ] in 1980.  Other Americans visited for 
varying periods to proffer specialist advice, gain familiarity, or just cement the working 
relationship. These were paralleled by personal contacts by Directorate of Defence 
Intelligence and Security Intelligence Service (New Zealand’s counterintelligence agency) 
with US, British, Canadian, and Australian counterparts.   
The third form of intelligence collaboration, which began in 1981, was the seconding by the 
GCSB of a New Zealand liaison officer to the National Security Agency at Fort Mead near 
Washington.301  
 
Secondly, New Zealand had the opportunity to purchase US military 
technology and equipment on very favorable terms. The basic framework of 
the US-NZ military cooperation was an arrangement signed in May 1965 
(the “Cooperative Logistic Arrangement Relating to the Supply Support of 
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the Armed Forces of New Zealand by the United States Department of 
Defense”) establishing the principles of common security objectives and 
mutual aid. According to the agreement, New Zealand’s requests enjoyed 
the same priority as those of the US armed services in peacetime. Then, the 
wartime supplies of military equipment were covered by the “Memorandum 
of Understanding on logistic support” (MoU) signed in June 1982. Finally, 
New Zealand was privileged in the application of the Arms Export Control 
Act adopted by the US in 1976. As Hoadley reported, “the Act established a 
daunting array of eligibility requirements, some of which, if applied strictly, 
had the potential to penalize New Zealand.”302 However, New Zealand 
benefited from a special status with Australia, Japan, and the NATO allies.  
Thirdly, New Zealanders had the opportunity to exercise and train regularly 
with American armed forces. The modest NZ's defense forces, therefore, 
obtained a high operational efficiency and professional competence sharing 
operation doctrines and tactics with a stronger partner as the US. Typical of 
these training led by the US were the RIMPAC maritime multilateral 
exercises operating in the Hawaiian waters (which involved NZ, US, 
Canada, Japan and Australia in 1983 and 1985) and exercise TRIAD 
involving air, land and sea forces from all ANZUS member-states. These 
exercises provided military training in a variety of tactical environments 
using high technology equipment that would have been unfeasible for a 
small country like New Zealand.303 
Finally, New Zealand strongly benefited from the cooperation on defense 
science matters with the westerns allies. As the analyst Peter Jennings 
pointed out, the New Zealand Defense Science Establishment (DSE) was 
very small carrying out little basic research. It relied on scientific 
cooperation with the US and UK, most notably under the "Technical 
Cooperation Programme", which focused mainly on sonar technology and 
Mine Counter Measures research. As the DSE argued in its Annual Review 
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in 1986, scientific research in New Zealand was heavily dependent on 
international cooperation.304  
In sum, the military cooperation with the US provided remarkable benefits 
to New Zealand's armed forces, which would have been not feasible 
otherwise for a small country.   
  
 
2.3. The policy of denuclearization: New Zealand voice attempts and its 
ineffectiveness 
 
New Zealand’s voice attempts focused mainly on making Washington 
benevolent about Wellington’s policy of denuclearization.  
As the Labor party gained power in 1984, it called for a renegotiation of the 
ANZUS treaty. New Zealand's primary requirements were the following: 
 
1) the recognition of NZ’s unconditional antinuclear stance; 2) the unfettered right to 
actively promote a nuclear weapons free South Pacific; 3) the acceptance of absolutely 
equal partnership on all issues and the requirement that decisions under the terms of the 
agreement be unanimous; and 4) a guarantee of the complete integrity of New 
Zealand's sovereignty.305 
 
The policy of denuclearization was at the core of Wellington’s claims. The 
Labor government argued that ANZUS was not a nuclear treaty, and New 
Zealand was not willing to be defended by nuclear weapons. Washington 
was invited to accept the weaker ally’s stance in virtue of an equal 
partnership. Minister of Defence Frank O'Flynn wrote in the introduction to 
his ministry's Annual Report for 1984-1985: 
 
We have made it clear that we do not ask or wish to be defended by nuclear weapons.  
We do not agree that our participation in ANZUS requires us to adopt nuclear defense 
strategies.  We are meeting our collective security obligations in other ways as we have 
always done and will continue to do.306 
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On the other hand, many new Zealanders were convinced that the US 
“neither-confirm-nor-deny” policy was a way to limit the independence of 
its smaller ally. In 1985, Lange adopted this line in his speech at the Oxford 
Union debate: "We are actually told that New Zealanders cannot decide for 
themselves how to defend New Zealand.”307 Then, commenting on its major 
ally, the Premier said: “to compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons against 
the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of totalitarianism, which 
allows for no self-determination."308 
     Once New Zealand’s government denied the access of the US navy 
Buchanan, it followed a deep interallied crisis. However, the weaker ally 
tried to keep ANZUS alive in several ways. Lange suggested through 
diplomatic channels that a Perry-class frigate – widely believed as non-
nuclear – could be an acceptable substitute for avoiding intrusive port 
inspection. Washington, however, rejected the proposal.309 Still, Wellington 
tried to involve the stronger partner in its internal legislation process. 
Although assuming New Zealand’s anti-nuclear posture, the Labor 
government was prepared to share drafts of its anti-nuclear legislation to 
find an acceptable solution for both sides. Washington, on the other end, 
refused even to discuss the bill claiming "if the legislation proceeds our 
defense obligations will be effectively terminated.”310 Finally, New 
Zealanders proposed also to solve the issue through a confidential US 
undertaking to send only non-nuclear capable ships to New Zealander's 
ports, but Washington refuted again.311 
In mid-September 1985, the Deputy Prime Minister Palmer visited 
Washington. He talked severely with the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz at the State Department. The former NZ 
diplomat Gerard Hensley reported Palmer’s speech as follows.  
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The opening line (in the recollection of at least one of those present) was: ‘We New 
Zealanders are a uniquely spiritual and caring people.’ It went on to argue that the 
United States and New Zealand, a large and a small democracy, should acknowledge 
each other’s principles. But the US did not recognize New Zealand’s; in fact it was 
being un-American in going against its own principles in the way it was treating its 
smaller ally. There were frequent references to the American Constitution and other 
revered texts. The clear message seemed to be that ‘you have abandoned your own 
morality and principles.312 
 
As Palmer came back from Washington, the Labor government started to 
think seriously about leaving ANZUS. Lange declared “if the ANZUS 
Treaty requires us to accept nuclear weapons, then it is the treaty which is 
the obstacle to the maintenance of good relationships between New Zealand 
and the United States.”313 On the other hand, the weaker ally did not 
succeed in its attempts to overcome the crisis. The ineffectiveness of voice 
opportunities led New Zealand to detach quickly from ANZUS.   
 
 
3. The US-NZ relations from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s 
 
3.1.When economic diplomacy prevails on traditional security: New 
Zealand’s pursuit of greater independence.   
 
As an Australian historian argued, in New Zealand “economic independence 
in the 1970s and 1980s was frequently presented in terms of diversification, 
the necessary break from dependence on one country.” This new foreign 
policy of trade “contrasted with the traditional foreign policy of alliances, 
security and defense.”314  
Indeed, there was continuity between the Labour and National party 
governments from 1970 to 1984. In the early 1970s, Kirk established 
relationships with two major communist countries as China and USSR to 
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favor New Zealand economic diplomacy. As the scholar David McCraw 
pointed out, 
 
One of Labour's first foreign-policy acts was to recognize the People's Republic of 
China; similarly, the Labour government moved quickly to re-establish an embassy in 
the U.S.S.R. Kirk said that it was in New Zealand's political and economic interests to 
respond to Soviet desires for friendly relations. In order to remove "an anomaly" in 
New Zealand's relations with the Soviet Union, the Labour government in 1974 
formally recognised the Soviet Union's 1940 annexation of the Baltic states, a step that 
Britain, Canada and the United States had never been prepared to take. The 
establishment of good relationships with the Soviet Union was important enough to the 
Labour government to take priority over the principle of self-determination of 
peoples.315 
 
New Zealand also voted for China admission to the United Nations in 1971 
recognizing the government in Beijing in 1972, while the Nixon government 
refused to do so until 1979. 
Following the 1975 election, the National Party government followed the 
Labour enthusiasm for expansive economic diplomacy. By emphasizing 
New Zealand’s need for greater leeway in its economic relations, the Prime 
Minister Robert Muldoon declared in 1978 “on the change of government in 
1975 it was obvious that New Zealand had to adopt a different stance in our 
relationship with our friends, allies and trading partners. We could no longer 
afford to be a country that said “yes” to everyone and end up with the short 
end of the stick.”316 The Iranian case was significant in that sense. As 
McCraw reported, 
 
Although eager to strengthen its alliance with the United States, the Muldoon 
government has not made this its first priority. As has been made evident on several 
occasions, it is New Zealand's trading interests which are of primary concern. In 
January 1980, for example, the government refused to support a U.S. call for a United 
Nations embargo on trade in non-food items with Iran. The latter was a buyer of New 
Zealand's wool, and was developing as a major market for its lamb. The export of wool 
to Iran for the first nine months of 1979 had been worth about $17 million, and $110 
million worth of lamb was due to be shipped in 1980. The National government was 
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unwilling to halt trade with Iran, and the Prime Minister said that the United States was 
"quite clear" on New Zealand's views. In April 1980, with the American hostages in 
Iran still not free, President Carter imposed an embargo on food shipments to Iran, and 
again asked American allies to do likewise. Muldoon said: "We have said we would 
not adopt self-damaging policies. I think they would understand if we did not change 
our minds. Finally, when the U.S. severed diplomatic relations with April, and asked 
other countries to follow suit, Muldoon said that New Zealand's ambassador would not 
be withdrawn immediately since he was due to leave in a matter of weeks anyway, and 
had some tidying up to do.317 
 
Then, New Zealand improved its relationships with communist countries. 
Although trading relations with the Soviet Union were ambivalent and 
fluctuating, the bilateral trade was increasing in the late 1970s. On the other 
hand, the Muldoon government confirmed a keen interest in more solid 
relations with China. 
 
The Prime Minister's first overseas visit in April 1976 included China, because he 
wanted to "register New Zealand's interest in strengthening [its] cordial associations." 
When the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited China in October 1977, it appeared that 
one purpose of the visit was to reassure the Chinese that New Zealand's increased trade 
with the Soviet Union did not mean a lessening of interest in its relationship with 
China. The National government declared itself unworried by Chinese diplomatic 
expansion in the South Pacific; and even China's testing of an intercontinental ballistic 
missile in the South Pacific in May 1980 was acknowledged with understanding. 
China's invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, while deplored, was not strongly 
condemned. The government merely called upon China to withdraw. The Muldoon 
government's interest in China is based partly on a perceived community of strategic 
interest in opposing Soviet expansion, and increasingly on China's trading potential.318 
 
In the mid-1970s, therefore, economic diplomacy became New Zealand's 
primary concern. The need for greater leeway in that foreign policy's area 
came at the expense of traditional security considerations of collective 
defence.    
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3.2.The US-NZ relations in a changing South Pacific 
 
New Zealand’s reorientation toward the South Pacific region was speeded in 
the 1970s following the independence of several South Pacific microstates. 
As colonies of great powers no longer surrounded it, New Zealand led (with 
Australia) these newly independent states to create the South Pacific Forum. 
The Forum was established in 1971 and aimed to regulate and improve 
regional economic cooperation. Wellington shifted to South Pacific the 
majority of its bilateral aid (around 78% in 1985) pushing for the economic 
sufficiency of the region. Moreover, it dropped import controls from its 
neighbors under the SPARTECA arrangement.319 
As New Zealand financed the Forum and supported its weaker member-
states, it was also engaged in promoting some common regional interests. 
The first issues in US-NZ relations arose precisely because of the initiative 
of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). As an Australian scholar 
pointed out, 
 
The New Zealand Labour government SPNFZ initiative, while supported strongly by 
the island states at the July 1975 South Pacific Forum, and by the UN General 
Assembly (110 votes to 0, with 20 abstentions) in a joint resolution sponsored by New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Fiji, was vigorously opposed by the United States 
(…) the [United States] primary concern was the zone's potential restriction of transit 
of nuclear-armed forces, both within territorial waters/airspace, and on/over the high 
seas.320 
 
However, the SPNFZ initiative weakened after the election of conservative 
governments in New Zealand and Australia in late 1975. The Muldoon 
National Party government expressed in-principle support for the SPNFZ 
but judged the proposal as unsuitable for keeping good relations with the 
United States. In 1982, however, the same New Zealand’s government 
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firmly opposed to the main ally, which failed in the ratification of the Law 
of Sea.321 
     On the other hand, New Zealand in early-1980s was still engaged in 
promoting ANZUS cooperation in the South Pacific region. The defense 
paper of 1983 emphasized New Zealand's need for self-reliance within a 
framework of increasing interallied cooperation. In early 1984, the NZ 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs argued:  
 
It will be of overriding importance for New Zealand that the South Pacific generally 
should remain western-oriented … to avoid the development of conditions of political 
or economic instability which the Soviet Union or other unfriendly or opportunistic 
power could exploit [and] to ensure that the western powers themselves (I am thinking 
particularly of France, the United States and Japan) are responsive to South Pacific 
concerns.322   
 
Following the election of mid-1984, also the Labour government recommitted 
itself to the ANZUS Treaty and a close relationship with the American ally. 
Nonetheless, the government aimed to redefine New Zealand’s contribution 
to the alliance. It triggered the ANZUS crisis. 
 
 
3.3.The Nuclear Ships Dispute  
 
As the Labour party won the 1984 election, it proceeded with its anti-
nuclear policy. The government announced that nuclear-armed ships or 
aircraft were not welcomed to New Zealand ports or airfields. Moreover, 
NZ’s armed forces renounced to participate in joint exercises involving any 
use or simulated use of nuclear weapons. Although the Labour government 
reaffirmed its adherence to ANZUS, it was restricted to conventional 
defense of the member-states.323 
On the other hand, the United States had a growing need for reliable allies in 
the Pacific. As Washington planned to expand its combatant vessels from 
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345 in 1982 to 600, the number of ship visits to the Pacific countries was 
likely to increase. As one Australian analyst observed,  
 
[t]he trend towards long-range nuclear weaponry deployed on mobile platforms, 
coupled with increasingly global anti-submarine weapon (ASW) and electronic 
surveillance programs involving tactical ASW nuclear weapons, serves to explain the 
heightened US concern about transit and port access rights in its approach to Nuclear 
Free Zones (NFZs) from the early 1970s onwards. The globalization of US nuclear 
weapon deployment on mobile naval and air platforms resulted in a limitation of the 
areas in which the United States was prepared to contemplate NFZ establishment (…) 
the United States was prepared to support NFZs only in land regions where it did not 
have major nuclear weapon deployment (Latin America, South Asia, Middle East, and 
Antarctica) and was opposed to all proposals perceived to constrain either its land-
based nuclear deployments (European and Balkans NFZ proposals) or mobile nuclear 
forces (Indian Ocean ZOP, SPNFZ, Mediterranean NFZ).324 
 
Although the Labour government proclaimed a firm anti-nuclear policy in 
July 1984, the US administration avoided a confrontation with the weaker 
ally. The ANZUS Council regularly met in Wellington, personnel and 
intelligence exchanges continued, and the October 1984 TRIAD exercise took 
place in New Zealand as scheduled.325  
The Labour government, however, reiterated that ANZUS was not a nuclear 
treaty taking further distance from US nuclear policy. As one New Zealander 
scholar pointed out,  
 
This meant that no NZ Navy ship would be permitted to exercise in a nuclear mode with 
ships of the US Navy nor would the Government allow nuclear-armed or nuclear-
powered vessels of the United States to enter internal waters or ports.  In the absence of 
assurances from the United States or its own assessment to the contrary, the NZ 
Government would assume that any vessel capable of carrying nuclear weapons was 
potentially carrying them, and would deny that vessel entry.  But conventionally powered 
and armed warships would still be welcome.326 
 
On the other hand, the United States reaffirmed its “neither-confirm-nor-
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deny” policy about the presence of nuclear weapons on any of its vessels. In 
this view, a ban on nuclear-capable vessels implied a ban on all US navies 
and aircraft.   
The interallied crisis quickly escalated when Deputy Prime Minister Palmer 
denied port access to the USS Buchanan in January 1985. While Washington 
claimed that New Zealand was infringing the ANZUS treaty, Wellington did 
not recognize any obligation concerning nuclear cooperation. Almost 
immediately, the United States adopted several counter-measures. As an 
Australian scholar reported,   
 
Once the Buchanan visit was irrevocably cancelled, the US response was swift and 
extensive. Exercise Sea Eagle and all other scheduled exercises, training and 
familiarisation exchanges, and military courtesy calls involving New Zealand, and an 
undisclosed quantity of intelligence flow, were immediately discontinued. High-level US 
officials and flag-rank officers declined to meet their New Zealand counterparts for 
nearly a decade.327 
 
In sum, ANZUS became quickly inoperative as a trilateral alliance. It was 
mostly substituted by two bilateral alliances, which forced Australia into two 
separate relations with the United States and New Zealand.    
 
 
3.4.The ANZUS split  
 
In mid-1985, New Zealand supported the regional initiative for a South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. However, the Labour government adopted a 
flexible attitude discouraging those, like the Melanesian island states, 
seeking stricter anti-nuclear provisions. As one Australian scholar argued,  
    
the New Zealand response to the treaty was subordinated to a wider South Pacific 
strategy of reassuring its ANZUS partners that New Zealand was serious about 
supporting ANZUS and Western interests in the South Pacific region. As such, the 
New Zealand response represented a successful example of the treaty's intended role as 
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a measure to channel regional anti-nuclear responses in a pro-ANZUS direction and to 
prevent the emergence of regional anti-nuclear alliances.328 
 
Although New Zealand did not aim to export its anti-nuclear policy, the 
legislative process concerning the anti-nuclear bill was progressing quickly. 
In December 1985, the Labour government sent the “New Zealand Nuclear 
Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill" to Parliament. The United 
States, however, warned the weaker ally that ANZUS was incompatible with 
a member state’s anti-nuclear posture. On 15 April 1986, Ambassador Paul 
Cleveland made a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs 
in Wellington. His warning anticipated US intentions:  
 
in the event the draft legislation is passed in its present form, the United States will fully 
review its security relationship with New Zealand with the likely outcome being the 
suspension of its ANZUS security commitment to New Zealand.329   
 
In addition, Lange later acknowledged that he had received "a written 
warning delivered in person by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James 
Lilley.”330 However, these warnings did not impede New Zealand’s 
Parliament to approve the Nuclear Free Bill. 
The ANZUS split quickly materialized in mid-1986. As the Nuclear Free Bill 
proceeded, on 27 June 1986, Secretary Shultz suspended US security 
obligations to New Zealand saying “we part company as friends, but we part 
company as far as the alliance is concerned.”331 Then, the Memorandum of 
Understanding was not renewed in mid-1987 removing New Zealand from 
the group of allies enjoying easy access to the US’s weapon supply.332 The 
United States, finally, did not adhere to the Rarotonga treaty that established 
the SPNFR. Although the treaty did not hinder the US strategic posture in the 
Pacific directly, Washington feared it could encourage other states to adopt an 
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anti-nuclear posture as the former ally New Zealand.333   
 
 
4.  The United States’ hard restraint and the New Zealand 
detachment: the processes of alliance termination 
 
This last section accounts for the alliance processes leading to the security 
treaty termination. Firstly, it describes the US politics of restraint. The 
analysis shows that the stronger ally adopted a hard posture increasing the 
weaker partner's dissatisfaction. Secondly, it focuses on New Zealand 
behavior. Although the weaker ally avoided confrontation with the major 
one trying to minimize the sources of frictions, we find evidence of 
detachment in two prevailing attitudes: New Zealand’s focus on greater self-
reliance and the pursuit of a closer relationship with Australia. 
 
 
4.1. US politics of hard restraint 
 
By the 1980s, the United States placed heavier emphasis on the Pacific. As 
it actively promoted nuclear-powered units in the navy, the Regan 
administration held that ships’ access was necessary for a maritime alliance 
as ANZUS.334 Moreover, the US looked at ANZUS as one of a series of 
global alliances. New Zealand anti-nuclear feelings could encourage other 
allies that like Greece, Denmark, Spain, Iceland, and Japan. At the 
beginning of ANZUS crisis, the admiral W. Crowe (CINCPAC) sent a 
telegram to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger describing the issue.  
 
As you are aware a number of other countries with nuclear sensitivities, notably Japan, 
Australia, and our NATO allies, are watching closely how we handle this situation. In 
December 1984, the State Department submitted a request for blanket diplomatic 
clearance for 1985 with advice that a ship visit to New Zealand is planned to follow 
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ANZUS exercise Sea Eagle 85-1-[censored]. Our ultimate objective is unfettered port 
access, while maintaining our neither Confirm nor Deny policy.335 
 
As it was strongly determinate to keep US ships access and the neither-
confirm-nor-deny policy, the Regan administration announced its intent to 
retaliate against New Zealand the same day that Lange denied the port 
access to the US Buchanan. As an American scholar pointed out, 
 
The United States in 1985 and 1986 introduced several serious punitive measures. The 
superpower cut off New Zealand’s access to high grade intelligence, canceled all 
military exercises involving joint participation of American and New Zealand forces 
(highly valued by the small but professional New Zealand military), postponed 
indefinitely the annual ANZUS Council meeting, and finally, “closed” the long-
standing and valuable “open door” policy between officials at various levels of the two 
governments.336   
 
Although US officials often portrayed New Zealand as having isolated 
itself, the retaliatory measures taken by Americans imposed a de facto 
isolation to Wellington. New Zealander's officials were excluded from any 
meetings in which US intelligence could be discussed, they lost easy access 
to the Pentagon for consultation and could not benefit anymore of US 
military training.337 In other words, the US administration pursued a 
discriminating policy deliberately to discipline the weaker ally. As an 
Australian scholar argued, 
 
[t]he flavor of the US measures and comments was best caught by US ambassador to 
Australia William Lane, who said: “New Zealand has been a bad boy and must be 
punished.” The State Department dissociated itself from Lane’s remark. However – in 
their paternalism, in their view that New Zealand had transgressed, and in their view of 
what had to be done to a transgressor – the words caught an important element in the 
US attitude toward New Zealand.338   
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4.2.New Zealand’s new strategic posture 
 
In the middle of the ANZUS crisis, New Zealand emphasized more strongly 
its policy of greater self-reliance. In the 1985 MOD Annual Report, the 
Defense Minister O’Flynn reiterated that New Zealand did not intend to 
shape its forces to act “as an appendage to overseas forces ever ready to be 
deployed to wars in distant lands.”339 Instead, New Zealand intended to 
develop armed forces able to protect the country sovereignty and regional 
stability, moving quickly in case of requests of help from neighbor 
countries. The Labour government was firm and cohesive on these points. 
As a New Zealander scholar pointed out,   
 
The need to be more self-reliant in defense and security and to assume a greater 
leadership role in the South Pacific was spelt out in two Cabinet papers [Cabinet 
Papers of 18 March and 1 April 1985] (…) The argument was that, though the basic 
ANZUS guarantee remained, its operational character had changed and the withdrawal 
of military and intelligence cooperation was irreversible, barring an unlikely backdown 
by either side. New Zealand would have to do more on its own. By safeguarding its 
security interests in the immediate neighborhood, and by ensuring that the South 
Pacific did not become an area of instability and conflict, New Zealand could display 
its reliability and in time seek a more stable relationship with both the United States 
and Australia. 
 
During the 1985-1986 ANZUS crisis, the government developed "the most 
fundamental change in defense policies (…) occurred since World War II." 
The 1987 White Paper was transparent on New Zealand's fundamental 
principle to improve its defense strategy. 
 
This country must exercise greater self-reliance and, as far as possible, maintain the 
ability to meet or deter credible threats to our security or interests using our own 
resources.
340
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It represented a significant alteration in New Zealand's strategic priorities 
emphasizing the ability to operate alone in the region, rather than as a part 
of a coalition of allied forces. 
     On the other hand, Wellington recognized the risks of isolation. 
Following the Buchanan diplomatic incident, the Labour government began 
supporting a closer defense association with Australia. Defense Minister 
O'Flynn expressed this goal in early 1985. 
 
Curtailment of defense cooperation by the United States has…underlined importance 
to New Zealand of exercising and training with Australian forces…In essence, our aim 
is to increase cooperation and so preserve, to the extent that our join resources permit, 
the present satisfactory security situation in the region.341      
 
An Australian scholar depicted the paradox of New Zealand new posture. 
 
The US measures that were taken against New Zealand made it all the more important 
for the Lange government to secure commitments of defence cooperation from 
Australia as a partial compensation for a perceived vacuum left by US withdrawal from 
military cooperation. Concern to secure increases in Australian defence cooperation, 
successfully implemented in the form of increased bilateral exercises, military 
personnel exchanges, joint purchase arrangements, increased coordination in defence 
communications networks, and collaboration in logistics, meant that New Zealand was 
constrained from pursuing any diplomatic challenge to the Australian government's 
SPNFZ initiative. To have sought more comprehensive denuclearization arrangements 
regionally would have risked forfeiting the valued Australian military assistance that 
partially compensated for US withdrawal of defense cooperation. 
 
The detachment from the United States forced New Zealand within another 
asymmetric relation to feel the vacuum left by ANZUS termination. 
However, the political relationship between Australia and New Zealand did 
not imply any nuclear obligation to the weaker side. 
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5. Conclusion  
 
As a case of alliance persistence, the US-NZ relation from the mid-1970s to 
mid-1980s appropriately represents how a mismanaged interallied crisis can 
lead to the alliance termination. Although ANZUS was a “showcase” 
alliance for more than 35 years, New Zealand’s denuclearization policy and 
non-conformity to the stronger side’s requests triggered a process of non-
reciprocity in interallied relations until the alliance termination.  
For our purposes, we found sufficient evidence that the ineffectiveness of 
New Zealand's voice led to the weaker side detachment from ANZUS. As 
Wellington was not able to improve the interallied cooperation on the 
ground of its needs, it renounced to the principal ally protection and military 
cooperation. The former allies preserved cordial relations avoiding the 
stricter obligations of an asymmetric military alliance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
The US-Australia relation in the mid-1980s:  
a case of alliance persistence 
 
 
 
At the end of World War II, Australia turned to the Unites Stated looking 
for protection against the possibility of a revived Japanese rearmament and 
rising communist powers.342 As the country ratified the ANZUS treaty in 
1952, it achieved two kinds of benefits. Firstly, Canberra obtained the US’s 
assurance of aid in the event of armed attacks from third countries (art. 
4).Washington therefore replaced Britain – Canberra’s erstwhile protector – 
that was no able to provide any security guarantee. Secondly, Australia 
obtained the privileged access to the major ally’s military hardware, training 
and intelligence networks, so confirming its status as the main actor in the 
South Pacific region. On the other hand, Canberra supported the major ally 
in its military campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s by sending a total of 
15000 service personnel to fight in the Korean War and nearly 47000 to the 
Vietnam War.343  
Acting as the Australia’s great power guarantor, the US assured its presence 
in the South Pacific region positioning some military bases on the 
Australian soil. These defense, communications and intelligence 
installations were critical to the US global posture. As the scholar Desmond 
Ball argued, the agreements on the North West Cape communications 
station (1963), and the satellite intelligence facilities at Pine Gap (1966) and 
Nurrungar (1969) in central Australia were extremely significant in 
Washington’s strategic planning.344    
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For the purposes of our inquiry, it is useful analyzing the interallied 
relations from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. In that period, the allies 
were facing the most significant crisis of ANZUS history. However, they 
overcame the major issues triggering the processes of alliance persistence. 
From the Australian perspective, the alliance voice opportunity was a major 
benefit of the relationship with Washington. As the former Prime Minister 
Keating wrote, the alliance provided standing for Australia to have its 
“voice heard in Washington”, especially about developments in its region.345 
On the other hand, the US was able to accommodate the weaker partner's 
needs and requests of greater autonomy. The effectiveness of the Australia's 
voice, therefore, avoided the alliance termination during the major crises of 
ANZUS history.   
     The following chapter develops in four sections. The first section 
describes Australia’s ambitions from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. As 
we need to stress the weaker ally's quest for autonomy as the trigger point of 
the inquiry, this section focuses on the Australia's foreign and defense 
policy. Then, the second section gives an account of the alliance variables. 
On the one hand, it measures Australia’s security concerns and the alliance 
remuneration in order to settle the framework for the empirical inquiry. On 
the other, it accounts for the weaker ally’s voice attempts and its 
effectiveness. The third section describes the US-Australia relation 
historically from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. The fourth section, 
finally, gives an account of the alliance processes. It firstly focuses on the 
major ally’s politics of soft restraint. Then, it analyses how Australia gave 
assurances to its major partner, still increasing its autonomy. These 
processes represent empirical evidence that confirms the validity of the 
alliance persistence's model. 
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1. How to define the case: Australia ambitions since the mid-1970s 
 
By the mid-1970s, three main features were characterizing Australia’s 
renovated posture in the alliance: the review of the agreements concerning 
the US military bases; a new defense policy, which aimed to Australia’s 
self-reliance; and, finally, a regional policy of arms control and 
denuclearization. 
As the Labor party came to power in the early 1970s, it started scrutinizing 
the interallied agreements concerning the US bases on the Australian soil. 
The government judged that the US Naval facility at Northwest Cape 
violated the country’s sovereignty. The allies then agreed that the station 
would become a joint US-Australia facility involving a greater number of 
Australian personnel in its operation, establishing an Australian National 
Communications center alongside the American station, and appointing an 
Australian naval officer as deputy commander of the entire facility.346 
Moreover, the Barnard-Schlesinger agreement included two significant 
concessions in deference to Australia. First, the Head of Australian Defense 
Staff in Washington obtained special access to high-level officials in 
Washington at very short notice. Secondly, as the scholar Thomas-Durell 
Young points out, the “accord established a regular forum for discussions 
between senior Australian service and civilian defense officials with their 
American counterparts concerning the strategic implications of Northwest 
Cape to Australian security”.347 
This deeper cooperation between the allies favored the policy of self-
reliance that Australia was adopting during the 1970s. Actually, by 1959 
Australia’s defense planners were already thinking to shape the country’s 
defense forces independently of allies. As the Australian scholar Paul Dibb 
points out, “[i]t was stated that, in certain circumstances, ‘Australia might 
have to rely completely on her own defensive and economic capacity for an 
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indeterminate period’”.348 However, this view was rejected by Cabinet, 
which preferred to prepare Australia for involvement in limited wars in 
Southeast Asia and required organized forces to act effectively with the 
major ally.  
It was only during the 1970s, following the American’s defeat in Vietnam, 
that the need for the self-reliant ‘defense of Australia’ arose as a serious 
intention. As Dibb pointed out,  
 
Elements of this new policy appeared in the 1972 public document Australian Defense 
Review, which argued for a more independent national defense capability and for self-
reliance as laying ‘claim to being a central feature in the future development of 
Australia’s defense policy’. The big breakthrough, however, was the 1973 Strategic 
Basis of Australian Defense Policy which set the course followed, by and large, up to 
the late 1980s. It asserted that Australia ‘must now assume the primary responsibility 
for its own defense against any neighborhood or regional threats’. Recognition was 
given to the fundamental requirements that flowed from the enduring features of 
Australia’s geographic circumstances. In particular, it identified the importance of 
capabilities for surveillance; naval and maritime air defense; long-range transport; 
responses to hostile landings; defense infrastructure and communication networks; 
comprehensive intelligence; and industrial, scientific and technological support.349  
 
Finally, in the early 1980s Australia manifested an unprecedented interest in 
arms control and nuclear disarmament.350 As the Labor party won elections 
in 1983, the government committed to work “towards meaningful détente 
and effective measures of arms control” and opposed to “operations 
involving nuclear weapons from Australian territory”.351 As two scholars 
pointed out “(i)n his first year as Foreign Minister, Hayden took his party's 
foreign policy platform seriously. He went to the brink of becoming persona 
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non grata in Washington with his pressure on the United States over arms 
control issues, especially the comprehensive test ban [...] By late 1984, 
United States' officials were talking of a 'major diplomatic rift'. To 
paraphrase a commentator of the time, Hayden's lack of enthusiasm for 
Shultz and the Pentagon were reciprocated in overwhelming measure.”352 
Australia’s policy of arms control and nuclear disarmament was the main 
issue in the interallied relation.353 The Hawke government opposed the US 
“Strategic Defense Initiative” (namely the Star War project), refusing “to 
participate because of what were seen as the destabilizing implications of 
the proposed scheme”. Moreover, Canberra did not cooperate with the 
major ally on the MX missile project.354  
     In sum, by the mid-1970s, Australia engaged in several attempts to 
increase its autonomy in the context of the asymmetric alliance with the US. 
However, the successful management of the alliance internal issues 
triggered processes of alliance persistence instead of termination. Therefore, 
as the weaker side’s voice was effective, the allies were able to overcome 
several sources of crisis.   
 
 
2. The Alliance Variables 
 
This section describes the variables that lead the empirical inquiry. Looking 
from the weaker side’s perspective, it measures Australia’s security 
concerns and the alliance remuneration. These variables assume the values 
as a Type II case. Then, this section accounts for the minor ally’s voice 
attempts and its effectiveness. The analysis shows that Canberra’s voice was 
effective as the minor ally was able to improve the interallied cooperation 
on the ground of its needs. 
Overall, the US-Australia alliance fits the theoretical framework as a case of 
alliance persistence. Firstly, the case passes the test for case selection 
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successfully, as Australia’s security concerns decrease while the alliance 
remuneration increases in the period under consideration. Secondly, the 
explicative variable fist the theoretic expectations comfortably as the 
effectiveness of the Australia voice led to the alliance persistence. The 
following paragraphs describe the variables in details. 
 
 
2.1.The South Pacific in the mid-1970s: the Australian low threat outlook  
 
Following the end of World War II, Australia looked for the Unites States’ 
protection against potential Japanese rearmament and rising threats from the 
communist powers. However, the South Pacific strategic environment 
changed significantly in the early 1970s. As three Australian scholars 
pointed out, “with the election of the Whitlam government, the low threat 
outlook became the official outlook. Whitlam’s minister for defense, Lance 
Barnard, stated that Australia would face ‘no threat for fifteen years’, and 
while this shocked the domino school, it proved accurate”.355 Although the 
1975 Strategic Basis Paper recognized the potential for Soviet penetration of 
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, it judged that the strategic and 
political opportunities open to the Soviet Union did not provide a “sufficient 
basis for any significant challenge to the strategic position of the United 
Sates in the Pacific” and, by association, did not menace Australia's interests 
as an ally of the United States.356 Moreover, the 1975 paper recognized that 
“Moscow had legitimate interests of its own in the area, and continued to 
affirm that there was no present likelihood of major strategic pressure or 
major military threat against Australia, its territories, maritime resources 
zones or lines of communication”.357 
In the late 1970s, the liberal Prime Minister Malcom Fraser returned briefly 
“to the ‘big threat’ imagery, initially in concern expressed over Soviet naval 
expansion in the Indian Ocean, and then with the Soviet invasion of 
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Afghanistan”.358 Although anti-Soviet rhetoric characterized the 
Government’s declaratory policies in foreign affairs and defense, the 
professional advisers were significantly less alarmist in their evaluation of 
the Soviet threat. They continued to judge that “the prospect of major, direct 
assault on Australia was 'remote and improbable', and that the Soviet Union 
was highly unlikely to militarily menace Australia or its territories.”359 
As the Labor party won election in 1983, “the low threat outlook became 
entrenched in defense-policy planning documents.”360 As the scholar Alan 
Dupont argued,  
 
In regard to Indonesia, which was considered to represent the most likely threat to 
Australia's security interests, the 1983 Strategic Basis Paper asserted that Australia's 
'enduring strategic interest was 'to avoid significant Indonesian attack against, or 
foreign occupation of Papua New Guinea...Implicit in Australia's defense of Papua 
New Guinea against attack from Indonesia [was the] risk of attack against Australia 
itself'. However, Indonesia was thought unlikely to develop a capacity 'to sustain 
intensive joint operations against Australia [for] at least 10 years'”361 
 
This view was also confirmed by the 1986 report to the Ministry for 
Defense Paul Dibb, which began with the following words:  
 
Australia is one of the most secure countries in the world, it is distant from the main 
centers of global military confrontation, and is surrounded by large expanses of water 
which make it difficult to attack. Australia’s neighbours possess only limited 
capabilities to project military power against it…Australia faces no identifiable 
military threat and there is every prospect that our favorable security circumstances 
will continue.362   
 
In sum, Australian official assessments from the early 1970s to the mid-
1980s have been reiterating that the country faced no foreseeable threats. 
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Consequently, as the scholar Desmond Ball pointed out, the vitality of the 
US-Australia alliance was “threat insensitive”.363 
 
 
2.2.The Alliance remuneration 
 
Australia benefited from the alliance with the US on three main levels: 
combined military exercises and training, military supplies, and intelligence 
sharing.  
Firstly, the minor ally’s military forces could train and exercise with the 
stronger partner’s ones. Combined exercises demonstrated the US’s 
capabilities as a reliable partner, and favored a stable security environment 
demonstrating the allies’ strength and resolve.364 The Australian Defense 
Force (ADF) conducted a wide range of exercises with the US Army, Navy, 
Air Force and Marine Corps. The most significant ones from the mid-1970s 
to the mid-1980s were the Kangaroo exercises held in 1974, 1976, 1979, 
1981, 1983, and 1986. As the scholar John Blaxland pointed out, 
 
[t]hese tested evolving joint (interservice) and combined (international) command 
arrangements focused on the defense of Australia. The first exercise Kangaroo in 1974, 
for instance, involved 15000 troops and forty ships. It was designed to be a major test 
for Australian forces of joint service procedures and doctrines, and included an 
amphibious lodgment. The United States supplied an amphibious task group, Great 
Britain supplied eight ships and Royal Marines, and New Zealand also contributed 
contingents from its three services365 
 
Secondly, Australia entered into many logistic agreements with the United 
States under the aegis of the alliance relationship. As Gary Brown argued, 
 
As early as 1951, the Americans formally declared Australia eligible for aid under the 
Mutual Defense Assistance program though little activity took place until the later 
sixties when the ADF began to acquire US rather than British equipments in some 
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quantity. But in 1965, by which time Australia had placed orders with the United States 
for three Charles F. Adams class DDGS and for twenty four F-111 long range strike 
aircraft, the two countries signed a Memorandum on co-operative logistic support. This 
was succeeded in 1980 by a fresh Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and in 1985 
by a renegotiated version.366 
 
The 1980 MoU listed many types of defense items and services which the 
US made available to Australia in peacetime. These included: weapons 
systems and equipments; spare parts; munitions, ammunitions, explosives; 
modification kits; test equipment; specialist services; training; repair 
services and so on. The agreement then provided that 
 
[s]ubject to its laws and regulations and the exigencies of war, the United States will 
continue to provide logistic support materiel and services […] to Australia during 
periods of international tension or in circumstances of armed conflict involving either 
or both parties.  
 
The MoU therefore assumed a vital role in Australian’s long-term national 
security planning process. Still in the 1987 White Paper, the government 
announced that 
 
[o]ur agreements with the United States also provide for the supply of munitions and 
equipment in an emergency, alleviating the need for large-scale stockpiling by the 
ADF. 
 
And, in tabling the Paper, Defense Minster Beazley spoke confidently of 
Australia’s “guaranteed access to ready resupply of essential war-stocks”.367  
Finally, as Ball argued, intelligence sharing was a main resource for both 
allies.   
 
From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the United States maintained in Australia more than 
a dozen (and in the 1960s and 1970s, more than two dozen) installations concerned 
with military communications, navigation, satellite tracking and control, and various 
forms of intelligence collection, including half a dozen seismic stations which 
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monitored underground nuclear detonations (NUDETS) and other facilities which 
provided information for the US Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS). 
Three of these installations were vital elements of the US strategic command, control, 
communications and intelligence (C31) system which supported the US strategic 
nuclear posture: the ‘joint facilities’ at North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar.368 
 
Australian governments on both political sides judged that the maintenance 
of the ‘joint facilities’ was in Australia’s interests. Moreover, beginning in 
the early 1980s, there was increasing involvement by Australians in the 
operation of these facilities, and increasing use of them for direct Australian 
purposes. In particular, the Royal Australian Navy became the principal user 
of the North West Cape communications station, increasing its 
communications with both its submarines and its Indian Ocean Fleet more 
generally.369 
 
 
2.3. Australia’s voice attempts and its effectiveness 
 
Having effective voice in the alliance was a key purpose for Australia when 
ANZUS was established. As the scholar Nick Bisley wrote, 
 
privileged access to Washington was and remains a key purpose for ANZUS. Indeed, 
for Percy Spender, the person more responsible for ANZUS than anyone else, this was 
a fundamental concern (…) Spender rightly recognized that, for Australia, the most 
important decisions in its security future would be being taken in Washington. It was 
hoped that the treaty would ensure Australia was, at the very least, part of the 
informational loop (…) Of course, Australia is not an equal partner, and one should 
recognize that access does not automatically imply influence. Nonetheless, the alliance 
provides a not inconsiderable foot in the policy door in Washington, without which 
Australia would be distinctly worse off.370 
 
Also Paul Keating – Australian Prime Minister from 1991 to 1995 – judged 
that “ANZUS’s main and critical benefit may simply be this: it provides 
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standing for us to have our voice heard in Washington, especially about 
developments in this part of the world”.371 
During the period under investigation in this chapter, we can find two 
significant occasions in which Australia’s voice was effective. Firstly, 
Australia obtained a renegotiation of the US bases arrangements on 
favorable terms. As the scholar Thomas-Durell Young pointed out,             
 
[t]he consultative and liaison arrangements established by the Barnard-Schlesinger 
accord were expanded following a May 1978 incident when the Australian public 
learned that the United States had decided to upgrade the satellite ground terminal at 
Northwest Cape without first notifying the Australian Minister for Defense. On 16 
January 1979, R.N. Hamilton, the first assistant secretary, Strategic and International 
Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defense, and Michael Armacost, 
deputy assistant secretary of defense (East Asia, Pacific and Inter-American Affairs) 
agreed […] that the United States had ‘an obligation to keep Australia fully informed 
of all likely and impending decisions with respect to the operations of the installations’. 
This accord apparently has replaced the Barnard-Schlesinger agreement in importance 
to Australia, since it expanded the venue for consultations to include the other Joint 
Facilities as well. Australian efforts in 1981 to expand still further its Washington 
liaison arrangements in the area of the operation of the Joint Facilities were evidently 
less productive than initially hoped. Nonetheless, Australian Minister for Defense 
Gordon Scholes and U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger agreed in 1983 to 
improve the lines of communication between their two defense departments concerning 
Northwest Cape.372 
 
The development of these joint Australian-American facilities tied Australia 
more closely into the management of global strategic affairs and, at the 
same time, gave added influence in Washington.373 
Secondly, Australia preserved its regional policy of arms control and 
denuclearization during the ANZUS crises in the mid-1980s, and opposed 
the US requests of nuclear cooperation. Indeed the Hawke government was 
able to eschew any endorsement concerning the US Strategic Defense 
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Initiative declining Australia’s participation. However, it did not trigger 
processes of alliance erosion, as happened to the US-New Zealand 
relationship. Therefore, describing Australia’s policy in the 1980s, the 
former Prime Minister Gareth Evans pointed out that, 
 
[o]n nuclear disarmament and arms control, Australia became very active and vocal 
both regionally and on the world scene, taking the position that our hosting various 
space-defence facilities jointly with the United States should be regarded not as 
inhibiting our speaking out on global disarmament issues, but as helping establish our 
credentials for doing so.374 
 
 
3. The US-Australia relations from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s 
 
 
3.1.Rethinking Australia’s place in ANZUS  
 
In the early 1970s, Australia pursued independent initiatives according to 
the new climate of regional affairs in Asia and the South Pacific. As Philip 
and Roger Bell pointed out,  
 
The Labor administration of Whitlam (1972-75), and to a lesser degree Fraser’s 
Liberal-Country Party Government (1975-82), did not blindly follow American 
leadership on all matters. Under Labor, specifically, the alliance was exposed to new 
tensions as Australia sought a more autonomous role in global affairs, anticipated US 
policy by recognizing the People’s Republic of China, and immediately withdrew its 
forces from Vietnam375 
 
Although the Labour government seemed more detached from the American 
alliance, it was a liberal Prime Minister, Malcom Fraser, which clearly 
expressed Australia’s new perspective concerning alliance relationships. As 
Fraser used to argue, the interests of the United States and the ones of 
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Australia were not necessarily identical, and Canberra’s first responsibility 
was to assess its own. It was a strong change of paradigm and, in the words 
of Coral Bell, “not exactly the Holt or Menzies tone of language about the 
alliance”.376  
During the early 1970s, moreover, “Australia worked towards a new, and 
largely bipartisan, approach to Australian defense. Part of that effort was 
devoted to a new definition of the role and value of the American 
alliance.”377 A clearly independent Australian defense policy was released 
in the seminal 1976 Defense White Paper. The White Paper regionalized the 
country’s priorities arguing that “the area of Australia’s primary strategic 
concern was the adjacent maritime area—the countries and territories of the 
Southwest Pacific, PNG, Indonesia and the Southeast Asia region”. 
Moreover, it argued that the requirements and scope for Australian defense 
activity should be limited essentially to these areas closer to home. Finally, 
looking at the country’s defense requirements, the document stated that the 
primary requirement was for increased self-reliance: 
 
We no longer base our policy on the expectation that Australia’s Navy or Army or Air 
Force will be sent abroad to fight as part of some other nation’s force, supported by it. 
We do not rule out an Australian contribution to operations elsewhere if the 
requirement arose and we felt our presence would be effective, and if our forces could 
be spared from their national tasks. But we believe that any operations are much more 
likely to be in our own neighborhood than in some distant theatre, and that our Armed 
Forces will be conducting joint operations together as the Australian Defense force. 
 
On the other hand, the Fraser government obtained a de facto 
reinterpretation of the ANZUS treaty. More specifically, the government 
received a written assurance form the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
that the treaty covered also Australian interests and territories in the Indian 
as well as the ones in the Pacific Ocean (although the treaty mentioned only 
the latter). As the change arose from Canberra’s reaction to the major ally’s 
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initiative (that originally aimed at the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean), 
the formal enlargement of ANZUS activities was a strong testimony of the 
Australian diplomatic strength in the late 1970s.378 Nonetheless, in his 
March 1980 speech, Australian Minister for Defense Jim Killen announced 
that Australia military forces were to increase the frequency of air and naval 
deployments in the Indian Ocean and expand the airborne surveillance of 
Australia’s ocean.379 As the historian Graeme Cheeseman pointed out,  
 
In September, the prime minister announced that agreement had been reached with the 
governments of Malaysia and Singapore for the resumption of multi-national exercises 
under the existing Five-Power Arrangements, and that a detachment of Australian 
long-range maritime patrol aircraft, together with aircrew and supporting personnel, 
would be deployed to Butterworth to help conduct surveillance operations in the 
Eastern Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. At the same time, a joint team from 
Australia and New Zealand was dispatched to the South Pacific to “survey the 
surveillance capabilities and requirements of the South Pacific Forum Island States”, 
and Australian economic and military aid to these states was stepped up.380  
 
 
3.2.The Hawke government: between loyalty and independence  
 
Hawke described in his autobiography how he approached Regan in the 
mid-1983 suggesting to review the ANZUS alliance: “I proposed the review 
not to derogate from the importance of ANZUS but to strengthen the 
alliance and enhance its relevance.”381 The Australian government asked to 
reconsider the arrangements for the joint facilities and proposed several 
arms control initiatives including a nuclear free zone for the South Pacific. 
The Labors were finally successful in the renegotiations on the joint 
facilities, and significantly enhanced Australia’s involvement “establishing 
the principle of Australian Governments having ‘full knowledge and 
                                                           
378
 Bell C., op. cit., 1988, p. 149-150 
379
 Cheeseman G., op. cit., 1993, p. 11 
380
 Ibidem, p. 11 
381
 cited in Jennings P., “The Politics of Defence White Papers”, Security Challenges, Vol. 
9, No. 2 (2013), pp. 1-14. 
  
137 
 
concurrence’ of their activities”.382 The government considered the outcome 
as a more controlled and equal relationship with the major ally. As the 
Defense Minister Kim Beazley assessed: “As we ministers got a deeper 
understanding of what the joint facilities did and their levels of capability, 
which were really quite massive, the more it appeared to us that there was 
value in those joint facilities for Australian purposes.”383  
Overall, the Hawke government reinforced congruence of interests in the 
interallied relationship. It was the case, for instance, concerning a 
substantial issue that earlier seemed contentious, that was East Timor. 
Although the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor was an issue for many 
Labour party activists in mid-1970s, both Canberra and Washington 
converged by the mid-1980s on avoiding antagonizing Jakarta. Then, the 
Hawke government showed few concerns (characteristic of most left-wing 
governments elsewhere in the world) when the US invaded Grenada in late 
1983.384 
On the other hand, the Defense Minister Kim Beazley reiterated the view 
that the Australian-American relationships served Australia’s interests 
without hindering out Canberra’s capacity to develop and sustain an 
independent foreign and defense policy.385 The Hawke government, 
therefore, continued the Fraser government’s policy supporting for strategic 
nuclear arms control, CTB (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and non-
proliferation. Its own initiatives included the creation of a South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone, the establishment of a Peace Research Centre and the 
appointment of a Disarmament Ambassador.386   
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3.3.The persistence of the US-Australia alliance 
 
By the mid-1970s, Australia looked progressively at the Pacific as its 
primary area of interest. In pursuing Pacific regionalism, but still keeping 
solid its relationship with the major ally, the Hawke government reached 
several achievements consolidating Australia as the only regional power. 
The principal result was the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1986 that established a 
nuclear free zone in the South-West Pacific. The same year Canberra solved 
a second dispute obtaining the signature of a Pacific fisheries treaty. Here 
the dispute developed between very small islands (which based their 
economy on the exploitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones) and 
powerful US lobbies (as the American Tunaboat Association, which refused 
to pay fees). In the late 1986, the parties reached an agreement thanks to the 
joint efforts of the US State Department (which provided a consistent 
amount of funds) and the Australian Foreign Service. In both cases, 
Australia assumed a significant diplomatic role as a mediator between 
disputant parties. Similarly, Canberra acted to limit damage to its own and 
other interests during the ANZUS dispute between the US and New 
Zealand. It firstly maintained its own connection with Washington, which 
was the main actor in ANZUS. On the other hand, although criticizing 
Wellington for its unwillingness to compromise, Canberra preserved also 
the relationship with the neighbor, which had in the older ANZAC 
agreement of 1944 an independent basis.    
In the mid-1980 and during the ANZUS crisis, Australia was able to assume 
a delicate diplomatic function within several issues involving the US in the 
South-Pacific region. Acting with a significant independence and freedom 
of action, the minor ally was able to consolidate its role as the key regional 
power, still preserving the relationship with the major ally.  
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4. The US’s soft restraint and the Australian assurances: the 
processes of alliance persistence 
 
This last section accounts for the processes leading to the alliance 
persistence. Firstly, it describes the US politics of restraint. The analysis 
shows that the stronger ally adopted a soft posture neutralizing the sources 
of internal opposition. Washington did not oppose the minor ally’s quest for 
greater autonomy and its regional policy of denuclearization. On the other 
hand, Australia was able to provide assurances to its major partner favoring 
the cohesion of the alliance instead of its erosion, still preserving the 
changes it aimed to achieve. 
 
 
4.1. The US politics of soft restraint 
 
Describing the US attitude in the mid 1980s toward Australia, the 
American scholar Henry Albinsky wrote that  
 
[t]he United States has for the most part been sensitive in its dealings with Australia 
and mindful of the political difficulties with which Hawke needs to contend. Earlier 
American tendencies to take the ANZUS alliance somewhat for granted, to be less than 
scrupulous about advising and consulting with the partners on the US intentions, have 
been corrected. Benign neglect has been rectified with the shock of New Zealand’s 
wayward policies and fresh appreciation of Australia’s strategic value.387   
 
This soft attitude characterized the US’s behavior toward Australia in 
several circumstances. Firstly, once the Australian government asked to 
reconsider the arrangements for the joint facilities, they significantly 
enhanced Australia’s involvement. As Peter Jennings pointed out, the 
Labors were finally successful in the renegotiations on the joint facilities, 
and significantly enhanced Australia’s involvement “establishing the 
principle of Australian Governments having ‘full knowledge and 
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concurrence’ of their activities”.388 The government considered the outcome 
as a more controlled and equal relationship with the major ally.  
Secondly, the major ally did not oppose the Australian strategy of self-
reliance, which found definite expression in the famous Dibb report of 1987. 
As Kim Beazley pointed out discussing this interallied issue, the United 
States showed concerns in the mid-1986 because of the evolution of the 
minor ally’s defense posture. As the former Defense Minister recorded, 
 
The United States was concerned that Australia directions might limit its willingness to 
support allied efforts in Cold War trouble spot and diminish Australia’s commitment to 
Southeast Asian security. The New Zealand ban on possible nuclear ship visit was 
raw.389  
 
However, the major ally did not oppose the Australian plans finding 
appropriate to the alliance its strategy of self-reliance.390 
Finally, Washington did not oppose to the minor ally’s policy of regional 
denuclearization at the time of the SPNFR negotiations. Although the US 
believed that supporting the SPNFZ could be seen as an endorsement of 
New Zealand’s ban, it did not block or prevent the treaty as it could have. 
As Hawke wrote in his memories, “in the best of all possible worlds the US 
no doubt wished they had never heard of SPNZ. But they did not seek to 
stand in our way.”391 
 
 
4.2. The Australian policy of regional denuclearization  
 
The Prime Minister Hawke proposed the creation of the South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) at the South Pacific Forum in Canberra in the 
late August 1983. As the scholar Andrew Carr pointed out,  
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Australia was ‘central’ to the development and ratification of the treaty of Rarotonga 
which bans the manufacture, stationing, testing and use of nuclear weapons in the 
South Pacific. This was an Australian initiative to codify the already strong support for 
the norms of non-proliferation and non-possession in the South Pacific. Yet, Australia 
was also encouraged by the region to undertake a leadership role in developing and 
codifying the SPNFZ.392 
 
Australia chaired the drafting process, leveraging both on its bureaucratic 
resources and on political weight to shape the outcome toward its own 
preferences. The main issue was the US hostility to the nuclear weapons 
free zone. On the other hand, many South Pacific countries had much 
radical non-proliferation views than Canberra. It forced Australia into a 
delicate diplomatic activity that tried to take care of US security concerns 
while creating a document that the South pacific countries could support. 
The Hawke government was successful because it was able to control the 
framing and the language of the treaty, by using methods of persuasion and 
even “a bit of bullying” its smaller neighbors to obtain a favorable 
outcome.393 In the meantime, Canberra provided assurances to its major 
ally. As Carr argued,      
 
[Australia] sought to provide assurance to Washington through its control of the 
drafting process that the treaty would not restrict the transport of nuclear weapons. 
Australia used its embassy in Washington and a personal visit by the Foreign Minister, 
Bill Hayden, to frame the SPNFZ for the US government as ‘not...a means of 
insulating our region from the consequences of nuclear war nor of absolving us of any 
responsibility for contributing to the maintenance of peace. In fact... the contrary is the 
case.’394 
 
Finally, the treaty of Rarotonga was the most significant product of the 
Australian anti-nuclear policy in the South Pacific region. It entered into 
force on December 12, 1986, following the ratification of eight Forum 
states. The document required signatory states not to manufacture, station, 
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or test nuclear devises in the region. On the other hand, the treaty enabled 
nuclear states to continued access to the high seas of the South Pacific, 
while leaving restrictions or denial on port and airfield access to each 
signatory party to decide.395 
 
 
4.3. Australia’s self-reliance within the alliance  
 
By the early 1970s, Australia abandoned the principle of “forward defense” 
– as manifested in its military commitment to South Vietnam – preferring 
that of “self-reliance”.396 In March 1972, the McMahon government 
assessed that “Australia requires to have the military means to offset 
physical threats to its territory and to its maritime and other rights and 
interests in peacetime, and should there ever be an actual attack, to respond 
suitably and effectively, preferably in association with others, but, if needed, 
alone”.397 The 1976 White paper explained the implications of this 
transformation arguing that 
 
[a] primary requirement arising from our findings is for increased self-reliance. In our 
contemporary circumstances we can no longer base our policy on the expectation that 
Australia’s Navy or Army or Air Force will be sent abroad to fight as part of some 
other nation’s forces and supported by it. We do not rule out an Australian contribution 
to operations elsewhere, if the requirement arose and we felt that our presence would 
be effective, and if our forces could be spared from their national tasks. But we believe 
that any operations are much more likely to be in our own neighborhood than in some 
distant or forward theatre, and that our Armed Services would be conducting 
operations together as the Australian Defense Force.398 
 
Through the self-reliance strategy, Australia aimed to escape the stigma of 
dependency in the ANZUS relationship, also achieving a greater 
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independence. More specifically, self-reliance implied that Canberra would 
no longer base its force structures principally to fight as part of American-
led coalitions in distant conflicts. Differently, it aimed to focus on the 
defense of the Australian continent, its maritime areas and airspace.  
The 1983 Strategic Basis paper gave priority to the development of military 
capabilities appropriate to the independent defense of Australia.399 
According to the critics of the ANZUS alliance, Australia’s new posture 
emphasized the recognition of a requirement spelt out in the treaty itself for 
“continuous and effective self-help”.400 Actually, the self-reliance strategy 
did not aim to achieve isolationism or any break with the major ally. Rather, 
“self reliance” meant that Australia still relied significantly on ANZUS. As 
the former Minister for Defense, Kim Beazley argued in a speech in the 
mid-1988,  
 
[the US] gives Australia the technological edge we need to enable less than 1% of the 
Earth’s population to guard 12% of its surface. Without that help, Australia cannot 
sustain a self-reliant defense posture. In this fundamental way, our alliance is literally 
essential to our self-reliance.401  
 
Therefore, self-reliance could really be achieved only within the ANZUS 
alliance, which was through the interallied cooperation.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
As a case of alliance persistence, the US-Australian relation from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1980s appropriately represents how allies can overcome an 
internal crisis. In the context of an asymmetric relationship, we found 
significant evidence that the effectiveness of the minor ally’s voice provided 
the needed benefits for guarantying the alliance persistence. Although the 
Australian quest for autonomy might erode the alliance, the US soft posture 
paved the way for accommodating the allies’ needs and requests. The 
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alliance therefore persisted despite the changes and frictions that 
characterized the most critical period of the ANZUS alliance.   
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Conclusions 
 
 
Asymmetry and voice opportunities: the ties that bind  
 
An asymmetric relation, by definition, implies an acknowledgment of 
different degrees of autonomy among the interested actors. The power of the 
stronger side relies on its ability to preserve its freedom of action while 
influencing the weaker partner's choices, or even coercing its behavior. 
Power differentials, in this view, can be interpreted as a tool to structure 
relationships, including through method of control. In military alliances this 
originate basically from the exchange between protection (provided by the 
stronger to the weaker) and obedience (promised by the weaker to the 
stronger). The weaker ally's duty of obedience might concern different areas 
of state action. The major ally, for instance, can try to inhibit the weaker 
partner’s foreign policy limiting its leeway. Then, the stronger side can 
exercise territorial control imposing the presence of its troops in the minor 
partner’s country. Finally, the major side can influence the weaker ally’s 
domestic affairs pushing the internal processes of decision-making on its 
preferences.   
As the empirical analysis pointed out, even cases of successful alliance 
management did not escape these features of asymmetric relations. Indeed, 
Britain exercised significant foreign policy control over Iraq for the entire 
decade following the end of World War II. Before the signature of the 
Baghdad Pact, Nuri plans had been already rejected by Britain on several 
occasions. In 1943, Britain did not favor the original Fertile Crescent 
project; in 1945, Britain did not support Iraqi leadership of the Arab League; 
in 1949 and 1951, Nuri proposed an Arab defense pact tied to the West, but 
London refused. Then, issues of territorial control characterized the US-
Australia relation. As the Labor party came to power in the early 1970s, it 
started scrutinizing the interallied agreements concerning the US bases on 
the Australian soil. The government judged that the US Naval facility at 
Northwest Cape violated the country’s sovereignty. The allies then agreed 
that the station would become a joint US-Australia facility involving a 
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greater number of Australian personnel in its operation, establishing an 
Australian National Communications center alongside the American station, 
and appointing an Australian naval officer as deputy commander of the 
entire facility. On the other hand, the major ally’s control on some portion 
of the weaker partner’s territory was an insolvable issue in the Anglo-
Egyptian alliance. Sidqi Pasha often admitted that the presence of British 
troops gave an unequal character to the Anglo-Egyptian alliance. However, 
Egypt regarded as hopeless any attempt to force the British to renounce 
completely their claim on Egyptian facilities and territory, trying instead to 
reduce and regulate British power, and to create a legal and institutional 
framework of alliance that would safeguard Egyptian independence in time 
of peace and minimize the extent of British interference in domestic affairs 
in time of war. Indeed the stronger ally’s influence in the weaker ally’s 
domestic policy was a common feature in the empirical analysis. It was 
particularly evident in the US-New Zealand relation with regard to the issue 
of denuclearization. It is worth noting that the NZ’s Labor government was 
prepared to share drafts of its anti-nuclear legislation to find an acceptable 
solution for both sides. Washington, however, refused even to discuss the 
bill claiming that the legislation should simply be deleted from the ally’s 
domestic agenda.  
Therefore, the empirical cases clearly showed that two opposite forces 
affected the evolution of these asymmetric alliances. On the one hand, 
several asymmetric features pushed the stronger side to establish a coercive 
relation with the weaker partner. On the other hand, the successful 
management of an asymmetric relationship required the acknowledgment of 
a certain degree of autonomy from the stronger to the weaker side. The 
effectiveness of the weaker ally’s voice opportunity, therefore, represented a 
key function in the alliances overcoming the internal issues. Although the 
voice effectiveness could not fully compensate the power differential among 
allies, it mitigated the power relationship. Moreover, the analysis considered 
weaker sides in asymmetric alliances that already suffered from same deficit 
in terms of either decreasing remuneration from the alliance or decreasing 
need of protection. Both Egypt and Iraq complained about Britain lack of 
support although internal and external threats arose significantly. On the 
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other hand, New Zealand and Australia felt more secure following the 
collapse of the communist threat, and tried to promote some change in the 
alliance. In these cases, the successful management of asymmetry implied 
opening to the weaker side’s needs to preserve the alliance. Here, the cases 
of alliance persistence showed how the allies could overcome internal crisis 
giving renovated strength to the alliance. Indeed the signature of the 
Baghdad Pact in 1955 showed that the weaker ally voice attempts were 
effective as the regional project centered on Iraqi needs. Firstly, the 
agreement established that Iraq did not commit beyond its borders and 
transferred to Iraqi control the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba. 
Moreover, Britain made several concessions: it joined a pact that invited 
other Arab states to adhere and implicitly (but clearly) excluded Israel; it 
took side between Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad; it linked the 
persistence of the Anglo-Iraq special agreement to the continuation of the 
Baghdad Pact. Similarly, the US-Australia relation in the mid-1980s 
persisted despite the changes and frictions that characterized the most 
critical period of the ANZUS alliance. Although the Australian quest for 
autonomy might erode the alliance, the US soft posture paved the way for 
accommodating the weaker partner’s needs and requests. The effectiveness 
of the minor ally’s voice, therefore, was crucial to understand the 
persistence of these successful military agreements. On the other hand, the 
cases of alliance termination pointed out the key features of asymmetric 
alliance mismanagement. As Egypt adopted a more ambitious foreign policy 
following the end of World War II, it asked to revise the Anglo-Egyptian 
treaty of 1936. Cairo aimed to stabilize the Anglo-Egyptian relations on a 
level of equality to establish, then, its regional leadership among the Arab 
states. However, the lack of British's recognition of Egypt national 
aspirations led to the weaker side decision to abrogate the treaty: London 
had monopolized the administration of Sudan and denied the Egyptians 
project of unity; it maintained three times the number of troops in the Suez 
Canal Zone permitted under the 1936 treaty; and denied Cairo the supplies 
of arms and equipment necessary for its defense. Therefore, the British's 
intransigence made as ineffective any Egyptian attempt to voice and forced 
the minor ally to oppose the major partner directly until the decision to 
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terminate the alliance unilaterally. Similarly, New Zealand’s 
denuclearization policy and non-conformity to the stronger side’s requests 
in the mid-1980s triggered a process of non-reciprocity in interallied 
relations until the alliance termination. Although ANZUS was a “showcase” 
alliance for more than 35 years, New Zealand's strategic posture 
significantly changed in the 1970s. As Wellington was not able to improve 
the interallied cooperation on the ground of its needs, it renounced to the 
principal ally protection and military cooperation. 
     In light of the research, it looks still unfortunate that IR scholars barely 
theorize on minor allies’ behavior in asymmetric alliances, generally 
assuming their passive attitude. Differently, it is definitely needed focusing 
on the processes that shorten or prolong an existing matrix of power. In 
other words, it is worthy of analyzing how the management of an 
asymmetric relationship can favor its persistence or termination. For these 
purposes, the research theoretic part described several alliance processes to 
point out the weaker ally’s loyalty or detachment. Looking at cases of 
alliances persistence, the focus was on the major ally soft restraint. Here, 
two alliance processes were hypothesized to be at work touching both 
external and internal dynamics. Firstly, wheatear the major ally was 
successful in asymmetry management by providing paths to accommodate 
the partner’s needs. Successful management implied a stronger side 
managing the partner requests and considering the latter needs as part of the 
broader alliance strategy. This feature was particularly evident in the Anglo-
Iraqi alliance. Indeed, in mid-1954 the concept of a Northern Tier position 
became paramount in British defense thinking concerning the Middle East. 
The idea was that Western alliances with Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan 
would constitute a defensive cordon on the Soviet Union's southern border. 
Iraq was recognized as the key Arab piece in this regional puzzle, and 
Britain decided to promote good relations with Baghdad to secure its 
cooperation in a regional defense pact. As Iraq rejected the American 
“Northern Tier” project in mid-1954, Britain fully supported the Iraqi-
Turkish pact and then joined the Baghdad Pact establishing a pro-Western 
alliance where Baghdad was the leading Arab state. The British's flexible 
strategy, therefore, paved the way for the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi 
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alliance and preserved Britain's dominant position in the region temporarily. 
Secondly, the alliance persistence model hypothesized a weaker partner 
recognizing the benefits of the hierarchical relations in virtue of the 
effectiveness of its voice opportunities. Successful management of 
asymmetry, in other words, would imply an increase in the legitimate 
authority from the weaker to the stronger side. In this regard, the US-
Australia alliance clearly showed a weaker ally engaging in acts of symbolic 
obeisance acknowledging its acceptance of the asymmetric relation. More 
specifically, Australia chaired the drafting process of the Rarotonga treaty, 
leveraging both on its bureaucratic resources and on political weight to 
shape the outcome toward its own preferences. For Canberra, the main issue 
was the US hostility to the nuclear weapons free zone. On the other hand, 
many South Pacific countries had much radical non-proliferation views than 
the US’s ally. It forced Australia into a delicate diplomatic activity that tried 
to take care of the US security concerns while creating a document that the 
South pacific countries could support. The Hawke government was 
successful because it was able to control the framing and the language of the 
treaty, by using methods of persuasion and even “a bit of bullying” its 
smaller neighbors to obtain a favorable outcome. In the meantime, Canberra 
favored the major ally obtaining that the treaty would not restrict the 
transport of nuclear weapons. 
Looking at cases of alliances termination, the focus was on the major ally 
hard restraint as an indicator of asymmetric relationship mismanagement.  
Here two alliance processes were hypothesized to be at work. Firstly, 
wheatear the minor ally opened to new partnerships to diversify its foreign 
policy. It implied, for instance, a minor ally trying to improve its relation 
with a rival state of the major partner. This feature was particularly evident 
in the Anglo-Egyptian alliance. Indeed the analysis evidenced the Egyptian 
detachment on two main plans: attempts to diversify arm suppliers and 
attempts to undermine the British primacy in the Middle East. Firstly, in 
1947 Cairo started negotiations with the communist bloc ordering weapons 
from Czechoslovakia. Although the embargo imposed by the Security 
Council made ineffective this attempt by Cairo to establish a new channel of 
weapons supply, in 1951 the Waft government (without reporting to Britain) 
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sent another delegation to Europe in search of arms. Thanks to these efforts, 
Egypt signed a new agreement with Czechoslovakia on 24 October 1951, 
which committed the communist country to provide Cairo with arms and 
ammunition. Then, Egypt led the establishment of a system of Arab 
collective security in 1950. It was a further step to pursue Egyptian 
independence, to exclude Britain and favor the Egyptian primacy in the 
region. On the other hand, the alliance termination model hypothesized a 
weaker side considering the major ally as a strategic hindrance. The weaker 
side, therefore, should lower the degree of policy coordination. This feature 
was particularly significant in the US-New Zealand alliance with regard to 
the issue of denuclearization. As the NZ Labor government claimed that 
ANZUS was not a nuclear treaty, Washington was invited to accept the 
weaker ally’s stance in virtue of an equal partnership. Indeed the anti-
nuclear policy was at the core of Wellington’s regional strategy. The ship-
dispute on port access showed that New Zealand was not more willing to 
cooperate on nuclear issues. Then, the major ally’s refusal became an 
obstacle to the weaker partner regional policy, and consequently an obstacle 
to the persistence of the alliance. 
     Finally, the empirical analysis evidenced the strength of the theoretic 
model of alliances’ persistence and termination. Indeed the effectiveness of 
the weaker sides’ voice led to the alliances’ persistence, while a 
mismanagement of the asymmetric relations paved the way for the security 
agreements termination. However, further researches will hopefully 
consider different cases, and eventually will use different research methods 
and ways of measurement to improve these findings. As voice opportunity 
is a key function of asymmetric alliances, it surely needs further 
investigation and attention by IR scholars. 
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APPENDIX – cases of bilateral alliances’ abrogation in ATOP dataset (1815-1989) 
 
 
Alliance Type Beg Term Evolution Atop interpretation 
Austria-Hungary – 
Two Sicily 
Defense/ 
Consultation pact 1815 1820 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
 
King Ferdinand of 2 Sicilies 
grants constitution in violation of 
secret Article II. Austria 
overthrows Ferdinand in March, 
1821 (Langer, 1972: 700). 
TERMCAUS 8 
Austria-Hungary – 
Toscany 
Defense/ 
consultation pact 1815 1848 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
 
Austria-Sardinian War of 1848 – 
Tuscany fights against Austria. 
TERMACAUS 6 
Austria-Hungary – 
Piedmont Defense pact 1831 1848 
Abrogation by minor 
ally violation 
 
 
War between the parties 
TERMCAUS 6 
Charles Albert declared war on 
Austria at the start of the War of 
Italian Unification (Gilber, 2008, 
pp. 127) 
China – United 
Kingdom Defense pact 1846 1856 
 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
On October 8, 1856 China seized 
a British ship at Canton. Britain 
attacked and occupied Canton 
with French help in 1857 (Kohn, 
1999 p. 343 and Langer, 1972 
p.911) 
TERMACAUS 6 
Austria-Hungary – 
Modena Defense pact 1847 1859 
 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Duke of Modena forced to flee 
due to peaceful revolution 
opposed to Austria (Albrecht – 
Carrie, 1973: 103). 
TERMCAUS 4 
Austria-Hungary – 
Parma Defense pact 1848 1859 
 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Duke of Parma forced to flee due 
to peaceful revolution opposed to 
Austria (Albrecht – Carrie, 1973: 
103). 
TERMCAUS 4 
France – Amman  
Defense pact 
Consultation pact 1874 1883 
 
Abrogation 
Treaty for French Protectorate 
(Langer, 1972: 907) after conflict 
between parties 
TERMCAUS 6 
China – Russia 
Defense/offense 
pact 1896 1900 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Russia fights against China in the 
Boxer Rebellion 
TERMCAUS 6 
The Boxer Rebellion brought an 
end to the formal terms of this 
alliance (Gilber, 2008, pp. 199) 
France – Belgium Defense pact 1920 1936 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Belgium denounces and reasserts 
neutrality following German 
reoccupation of Rhineland 
TERMACAUS 4 
France – 
Czechoslovakia Consultation pact 1924 1938 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
Munich Agreement – France 
makes a deal with Germany for 
Germany to annex Czech territory 
TERMCAUS 8 
France – 
Czechoslovakia Defense pact 1925 1938 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
France allows Germany to annex 
Czech territory – Munich 
agreement. 
TERMCAUS 8 
URSS - Turkey 
Neutrality pact 
Nonaggression 
pact 1925 1945 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
USSR denounces and asks for 
territorial concessions (Langer, 
1972: 1297). 
TERMCAUS 4 
Italy – Spain  Neutrality pact 1926 1936 
Abrogation by major 
ally 
 
Italian intervention in Spanish 
Civil War 
TERMCAUS 4 
 
Russia/URSS – 
Afghanistan  
Neutrality pact 
Nonaggression 
pact 1926 1979 
Abrogation by major 
ally 
Russia invades Afghanistan 
TERMCAUS 6 
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URSS – Persia  
Neutrality pact 
Nonaggression 
pact 1927 1941 
Abrogation  
by major ally violation  
Soviet and British forces enter 
Iran and install a regime that will 
cooperate in WWII (Langer, 
1972: 1309) 
TERMCAUS 8 
Italy – Albania Defense pact 1927 1939 
Abrogation 
by (major/minor?) ally 
violation 
 
Italy invaded Albania 
TERMCAUS 6 
The defense pact soured in 1931 
as Albania tried to distance itself 
from Italian foreign policy. 
Albania even signed trade 
agreements with Greece and 
Yugoslavia in 1934, prompting 
Mussolini to send fleet of ships to 
the Albanian coast as a show of 
force. Ultimately, the defense pact 
ended with the Italian invasion of 
Albania in 1939 (Gilber, 2008, pp. 
263) 
Italy – Turkey  Neutrality pact 1928 1935 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Turkey participates in sanctions 
against Italy (Langer, 1972: 1000) 
TERMCAUS 8 
Italy – Ethiopia  
Nonaggression 
pact 1928 1934 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
 
Italy invades Ethiopia  
TERMCAUS 6 
Italy – Greece  
Neutrality pact 
Consultation pact 1928 1935 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Greece participates in sanctions 
coalition v. Italy (Langer, 1972: 
1000) 
TERMCAUS 4 
URSS – Finland  
Nonaggression 
pact 
Neutrality pact 1932 1939 
 
 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
USSR denounces treaty (Langer, 
1972: 1224) 
TERMCAUS 4 
The terms of the treaty ended with 
the Soviet invasion of Finland, 
after Finns ‘refusal to sign a new 
agreement that was much more 
favorable to Soviet interests 
(Gilber, 2008, p. 283) 
URSS – Poland  
Nonaggression 
pact 
Neutrality pact 1932 1939 
 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
USSR invades Poland 
TERMCAUS 6 
Germany – Poland  
Nonaggression 
pact 
 1934 1939 
 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
Germany denounces the 
agreement (Langer, 1972:1039). 
TERMCAUS 4 
URSS – 
Cezchoslovakia 
Consultation pact 
Defense pact 
Neutralità pact 1935 1938 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
Great powers allow Germany to 
annex large portions of 
Czechoslovakia 
TERMCAUS 4 
The alliance officially ended with 
the collapse of the communist 
government of CZ in 1989 
(Gilber, 2008, p. 304) 
United Kingdom – 
Egypt 
Consultation pact 
Defense pact 1936 1951 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Egypt abrogated the treaty (BFSP, 
vol. 158, p.768). 
TERMCAUS 4 
Germany – 
Denmark  
Nonaggression 
pact 
Neutrality pact 1939 1940 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
Germany invades Denmark, 
which results in Danish 
capitulation and loss of 
independence. 
TERMCAUS 4 
URSS – Estonia Defense pact 1939 1940 
Loss of independence 
(coded as abrogation) 
 
URSS – Latvia Defense pact 1939 1940 
Loss of independence 
(Coded as Abrogation) 
 
USSS – Lithuania Defense pact 1939 1940 
Loss of independence 
(Coded as Abrogation) 
 
URSS – Finland  
Nonaggression 
pact 1940 1941 
Abrogation by minor 
ally 
War between members (WW II) 
TERMCAUS 6 
On 25 June, 1941, Finland joined 
Germany in its attack on the 
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Soviet Union (Gilber, 2008, p. 
337) 
UK – Thailand  
Nonaggression 
pact 
Neutrality pact 1940 1940 
 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Thailand attacks French Indochina 
TERMCAUS 8 
URSS – 
Yugoslavia 
Defense/offense 
pact 1945 1949 
Abrogation by minor 
ally violation 
 
Yugo-Soviet split 
TERMCAUS 4 
Relationship soured when Tito 
declared Yugoslavia neutrality 
during the cold war and began 
pursuing a policy of isolation in 
1948 (Gilber, 2008, p. 355) 
United Kingdom – 
Jordan 
Defense pact 
Consultation pact 1948 1957 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Terminated by Jordan 
TERMCAUS 4 
United Kingdom – 
Lybia 
Defense pact 
Consultation pact 1953 1970 
 
 
Abrogation 
by minor ally 
Grenville and Wasserstein (1987, 
351) says the treaty was 
terminated after Colonel Gaddafi 
overthrew King Idris on 
September 1, 1969. Britain and 
American troops withdrawn from 
Libyan bases on March 30 and 
June 30, 1970. 
TERMACAUS 4 
UK – Egypt Consultation pact 1954 1956 
 
Abrogation  
by minor ally violation 
Egypt announced abrogation. UK 
was involved in military conflict 
with Egypt following Egypt’s 
nationalization of the Suez Canal. 
TERMCAUS 8 
United States – 
Taiwan  Defense pact 1954 1980 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
The treaty was replaced by 
unilateral declaration by the 
United States- Taiwan Declaration 
Act ( Plischke, 1991) 
TERMCAUS 4 
United Kingdom – 
Iraq Defense pact 1955 1959 
 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Iraq terminates agreement 
following 1958 military coup due 
to change in foreign policy 
orientation 
TERMCAUS 4 
United Kingdom – 
South Africa Defense pact 1955 1975 
 
Abrogation 
 
Terminated by exchange of letters 
between members (UNTS) Britain 
cancels due to political unease in 
supporting apartheid government 
TERMCAUS 4 
France – Morocco  Consultation pact 1956 1966 
Abrogation  France recalls ambassador and 
breaks diplomatic relations over 
conflict regarding Ben Barka 
Affair. 
TERMCAUS 4 
United States of 
America – Iran 
Defense pact 
Consultation pact 1959 1979 
 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Iranian government announces 
intention to leave CENTO - later 
in the month US personnel 
services terminated (Keesings 
Record of World Events, 1980) 
TERMCAUS 4 
France – Mali 
Defense pact 
Consultation pact 1960 1960 
 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Mali ends membership in French 
Community and demands 
renegotiation of agreements after 
the secession of Senegal (Facts on 
File November 30, 1960). 
TERMCAUS 4 
France – 
Madagascar Defense pact 1960 1973 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Exchange of letters - Madagascar 
demands change in relations 
TERMCAUS 4 
United Kingdom – 
Nigeria 
Defense pact 
Consultation pact 1960 1962 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Nigerian freedom of action: 
Domestic and international protest 
(Keesings March 1962; Idang, 
1970). 
TERMCAUS 5 
URSS – Poland Defense pact 1965 1991 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Poland’s Defense Minister 
announced that his country’s 
military alliance with the USSR 
was over and Poland was now 
isolated and neutral. 
TERMCAUS 4 
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URSS – Egypt  
Consultation pact  
Nonaggression 
pact 1971 1976 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
Egypt denounces unilaterally due 
to Soviet refusal to reschedule 
debts, supply spare parts, and 
supply arms 
TERMCAUS 4 
URSS – Iraq  
Consultation pact  
Nonaggression 
pact 1972 1990 
Abrogation 
by major ally violation 
Gorbachev and Russian 
Parliament demand break in 
response to Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. 
TERMCAUS 7 
URSS – Somalia  
Consultation pact  
Nonaggression 
pact 1974 1977 
 
 
Abrogation 
According to Somalia it is Soviet 
support of Ethiopia in conflict 
with Somalia. Soviets claim it is 
because they refuse to support 
Somalia’s expansionist/aggressive 
policy toward Ethiopia 
TERMCAUS 4 
URSS – 
Afghanistan 
Consultation pact  
Nonaggression 
pact 1978 1979 
Abrogation 
  
USSR executes Afghan leader and 
installs a new leader 
TERMCAUS 8 
URSS – Malta  
Consultation pact 
Neutrality pact 
Nonaggression 
pact 
1981 1987 
 
Abrogation 
by minor ally violation 
 
New Maltese leader declares that 
Malta will disregard consultation 
clauses (Associated Press, May 
27, 1987) 
TERMCAUS 4 
 
 
